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This study focuses on the social and political history of Africans in Langa Township 
from 1927 to 1948. Langa conveniently and justifiably serves as a good case study of 
the urban African experience because it is the area in Greater Cape Town, during 
this period, where there was the largest concentration of a relatively organised, 
stabilised and permanent African working class community. It is also the oldest 
township with the deepest roots and longest evolution in Cape Town. 
Langa also makes an interesting area of study because the politics surrounding its 
evolution as an urban African segregated residential township presents it not only as 
an arena of social conflict between the ruler and the ruled, but also stands out as a 
veritable testimony of the African struggle to become an integral part of the city. 
The thesis traces what, initially, began as an "externalised" struggle by Africans 
against the forced removals from the city and Ndabeni Location to Langa and 
attempts to establish the continuities of this struggle within the township - i.e. 
"internalised" struggle. African popular struggles in Langa predominantly centred 
around such issues as rents, railway fares, living conditions, restrictions on beer­
brewing and trading activities, the demand for direct municipal representation and 
the freedom of movement. 
The study explores the nature of the relationship that subsisted between the Langa 
residents and the Cape Town City Council and the internal social and political 
relations in the Langa community. paying particular attention to conflicting 
tendencies and the forms of resolution implemented. The thesis aims to highlight 
the fact that protest and resistance were the only weapons that empowered the 
Langa residents to fight against unilateral unpopular decisions by the local authority 
or central government. 
iii 
Flowing from these findings is an attempt to discover how the lived experiences of 
the Langa people, their frustrations, disillusionment, crises of expectations, 
translated into political consciousness and how these help us to explain the people's 
role in nationalist politics. Alternatively, this will help us to explain how political 
parties, the African National Congress (ANC), the Communist Party of South Africa 
(CPS A) , and the National Liberation League (NLL) exploited the crises in civic 
matters to enhance or strengthen their support bases and with what results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis seeks to show how local social and political struggles by Africans in Langa 
from 1927 to 1948 became enmeshed with wider national political issues. There are 
some very useful pioneering works on Langa which precede this study. The first one 
was a book co-authored by Wilson and Mafeje and published in 1963. 1 The book has a 
social anthropological slant and besides giving a brief general historical background, 
concentrates on analysing the basis for the coherence of groups in Langa in the 1950s 
and early 60s. True to their discipline, the two anthropologists did not address those 
i~sues that fall within the historian's area of cognition. However, from an inter­
disciplinary perspective, this work remains a useful source. 
Saunders' article "From Ndabeni to Langa", was the first serious attempt to lay the 
basis for the reconstruction of the 'hitheno neglected history of Africans in the Mother 
City'.2 It traces the rise of the first African Township after the destruction of Ndabeni 
Location. 
A number of History Honours students have, in recent years, attempted to move a step 
further and examined some interesting themes on historical developments in Langa. 
Kondlo, for instance, focused on the culture and religion of the people of Langa from 
1938 to 1958. His overall objective was to examine to what extent religion impacted 
on the development of their culture. 3 Mohammed examined the history of Langa High 
School before and after the passage of of the Bantu Education Act in 1954 and the 
Langa residents' response to the legislation. 4 Lastly, Molapo looked at the question of 
I.M.Wilson and A.Mafeje, LANGA: A study of Social Groups In 
An African Township, (Cape Town, 1963) 
2.C.Saunders, 'From Ndabeni to Langa', Studies in the 
History of Cape Town, 1, (1984), 194-230. (hereinafter 
referred to as Studies). 
3.K.M. Kondlo, 'The Culture and Religion of the People of 
Langa during the Period 1938 to 1958', (B.A. Hons. thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 1989). 
4.N.Mohammed, 'Langa High School: The Struggle For 
Existence: The First Twenty Years in the History of Langa 
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identity and popular culture in the same township in the 1960's. He wanted to 
demonstrate how the Langa community, through music, culture and politics attained a 
specific identity which serves as an oppositional element against the culture of the 
dominant classes.s 
These works hardly deal, substantially, with any of the aspects this thesis seeks to 
address. This study will attempt to present a substantial account of how the residents' 
lived experiences, frustrations, disillusionment and crises of expectations, manifested 
through resistance and protest against the paternalistic Cape Town City Council, 
became a fertile ground for nationalist politics. 
The choice of aspects for discussion in this thesis was largely influenced by two factors 
which, ideally, determined the areas of struggle in Langa and these are: 
(1) the needs and concerns of a community and 
(2) the structures and interests of the local and central governments and the relationship 

between the two. 

It is at that point when one of the two fails or refuses to respect and/or fulfil the needs, 

concerns, interests or structures of the other that the terrain of struggle becomes clearly 

delineated. A statement by Muthien consolidates this point: 

Material conditions and political structures create parameters which 
circumscribe political actions, but at the same time, political action and 
opposition to those structures continually force readjustment. 6 
The thesis treats the themes of protest and resistance as offensive strategies through 
which the very foundations and structures of the local state were challenged. It 
assumes that this sort of challenge forced the local state to respond either by backing 
down and introducing reforms or by becoming more repressive. In short, protest and 




5.R.Molapo, 'Identity, popular culture and Politics in Langa 





6.Y.Muthien, 'Pass Control and Resistance, Cape Town 

1939-1965', (D.Phil. thesis, Christ Church College, Oxford 

University, 1989), 307 

3 
resistance are regarded not merely as defensive reactions to imposed limitations on 
peoples' freedom and individual liberties but also as offensive strategies which compel 
the state to readjust. 7 Below is a discussion of the major concerns of the thesis in 
chapter form. 
The first chapter provides a background to the creation of Langa Township in 1927 and 
situates it within the segregationist discourse which provided the rationale for its 
formation. It outlines the demographic, gender and occupational profiles of the 
township residents in relation to those who lived outside the township. This edifies our 
understanding of the peoples I residential patterns and what such patterns meant to their 
existence as well as to the local authorities. 
The second chapter deals with the structural expansion of Langa, occupation and 
resistance. It focuses on the institutional structures in the township, i.e, the lay-out of 
buildings and infrastructure and how this had a direct bearing on the question of 
physical and social control, living conditions, interaction of residents, socialising and 
permanent stabilisation. The aim is to gauge the overarching influence this 
infrastructure had on the community's internal relations, in terms of conflict and 
consensus and even perceptions of one section towards the other, and above all, 
external relations, i.e., conflict between the local authority and the residents. The 
chapter proceeds to consider the course, complexity and the nature of the forced 
occupation of Langa and African reaction. The aim is to explore the trend, form and 
the sort of ideas that informed African resistance to domination, which drew on earlier 
traditions in Ndabeni. It establishes how this initial resistance from outside (Le. in 
Ndabeni) Langa sets the tone of future organised resistance within Langa. 
The systematic lay-out and structuring of infrastructure in the segregated African 
township/location was dictated by the central and local states' need to control and 
7.Muthien, 'Pass Control and Resistance', 3~~-301. 
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manage urban space, labour and leisure time. II The process of urban space construction 
(Le. 'the configuration or arrangement of space in the urban environment')9 was very 
much part of the framework of control. Meticulous considerations were made in the 
planning of townships. In order to facilitate repressive control of Africans as and when 
it became necessary, the state provided 'limited access routes that are easily blocked off 
in times of crisis' .10 This made official surveillance over African movement fairly 
manageable. 
CHAPTER 3 deals with the encroachment of the City Council of Cape Town into what 
Africans in Langa saw as their exclusive business/trading domain. This happened in 
two ways, firstly, the municipalisation of trading activies, the refusal by the Council to 
grant trading licences or business premises to would-be African traders and, secondly, 
the monopolisation of beer brewing and selling. This became a distinct area of conflict 
between the affected classes of people such as, traders, beer-brewers, hawkers and the 
other residents, as they were directly and indirectly affected, on the one hand and the 
City Council, on the other hand. The Council struck at the centre of African urban 
existence and laid bare the contradictions between official versus popular perceptions or 
conceptions about life in general. II 
Official apprehensions of the dangers of African consumption of alcohol were certainly 
not shared by the Africans themselves. Quite to the contrary, the women of Langa, 
8.F.Cooper, 'Urban Space, Industrial Time, and Wage Labour 
in Africa', F.Cooper, (ed.), Struggle for the city: Migrant 
Labour. Capital and the state in Urban Africa, (London, 
1983) 8. 
9.M.Padayachee and R.Haines, 'Capital Accumulation, Control 
and the Construction of Urban Space - An Overview of Some 
Aspects of Urbanisation and Urban Space Construction in 
South Africa 1870 -1980', R.Haines and G.Buijs, The Struggle 
for Social and Economic Space: Urbanisation in Twentieth 
Century South Africa, (Durban, 1985), 1. 
10.K.Philip, 'Mitchell's Plain: Urban Contradictions and 
Community Struggles', L.Cooper & D.Kaplan, Selected Research 
Papers on Aspects of Organisation in the Western Cape, 24 
(Dept. of Economic History, Univ. of Cape Town, June 1982) 
11.P. la Hausse, 'The struggle for the city: Alcohol, the 
Ematsheni and Popular Culture in Durban, 1902-1936' (M.A. 
thesis, University of Cape Town, 1984), 4. 
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living as they did on the margins of subsistence perceived domestic beer-brewing, first 
and foremost, as a survival strategy. Similarly, men were often proud of their 
methodical drinking habits -drinking in sets! groups based on kinship or home-boyism 
associations. Whereas the officials perceived African men as given to unregulated 
consumption of alcohol, in fact it was not 'just the imbibing of alcohol that counts, but 
the essentially social nature of the act, the affirmation or strengthening of ties with kith, 
friends or neighbours' .11 It is this lack of a clear grasp of the workings and 
significance of this popular culture on the part of officialdom which inevitably resulted 
in a protracted militancy by the subordinate people. 
The municipalisation of trading activities in Langa was largely based on a reworking of 
the institutions already established by the Africans, for example, the domestic brewing 
of traditional beer, which the City Council sought to transform into the beerhall system 
based on the Durban modeL The chapter also investigates the ways in which the 
people tried to preserve their culture, of which beer brewing was a part, vis-a-vis the 
threat by the Council to undermine it. Symbolically the drinking of traditional beer and 
the act of brewing it provided a lasting continuity between the town and the countryside 
in spite of an increase in its commercialisation in response to harsh economic 
conditions in the location. Thus the significance of this cultural expression will be 
evaluated. 
Attention will be paid particularly to the role played by the women of Langa, as they, 
poignantly and quite distinctly, came to the fore in resisting the Council's 
encroachment upon what they regarded as their exclusive spheres of influence, the 
manufacturing and selling of beer and trading in food stuffs. This will provide us with 
an opportunity to view women not simply as passive, silent and as mere functionaries 
in the making of history but also as equally active participants as men, in the arena of 
popular resistance. 
12.P.Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesman, Conservatism and the 
Process of Urbanisation in a south African City, (Cape Town, 
1971), 118 
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Crucial to our understanding of these developments is the premise upon which Council 
policy proceeded. Council policy was meticulously designed to frustrate the 
mushrooming of a potentially strong and competitive African business class in Langa. 
It was also intended to ensure that the African trader and consumer alike did not 
entrench him/herself in Cape Town, as this would naturally subvert the migrant labour 
system upon which, and for which, Langa African Township had been established. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the way in which 
enforcement of the policy of total prohibition of beer brewing engendered intense 
resentment among the Langa residents and how they reacted to police raids, searches 
for liquor and arrests. It also considers how the failure of this policy of total 
prohibition gradually paved the way for the hated and "dreaded" beerhall system. 
The second part concentrates on attempts by the City Council to establish a beerhall in 
Langa - something it failed to do on three occasions. That a municipality failed to 
establish a beerhall, when it had all the necessary legal and financial resources at its 
disposal is unusual in the history of the liquor question in South Africa. In other urban 
centres such as Bloemfontein, Durban and Johannesburg, beerhalls were established 
and riots against the institutions came later. Therefore, the unusual developments in 
Langa help us to analyse the changing nature and character of popular non-violent 
resistance as compared with other centres. The surfacing of African political 
organisations in the 1940s and their involvement in the beerhall question adds a new 
twist to the evolving history of popular resistance in Langa - hence their effect will be 
examined. 
The third and last section deals with the actual establishment of a monopoly by the 
Council in trading activities in Langa and the way in which it unceremoniously pushed 
the African traders out of business. Of interest, in this section, is the protest by women 
against municipal trading which was informed by an analysis of their living conditions. 
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The fourth chapter considers yet another significant site of struggle, namely the role of 
the Advisory Board in the Township and how it structured and polarised relations 
between the Langa residents and the City Council. The failure of the Langa Advisory 
Board to effectively and genuinely represent the residents' civic interests led to the 
clamour for direct municipal representation instead of continuing to depend on an 
institution that did not help them. 
Deprived of direct municipal representation, Africans in the urban locations of South 
Africa increasingly found themselves initially relying on Native Advisory Boards as the 
only mechanism to express their views and air their grievances to the Native Affairs 
Committees of various city councils. This advisory board system formed part of the 
whole matrix of social and political control over the permanent and stabilized urban 
African working class in the 1930s and 1940s. Literature focusing specifically on the 
efficacy of the advisory boards is unanimous in its characterisation of the institution as 
a purely consultative machinery of a perfunctory nature abhorred by many an urban 
African.!3 Urban Africans, invariably and disdainfully described Advisory Boards as 
"mere debating societies", "talking shops", "grievance committees" 14 , "guns without 
bullets", and "collaborationist organisation(s),,!5, while those who served on the boards 
were seen as "agents", "stooges" or "sell-outs'"16 These epithets testify to the extent to 
which the advisory board system was not only unpopular but objectionable wherever it 
was implemented in South Africa. 
What is patently clear from the foregoing is that urban Africans wanted to have a say in 
how best they should be governed if they were not to govern themselves. The chapter 
then considers the case of Langa Township and explore the development of the politics 
13.BC 579 B11.58 South African Institute of Race Relations 
Conference Report - July 1941 
14.P.R.B. Lewis' A "City" within a city. The Creation of 
Soweto', Lecture Notes delivered at University of 
Witwatersrand, September 1966, 23 
15.L. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie. Race~ Class and 
Politics in South Africa. (Yale University Press, 1965, 344. 
16.Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, 344. 
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of and the demand for direct municipal representation in Cape Town by Africans. It 
examines why and how the Langa residents were opposed to the establishment of a 
Location Advisory Board from the beginning - and whether 'its establishment was a 
compromise or change of heart on the part of the residents, as well as the nature of the 
relations between the Langa Advisory Board and the Native Affairs Committee 
(N.A.C.) on one hand and the Advisory Board and the Langa community per se, which 
it supposedly represented, on the other. It also investigates how the Langa people, 
sought and created alternative channels of representation without necessarily dissolving 
the advisory board - and the significance of this in African protest politics. All these 
developments culminated in the eventual demand or quest for direct municipal 
representation. Lastly, this chapter considers how local demands for municipal 
representation translated into a national demand for genuine political parliamentary 
representation. 
CHAPTER 5 represents a deliberate attempt to shift, for a while, from a concentlation 
on resistance and protest politics by the Langa residents against the municipality to an 
examination of the inner workings of the Langa African community. By adopting this 
approach, we hope to be able to understand what exactly made the Langa community 
almost always respond to the City Council's overtures in a unified way. This will be 
done, firstly, by examining how the process of community-formation generally takes 
place and what forces brought the conflicting sections of the community together in 
times of common popular struggles as well as what mllitated against such a united 
approach. 
One of the central and complex social and political processes that are the inevitable 
products of urban segregation is community-formation. 17 Tne term "community" 
denotes a variety of things. In general terms, it refers to a grouping of people who 
share all or some of the following: common origins, beliefs, geographical and social 
space, who share a common type of residence, and can be identified by similarities of 
17. But it could also-ironically-dtvisive. 
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class position. ls According to Thornton and Ramphele, the term can be conceived as 
an "image of coherence", a cultural notion which people use in order to give a reality 
to their social actions and thoughts. They go on to say that, from a sociological point 
of view, communities, I are founded on more or less intense social interaction among 
their members, which inevitably produces social boundaries defining them and giving 
them identity' .19 To Belinda Bozzoli, this "sense or image of coherence", derives 
from the spatial aspect of community-formation, as she argued that the term 
"community" refers to, 'a space within which the group is formed and reproduced' .20 
But the question is, what fosters the process of' community-formation particularly the 
urban African community in the South African context? Thornton and Ramphele do 
not address this issue adequately. Neither do they attempt to explain what engenders 
this community esprit de corps. 
BozzoH provided some of the answers to these questions. The history of urbanization 
in South Africa shows that community-formation is a dynamic process which derives 
from the African people's traumatic experience of forced removals. It is always in a 
constant state of flux because community-destruction through state-decreed forced mass 
removals of Africans leads to a regrouping of the same people who, because of the 
devastating experience they have in common, try to adopt defensive strategies. 
Besides, one of the most obvious shared experiences of the majority of urban Africans 
in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s was dispossession, a product of rural impoverishment in 
the reserves and the rise of capitalist agriculture. 21 In towns, it was the dispossession 
or deprivation of the right of choosing where one wishes to live. Bozzoli argues that 
18.R.Thornton and M.Rampele, 'The Quest for Community', in 
E.Boonzaier and J.Sharp, (eds.), South African Keywords: The 
Uses and Abuses of Political Concepts, (cape Town, 1988), 
29. 

19.Thornton and Rampele, 'The Quest for Community', 38. 

20.B.Bozzoli, 'Class, community and Ideology in the 

Evolution of South African Society', in B.Bozzoli, (ed.), 

Class, Community, and conflict, South African Perspectives, 

History Workshop, 3, (Johannesburg, 1978), 27 

21.H.Sapire, 'The Stay-Away of the Brakpan, 1944 1 , in 

B.Bozzoli, (ed.), Class, community and Conflict, 366. 
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because dispossession is the common denominator, the dispossessed people who occupy 
a given geographic space usually congregate in groups which reflect why and how they 
left at a given time and that this often occurs along ethnic, racial or non-class lines. In 
this respect, therefore, community-formation becomes a concerted effort to respond to 
the twists and turns of a dispossessed existence. 22 The act of forced removals by 
Government decree instilled, in urban Africans, a sense of community. The 
destruction of established communities through the relocation of townships was usually 
followed by a restructuring and consolidation of internal community relationships to 
stave off further "external" hostile acts, a veritable act of self-empowerment. Instead 
of destroying the sense of gregariousness in urban African communities, the very act of 
removal had the effect of transforming those communities into militant ones. It also 
spawned a specific ideology, a new culture and a new identity. 23 
Community-formation is also made possible by "the existence of a hostile 
environment" . The over-bearing and paternalistic South African state was responsible 
for creating such an environment. The result is that • communities, urban and rural 
alike, find a hitherto undiscovered internal unity in the face of the threat of removal or 
destruction' .24 
But to explain the shaping of a community only as a process caused by external hostile 
pressures is to overlook other equally important factors that make community-formation 
necessary and possible. Even without the threat of dispossession or removal the 
process of community-formation never ceases to take place. The establishment of 
institutions, by a group of people, which make human interaction fluid, such as 
churches, sports, and self-help financial associations, with or without external help, is 
in itself a significant indication of the moulding of a lasting community. 
22.Bozzoli, 'Class, Community and Ideology', 21. 
23.Bozzoli, 'Class, Community and Ideology', 28. 
24.Bozzoli, 'Class, community and Ideology', 29-30. 
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The internal solidarity in the urban African community in South Africa was hardly a 
welcome feature to the central state, the local state and other powerful groups. If 
anything, the central and local states encouraged class, ethnic and gender cleavages 
among urban African communities. 25 There was a fear that those internal networks 
that appeared to transcend class divisions could: 
converge into a dense and dangerous network of bonds among workers, 
the self-employed, and job-seekers, united by poverty and oppression. 26 
These attempts at tearing apart the very fabric that unites people when confronted by a 
common onslaught widened the boundaries of struggle between the central state, the 
local state and the township communities, and in our case Langa Township as we shall 
see in the succeeding chapters. 
The penultimate chapter deals with the activities of nationalist political organisations in 
Langa and, where relevant, in Cape Town. It traces how the National Liberation 
League (NLL) , the African National Congress (ANC) and the Communist Party of 
South Africa (CPSA) transformed community-based protest into a popular protest with 
a national outlook. Party political participation added a new dimension to the nature of 
popular protest in Langa. The emergence and dynamics of the new ideology of popular 
protest can best be understood by, briefly, focusing on the cogent conceptual analysis 
of the French historian, George Rude.27 
Defining what constitutes the ideology of popular protest, Rude stated that it is: 
often a mixture, a fusion of two elements, of which only one is the 
peculiar property of the "popular" classes and the other is superimposed 
by a process of transmission and adoption from outside.28 
Popular ideology is, therefore, characterised by two elements, which are: 
25.Bozzoli, 'Class, Community and Ideology', 20. 
26.Cooper, 'Urban Space, Industrial Time', 38. 
27.G.Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest, (New York, 1980), 
28.Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest, 28. 
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(a) "inherent" beliefs. These are ideas that are transmitted via oral traditions and folk 
memories, concerning issues like the right to the land and a fair, if not proper political 
order. 
(b) "derived" or "borrowed" ideas which are or could be of a political, philosophical 
and/or religious nature. Derived ideas are then grafted on to the inherent notions. But 
the final amalgamation of the "inherent" and "derived" dialectical elements is largely 
determined by the specific circumstances and the sharp "jostle of experience" of a 
particular community. This also determines whether the product of the mixture of the 
two elements will assume a militant, progressive or conservative outlook.29 
Rude's treatise is a pertinent analytical tool for any analysis of the ideology of popular 
protest in urban African communities in South Africa, provided, and one should take 
heed of Hirson' s cautious advice, that it should not be applied in a mechanical way. 30 
By this he meant that one should not forget that there were notable periods in which 
people made gigantic strides forward in understanding and coming to grips with the 
difficulties which confronted them. But there were also times when they receded and 
sought an explanation in their past beliefs. Therefore, in that sense their minds were 
not like a tabula rasa on which ideas were simply grafted,3l even though, I (i)nevitably, 
leaders emerged and put their stamp on events--and they too brought ideas, old and 
new, to inform their followers '.32 
Urban Africans had their own "inherent" beliefs and expectations, such as the belief 
that they had a right to live in the city, to unfettered movement, to higher wages, to 
adequate sanitation, to cheap and convenient transport and to equal education. It is 
around these issues that popular and community-based struggles shaped the African 
urban geo-socio-political landscape. Protests in the form of strikes, stay-aways, bus 
29.Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest, 36. 
30.B.Hirson, Yours for the Union: Class and Community 
struggles in south Africa, (Johannesburg, 1989), 122. 
31.B.Hirson, Yours for the Union, 122 
32.Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest, 32 
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boycotts and riots in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s were all veritable manifestations of, 
and an attestation to, the persistence of these and other grievances. 
It is also worthwhile for our purposes to consider Rude's question: 
But how far can this "inherent" ideology by itself carry the protesters 
into strikes, food riots, (with or without success); and even into a state 
of awareness of the need for radical change?33 
Rude argued that these popular struggles cannot advance without the fusion of both the 
"inherent" ideology and the "derived" element: 
the political, philosophical or religious ideas that, at varying stages of 
sophistication, became absorbed in the more specifically popular 
culture. 34 
This process of fusion, according to Rude, is one that takes place gradually and does so 
at different levels of sophistication. In its rudimentary stages, it can take the form of 
slogans but with the passage of time, it assumes a higher level of political sophistry as 
radical terminology is used and radical demands are made. 3s 
In our context, the derived element was represented by the three political organisations 
whose role and activities in Langa and Cape Town at large were significant and quite 
far-reaching, namely, the NLL, the ANC and the CPSA. 
Party political programmes were received by almost all classes of people in Langa, 
owing to the fact that although people had disparate class interests, an unwritten 
alliance was readily forged between the core of Langa's middle class and its working 
class as well as its lumpen elements. The Langa residents were crowded together, 
irrespective of class position, in the same type of accommodation. As a result, they 
laboured under the same racial indignities and discrimination. In more ways than one, 
they had the same grievances. The activities of these organisations in the township saw 
33.Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest, 32. 
34.Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest, 33 
35.Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest, 34. 
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the intertwining of social and political issues, and thereby made Langa an outstanding 
locus of resistance against state repression in Cape Town. In spite of this, the very few 
works on the role and activities of political organisations in the Western Cape and Cape 
Town proper, quite incredulously, skirted Langa. 36 Yet it was the "core activist 
constituency" of the NLL, ANC, and the CPSA. 
The theses of Kingwill, Hofmeyer and Grossman, are cases in point. Kingwill's 
Honours thesis on the ANC in the Western Cape is patchy and sketchy. It is a general 
history of the organisation and as a result fails to pay attention to its activities at 
grassroots level. Although Hofmeyer's M.A. thesis deals essentially with the ANC's 
activities in rural Worcester, he devoted a substantial part of the thesis to the 
organisation's political activities in Cape Town. But, again, he peripheralized Langa, 
in spite of his conclusion that 'it was only in the Western Cape that there was a revival 
of the ANC as a mass-based organisation'.37 Jonathan Grossman's voluminous D.Phil. 
thesis, (divided into two volumes), on the CPSA, does not accord Langa its "rightful" 
place, in spite of the fact that the CPSA had Langa as one of its most important and 
support-bases. The failure to render such a treatment to Langa has, quite evidently, 
created a significant void in the history and evolution of African political organisations 
in the Western Cape as none of these researchers satisfactorily situates them within the 
context of social history. This problem can be partly explained by the fact that the 
political climate, during the time these works were written, was not conducive to a 
thorough investigation of political organisations without incurring the wrath of the 
36.R.Kingwill, 'The African National Congress in the Western 

Cape: A Preliminary study', (B.A. Hons.thesis, University of 
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W.Hofmeyer, 'Agricultural Crisis and Rural organisation in 
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37.W.Hofmeyer, 'Rural Popular Organisation Problems: 
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Perspective, 1983, No. 22, 27. 
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repressive government, or even that of the African people on grounds of 
suspicion! spying. 
CHAPTER 7 is an extension of Chapter 6 in that it also deals with the activities of 
political organisations. But the main difference is that whereas the previous chapter 
concentrates on politics from above,(i.e. there was a time when there was very little 
involvement and participation by the people of Langa in the political programmes of 
the day, the political leadership prescribed what to do for the people), this chapter 
completes the picture by examining the participation of the Langa residents in 
campaigns against the Pass Laws between 1943 and 1946. It demonstrates that good 
organisation by the leadership which filtered through to the targeted constituency 
generated a positive response and success. 
This leads us to important aspects of the Anti-Pass Campaign which we will explore, 
namely orl:anization and response. Perhaps more than any other grievance examined 
in this thesis, the Anti-Pass Campaign aroused an extra-ordinary response from 
Africans country-wide. This was so in the Cape Peninsula. This response can, first 
and foremost, be attributed to good organization. The Cape Town Anti-Pass 
Committee demonstrated an ability to organize itself and the people. But from where 
did this ability come? The prominent Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire had this to 
say about organization: 
Organizing the people is the process in which the 
revolutionary leaders, who are also prevented from saying 
their own word initiate the experience of learning how to 
name the world. So it is that leaders cannot say their 
word alone; they must say it with the people. 38 
This, again, points to another significant element of the campaign, namely co-operation 
between the leadership and the people (who may have diverse levels of functions, 
interests of responsibility), which can only be achieved through communication or 
dialogue. Freire went on to say that it is this cooperation which, 





leads dialogical Subjects to focus their attention on the reality which 
mediates them and which--posed as a problem--challenges them. The 
response to that challenge is the action of dialogical Subjects upon reality 
in order to transform it. 39 . 
Freire's concepts may have been specially tailored for a specific discipline, but they are 
pertinent to this analysis of the Anti-Pass Campaign. Rarely did the leadership of the 
Cape Town Anti-Pass Campaign (also subjected to the rigours of Pass legislation) issue 
statements without the endorsement of the people they represented. There was a 
genuine realisation of the need to involve the people. 
Finally the conclusion evaluates the importance of Langa Township in the development 
of nationalist politics. It also assesses the significance of community struggles and 
argues that although the Langa residents attained very few substantial concessions in 
their protest activities, they nevertheless in the words of Tom Lodge had an 
"accumulated heritage of resistance" .40 This resistance saw Langa become, after 1948, 
a flash-point of political demonstrations and in 1960 was the only parallel to 
Sharpeville in South Africa. 
This study utilised both published and unpublished official sources, periodicals and 
newspapers and a few oral interviews. Most of the data was gleaned from over a dozen 
volumes of the minutes of the Native Affairs Committee, and the minutes of the Langa 
Advisory Board and the Vigilance Committee spanning the period 1925-1948, in the 
Cape Municipal Archives. Extensive use was also made of the Molteno Papers at the 
Manuscripts and Archives Department of the Centre for African Studies Library. But 
what these documents evidently lacked was information on political organisations, in 
particular the ANC and the CPSA. What filled this yawning gap was The Guardian ( a 
mouthpiece for the CPSA and to a lesser extent the ANC and the NLL) and Inkululeko 
(a pro-ANC paper). I also could not get access to the Simons Papers which contain 
39.Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 136. 
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information on La.nga due to an "embargo" over their use. These documents are in the 
Manuscripts and Archives. 41 
Unfortunately, oral interviews were not very useful particularly on the activities of 
political organisations in La.nga. The period within which this study falls made it 
difficult to get hold of interviewees who were old enough to have witnessed the 
political developments that transpired then. There was also some reluctance by some 
interviewees to talk on the subject of politics and this can be attributed to the fact that 
the people have just emerged from a period of political repression in which freedom of 
speech and political involvement of any magnitude was a risky exercise. But 
interviews on some social aspects of the peoples' existence in La.nga were quite 
enriching. 




THE CREA TIO~ OF LANGA: 1927 
Langa African Township was established in 1927 as an alternative to Ndabeni Location 
which had outlived the purpose for which it had originally been founded. Ndabeni had 
been the by-product of white racism c.gainst Africans that was manifest in Cape Town 
at the turn of the twentieth-century. 42 The emergence of the bubonic plague that 
afflicted the Mother City in 1900 served as an expedient for the realisation of the 
residential segregation of Africans. 
The path-breaking works by Saunders43, van Heyningen44, and Barnett 45 on the 
creation of Ndabeni are provide a useful introduction to an analysis of later 
42.Even before the outbreak of the bubonic pandemic, strong 
tendencies towards the physical and social segregation of 
Africans had already set in by the end of the 19th century. 
Swanson's oft-qouted phrase "sanitation syndrome II which 
meant the equation of 'black urban settlement, labour and 
living conditions with threats to public health and 
security', sums up these tendencies. See M.W. swanson, 'The 
Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy 
in the Cape Colony, 1900-1909', Journal of African History, 
18, 3, (1977), 387-410. 
For a further development of this point, see also 
V.Bickford-Smith, 'A "Special Tradition of 
Multi-racialism"?: segregation in Cape Town in the Late 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries', in W.G. James and 
M.Simons, (eds.), The Angry Divide: social and Economic 
History of the Western Cape, (Cape Town, 1989). See also by 
the same author, 'The Background to Apartheid in Cape Town: 
The Growth of Racism and segregation from the Mineral 
Revolution to the 1930's', unpub.paper, (University of 
Witwatersrand, History Workshop, 1990). Br fly, 
Bickford-Smith saw the white elite class as having been 
concerned with the preservation of its status as the 
dominant class from the "contamination" of races "other than 
whites". By the end of the last decade of the 19th century 
there were demands for the establishment of a separate 
location for Africans. In what amounted to xenophobia, Cape 
Town's "respectable" classes alleged that the "natives" were 
causing a "nuisance", that their presence in the city 
disturbed the equanimity of the more respectable working 
classes and that their continued presence led to the 
devaluation of property aand lack of security. 
43.C.C. Saunders, 'The Creation of Ndabeni: Urban 
Segregation and African Resistance in Cape Town', Studies in 
the History of Cape Town, (hereafter referred to a~ 
Studies)! 1, 1979, 165-193. 
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developments in Langa. A number of salient characteristics which directly impacted on 
and informed the nature of African resistance against forced removal from Ndabeni to 
Langa, can be gleaned from their works. The removal of Africans from the city to 
Ndabeni in 1901 had a profound and long-lasting effect on race relations between 
blacks and whites in Cape Town. Whites' actions on Africans, as van Heyningen 
observed, were not simply a result of racism but the result of · a complex blend of 
prejudice, fear, expediency and paternalism'. 46 Africans on their part, generally viewed 
whites, and in particular, the central and local authorities, with mistrust and suspicion. 
Their protest against removal from the city to Ndabeni and the "sustained opposition" 
throughout the existence of Ndabeni and, above all, their "remarkable unity" was in 
itself an excercise in political education. Frequent use was made of not only informal, 
but also formal means of protest, especially the use of legal means in challenging 
authority.47 They were able to use, quite effectively, the experience they had acquired 
over time to resist the relocation to Langa. 
By the late 1920s, the overall living conditions at Ndabeni had deteriorated. The hasty 
establishment of the location, coupled with poor sanitary conditions and over-crowding, 
and above all Government negligence, had left Ndabeni in a decrepit condition. What 
served as a warning to the Government was an outbreak of the Spanish influenza in 
1918 which claimed the lives of many residents in Ndabeni. Just as the bubonic plague 
of 1901 had publicised the dangers of overcrowding in the city, so too did the Spanish 
influenza reveal the precariousness of the living conditions for urban Africans. 48 What 
also necessitated the relocation of the labour-force at Ndabeni was the expansion of 
industry. In December 1919, a commission was set up to enquire into the suitability of 
44.E.van Heyningen, 'Cape Town and the Plague of 1901', 
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Ndabeni as a site for a permanent location. 49 In its findings the commISSIon 
recommended that the location be demolished in order to make way for the proposed 
Garden City of Pinelands. Once the Garden City had been established there was little 
doubt that Ndabeni would never be allowed to continue to exist adjacent to it since it 
was believed that the township would erode the value of the latter. As Cuthbertson 
wrote, 'The Ndabeni location, on the northern border of Pinelands, was a constant 
source of discontent among residents of Pinelands and was the subject of many debates 
at Garden Cities board meetings' .50 
The Garden City fathers argued that something needed to be done about the location to 
'safeguard the character of Pinelands' .51 This echoes Davenport's comment on 
locations in general: 'The location became far too easily a moving area of settlement on 
the further edge of expensive land'. 52 The same commission further advised the 
Government that because of the phenomenal growth and increase in the number of 
industries in the Cape Peninsula, housing provisions had to meet the proportional 
increase of African workers at a new location.53 It should be noted that it took the 
Government about eighteen years to discover that Ndabeni was not suitable as a 
permanent location. Had it not been for the need to create space for industrial 
expansion there may not have been talk of demolishing it. 
The urgent need to provide housing for the Africans in Cape Town revealed the 
contradictions in the relationship between the Government and the municipality of Cape 
Town. Which body was responsible for housing urban Africans and under what laws 
and regulations was this to be done? Municipalities maintained that it was the 
49.G.C. cuthbertson, 'A New Town At Uitvlugt: The Founding 
and Development of Pinelands 1919-1948', studies, 1, 1979, 
118. 
51.Cuthbertson, 'A New Town At uitvlugt', 118. 
52.Davenport, 'Rhodesian and South African Policies for 
Urban Africans', 72. 
53.Kinkead-Weekes, 'Africans in Cape Town: The origins and 
Develpment of State Policy and Popular Resistance to 1936', 
(M.Soc.Sci. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1985) ,116. 
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Government's responsibility to establish and administer locations. On the other hand, 
the Native Affairs Department insisted that since the bubonic plague had receded it 
could not continue to run or establish the locations. Instead the municipalities should do 
so under the 1902 Locations LaW. 54 Attempts at finding a centralised control system 
and the formulation of a standard national urban policy had been foiled by an ambiguity 
in the South Africa Act of 1909 concerning the responsibility of provincial and central 
governments over the administration of Africans in the urban area. 55 It was only after 
the First World War, following a rapid expansion of the urban African population, 
increasing urban impoverishment, housing shortage and general African resistance to 
low wages and pass controls, that the State decided to formulate a clearcut urban policy 
which culminated in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923.56 
It is against this backdrop that the city of Cape Town and the Government tossed the 
question of responsibility hither and thither between them. When the Government 
announced in March 1919 that Ndabeni was to fall under the jurisdiction of the Cape 
Town Municipality in terms of the Natives (Urban Areas) Bill that was being tabled in 
Parliament, the Council did not readily accept the "offer".57 The Council protested 
against taking responsibility over what it thought was the Government's mess and 
argued that it: 
54.M.W. Swanson, 'The Sanitation Syndrome', 397. 
55.E. Hellmann, 'The Application of the Concept of Separate 
Development 	to Urban Areas in the Union of South Africa', 
(unpub. pamphlet, 1961), 121. 
56.The enactment of this legislation in 1923 was the first 
manifest intervention of the central state in the 
management-reproduction of African labour power since Union. 
The Act had five salient principles which laid the basis for 
the establishment and governance of locations. It empowered 
local authorities to: (a) control the "influx" of Africans 
into the cities and "efflux" from the rural areas and in 
conjunction with this a system of labour allocation through 
a labour bureau. (b) establish and administer segregated 
African townships. (c) administer a separate Native Revenue 
Account which would self-finance the collecttive means of 
consumption. (d) prevent Africans from making land 
purchases in urban centres. (e) refuse the granting of 
political rights to Africans in cities. 
57.Kinkead-Weekes, 'Africans in Cape Town', 116. 
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had allowed a location to grow up at Ndabeni which was a disgrace to 
any country, and realisation of the fact had made them a little more 
anxious than ever to off-load the burden and transfer it to the Counci1. 58 
The Council was concerned about the financial implications of accepting such a 
responsibility. It made it clear that, whilst it was willing to take up the burden of 
operating locations, it would not commit itself to the rehabilitation of Ndabeni. It 
would provide a "first class" location pending the passing of the Natives (Urban Areas) 
Bill into law. 59 Even though the Council agreed to adminlster locations, it was quick to 
point out its halfheartedness in executing the obligation it had accepted. At a meeting 
of the Native Affairs Committee on 6 November, it was unanimously resolved that the 
issue of providing housing for Africans should not take precedence over the question of 
assisting the "poorer" coloured people because the latter class 'have lived in our midst 
for generations whereas, the native is imported from up-country'. 60 This was in spite 
of the fact that the Council itself employed African workers. This clearly spelt out 
where the priorities of the Council lay and this indifferent attitude towards the welfare 
of the Africans perfectly coincided with and echoed the principles of segregation 
enshrined in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act- and the doctrine of Stallardism that 'towns 
were essentially the creation of the white man, and that the black man's presence there 
could be justified only in so far as he served the white man's needs' .61 
The Urban Areas Act came into effect on 1 January 1924 and the boundaries of the 
City of Cape Town were extended forthwith, bringing into its jurisdiction Ndabeni 
Location and the proposed Langa African Township . For the purposes of the 
registration and removal of squatters within the urban area under the Act, the area 
outside Cape Town was extended from three to five miles under Proclamation 135 of 
58.CA, 3/CT 1/4/1/1/1, Minutes of the Native affairs 
committee (N.A.C.), 6 November 1922. 
59.CA, 3/CT 1/4/1/1/1, Minutes of the N.A.C., 6 November 
1922. 
60.CA, 3/CT 1/4/1/1/1, Minutes of the N.A.C., 6 November 
1922. 
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1926.62 It was hoped that by so doing the Act could be effectively enforced as no 
Africans could live within the range of this newly designated area. 
The Council's assumption of control over Ndabeni was followed by the appointment of 
a "Superintendent for Natives" and the first incumbent to this post was Mr.George 
P .Cook. He was to act as Superintendent of Ndabeni until it was demolished in 1936. 
At the same time, he was to preside over matters concerning the development of the 
new township to which he was appointed as the substantive superintendent in 1927. In 
executing his duties he was assisted by Mr S.A.Rogers who succeeded him in 1938. 
From 1 September 1940, the designation "Superintendent of Natives" was changed to 
"Manager of Native Administration". 63 It is not clear why but Davenport suggested 
that the latter title was used in "richer towns". 64 The superintendent was responsible to 
the Native Affairs Committee. The incumbent of this post was to be, 
of good character and address, that he should possess some knowledge of 
Native languages, that he should be experienced in the handling of 
Natives and a good organiser, and that he should be competent in 
correspondence and in the keeping of accounts and stores. Above all, the 
Superintendent should be a man of strong personality, who is able to 
combine firmness with tact, patience and sympathy in his dealings with 
Natives. 65 
Notwithstanding these requirements, it was fashionable during those days for local 
authorities to employ location Superintendents with either a military or police 
background. The rationale was probably that they would have had the requisite 
experience in exercising rigid control. It is, therefore, not a matter of coincidence that 
Cook qualified for this position given his career background. He joined the service of 
the Bechuanaland Exploration Company in what was then Rhodesia, at the age of 
sixteen. He was in charge of many of Africans in the Company. He also served in 
several wars including the Matebele Rebellion and the South African War. To crown 
62.CA, 3/CT 4/1/5/1266, Correspondence between the Town 
Clerk and the Assistant General Manager , South African 
Railways and Harbours. 
63.CA AWC 3/1/3 superintendent's Monthly Report, 31 December 
1940 
64.R.Davenport, 'Historical Background', in M.Swilling 
et.al, Apartheid city in Transition, (Cape Town, 1991), 8. 
65.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1275, Secretary of the Native Affairs Dept. 
to the Town Clerk, 13 July 1923. 
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it all, in 1913, he joined the Bloemfontein Municipality and was instrumental In the 
establishment of the first African location there. 66 
He was respon~ible to the Native Affairs Committee -an organ of white town councils 
set up on the recommendations of the Stallard Commission. 67 However, with 
minimum supervision, the Superintendent enjoyed almost an unfettered control over the 
Township and very often did not evince the required noble qualities mentioned above in 
the day-to-day execution of his duties. On numerous occasions Langa residents called 
for the resignation of Mr. Cook and later Mr. Rogers because of their lack of "tact, 
patience and sympathy", and their excessive "firmness" which amounted to lack of 
tolerance. For instance, in 1946 the Langa Advisory Board said of the Superintendent: 
The chief weakness is the autocratic control exercised by the 
superintendent, whose powers are like those of a commandant of a 
concentration camp. The big change needed is to bring the 
administration under democratic control. This can only be done through 
direct representation of African residents. 68 
The Superintendent's position was bolstered by a set of regulations used in the 
governance of Langa Township. This was the first major development under the Urban 
Areas Act and the Cape Municipal Ordinance of 1912. The regulations were received 
with an intense dislike by the Ndabeni residents who were the prospective residents of 
the new" model location", the so-called "torch-bearer of decent housing", for Africans. 
The regulations were rejected in their entirety. 
One of the most hated regulations was that dealing with registration. Every African, 
upon arriving at the township for the purpose of residing there, had to be registered and 
obtain an identification card. He was also obliged to obtain a registered contract of 
service from his employer. The package of regulations included 
(1) the prohibition of any type of trading, 
(2) reporting of visitors and stating the object of a visit to the Superintendent, 
66.CA, 3/CT 1/4 10/1/1/2, unpub. Municipal 
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(3) entrance into or exit out of the township was to be through gateways provided for 
that purpose, 
(4) no occupier of any dwelling was allowed to harbour any non-resident African 
without the Superintendent's permission, 
(5) that no gathering, public meeting or entertainment was to be permitted in any street 
or public place in the Township without the written permission of the Superintendent, 
and 
(6) no dance, public meeting, tea meeting or special gathering was to be held or 
continued on Sundays or any other day after 10.00 p.m., except on Saturday, when 
there was an extension to 11.00 p.m. 69 Residents perceived these regulations as 
nothing more than draconian. Some Langa residents maintained that the "regulations 
are only meant to humiliate the Africans". 70 At the height of intense political activity 
in Langa, a delegation representing ten organisations protested against these regulations 
which, they alleged, "turned the place into a concentration camp". 
In a striking aphorism Johnson Ngwevela of the ANC and an official of the Langa 
Advisory Board scorned at the regulation by saying that "a visitor has to get the 
permission of the gaoler before he can see the prisoner" .71 
In December 1948, the Cape Town Municipality backed down and relaxed regulation 
No. 24 which made it compulsory for all visitors to report to the Superintendent before 
seeing their friends or relatives. 72 
In 1924, the Superintendent conducted a number of meetings with representative bodies 
of Ndabeni residents, such as the Advisory Board, the Vigilance Committee and 
members of the National Native Congress (Ndabeni Branch), with a view to explaining 
Cook was, moreover, coming from a place that had been hailed 
as having a "model location" in Bloemfontein after the First 
World War and the Town Council's successful eradication of 
the 'flu bore testimony to this. See Phillip, '''Black 
October" : The Impact of the Spanish Influenza', 150. 
69.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1243 Langa African Township Regulations. 
70.The Guardian, 13 March 1947 Also cited in Muthien, 'Pass 
Control and Resistance', 290 
71.The Guardian, 4 November, 1948 
72.Muthien, 'Pass Control and Resistance', 291. 
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the import of the regulations. The representatives placed on record their total objection 
to the proposed regulations and refusal to have anything to do with them "in any shape 
and form". 73 They objected to the regulations because they were tantamount to the 
institution of a pass system. They argued that the employers would take advantage of 
them and reduce wages or even retrench them in preference to coloured labour, as the 
latter had no registration complications. They also interpreted the word "contract" to 
mean "slavery" as they were not party to the agreement. This reaction was a pointer to 
the sustained resistance against forced removals that ensued later. 
The regulations were also attacked by political as well as religious groups. James 
S. Thaele of the Cape African National Congress wrote to Superintendent Cook 
denouncing the "multitudinous regulations" such as being forced to be indoors by 9.00 
p. m. and the system of contract labour. He deprecated the pass system as denigrating 
and an evil to the whole of the Cape and vowed to 'agitate against it until the 
millenium' .74 A similar protest was communicated to the Native Township Committee 
by the Synod of the Wesleyan Methodist Church as 'deregatory to the self-respect of 
the individual' and that all pass laws were 'an unjust restraint on liberty and an 
incentive to police tyranny' .75 
These protests went unheeded as the municipal Council, sanctioned by Government, 
went ahead with the implementation of the regulations without even the slightest 
attempt at amending them. It demonstrated that the Superintendent's gesture of 
consultation was mere lipservice. Such intolerance, which ran counter to the specified 
qualities of a Superintendent, was, again, a significant pointer to the somewhat tense 
future relations between the Langa residents and the Council and its agent, the Langa 
Administration. 
73.CA4 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/1, Memo. from the Superintendent to 
the Native Township committee, 16 January 1924. 
74.CA 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/1, Supt. to Native Township committee. 
75.CA 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/1, Supt. to Native Township committee. 
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THE DEMOGRAPHIC, GE1\l)ER ~ND OCCUPATIONAL PROFILES OF THE 
LA...~GA RESIDENTS. 
When it was established, Langa was the only spot in greater Cape Town where 
Africans were allowed to reside by the City Council. It was designed to accommodate 
an official figure of no more than 5000 people. 76 It is important to, briet1y, consider 
the demographic and gender profiles of Langa in order to highlight the residential 
patterns of Africans in the Municipal area of Cape Town. 
The population of Langa compared to Ndabeni as on 31 December 1927 was as 
follows: 
Female 
LANGA 231 2 233 
NDABENI 3980 1 005 4985 
By the end of 1928, there was a significant increase in the occupation of Langa. But 
instead of a proportional decrease in population at Ndabeni, there was a substantial. 
increase. What was also unique about the population of Ndabeni was that there was a 
sprinklingtfColoureds. They were, all in all, nine (3 males, 3 females, and 3 
children).78 The settlement of Coloureds in Langa was never entertained by the 




LANGA 611 160 189 960 
NDABENI 4 649 564 943 6 156 
The fact that Ndabeni, ironically, experienced an increase in population during this 
year throws light on the Africans' reluctance to move to Langa. It also suggests that 
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77.Medical Officer of Health (MOH) Annual Report, in Mayor's 

Minute, 1928, Appendix 8, Table J, 118. 

78.MOH Annual Report, 1928, Table J, 118. 

79.MOH Annual Report, in Mayor's Minute, 1929, Appendix 8, 

Table J, 12 o. 
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removing Africans to Langa was not an easy task for the Council. However, this trend 
changed when the City Council began to institute legal proceedings and considerable 
amount of force. (Appendix B shows this trend). 
The population census of 1936 put the total resident African population In the 
municipal area of Cape Town at 15 679. The age and gender divisions of the 
population were: 
Over 18 vears Under 18 years. 
Males 9 853 1 521 
Females 2785 1 520 
Total 12638 3041 
The number of Africans resident in Langa Township at the time of the census was 3 
855. The total number of females stood at 799 and males numbered 3 056. In 1941 
the number of males in Langa had risen to 3 349 but the female population (over 18 
years) had declined to 713, altogether totalling 4 062.80 As at 31 January 1941 the 
number of children in Langa stood at 1 812. Six hundred of the adult males and all the 
women and children lived in the married quarters, while 2 649 male adult At, eans 
resided in the single quarters. Over 9 000 Africans lived outside the township. In 
1942, the City Engineer estimated the African population in the municipal area of Cape 
Town to be 19 300 of which 7 300 resided in Langa, 6 000 at Windermere, and 
6 000 in Cape Town. Between 600 and 700 of this number in Cape Town lived at the 
Docks Location. 81 
During and after the war years Langa continued to experience an increase in population 
so that the average population for (i) the 12 months July 1946 - June 1947 was as 
follows: 
80. union of South Africa Population Census Report of 1936, 
U.G. 21/1938. 
81.Inter-departmental Report on the Inspection of the 
Conditions of Natives in the Cape Peninsula/Slarke Report 
(Native Affairs Department, Cape Town, April 1943). 
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Total 82Adults Children 
Male Female 

6613 1 377 2527 10 517 

For the the 12 months July 1947 to June 1948, there was a very marginal drop in male 
figures but an increase in both female and children's figures. 




6312 1397 2750 10459 

The graph on the next page represents a gender breakdown of the increase in population 
in Langa Township. (See also Appendix B) These figures can only be treated as 
conservative estimates of the African population as a whole because in spite of the 
influx control regulations, there was frequent mobility which made counting difficult. 
The Docks Compound/Location was a private establishment under the management of 
the South African Railways and Harbours Administration. It was liable to inspection 
by the Native Commissioner of Cape Town. 84 It served as a depot where Africans 
waited to be employed in the dock yard. Only male adult Africans were accommodated 
there. Most of the men were casual labourers. They were however allowed to seek 
employment with, for example, the stevedoring companies for very brief periods, when 
they were not required by the Administration. The population of the Docks Location 
tended to fluctuate but it could hold more than 600 people. 85 Although the location 
relieved the City Council of having to provide housing for the Railways and Harbours 
employees, this did not have an impact on the situation in the urban area. 86 
There were, however, other institutions where Africans could stay with the approval of 
the Council. These were: 
(a) St. Columbus Home, was founded by the Churc.h- of England in 1897. It was 
situated in District (6) and it housed about 108 people. The Home was controlled by 
82.MOH Annual Report, in Mayor's Minute, 1948, Table S, 125 

83.MOH Annual Report, in Mayor's Minute, Table U r 130 

84.CA AWC 3/18/57. 

85.MA MP BC579 B9.35, Inspector of Urban Locationns, (P.G. 

Caudwell) Report on Africans in Cape Town, 30 April, 1941. 

86.MA, MP BC579 B9.35, Report on Africans, 1941 
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Father Bull and Father Savage both of whom made a significant contribution in the 
fields of education and religion in the Langa community. Accommodation was offered 
to only those Africans who were known to the Church. The occupants of this Home all 
worked in the municipal area. 87 
(b) The Cape Marine Suburbs, Ltd, Compound : was situated at Camps and housed only 
32 African male employees of the company. 
(c) The Stakesby-Lewis Hostel: a temperance hostel, accommodated Africans and 
Coloureds in separate sections . There was accommodation for 30 Africans in the 
African section. In what seemed like an aberration from the norm, the hostel reserved 
one room for African women. 88 
The City Council also allowed some employers in the city to provide accommodation 
for those African employees who, because of the nature of their jobs, could not 
practically stay in Langa. These were people who did domestic work and some worked 
in dairies, hotels, restaurants, theatres, garages, news agencies, etc. where the hours of 
work were such that they could not live in the township.89 One is immediately 
reminded of Maylam' s general observation of this contradiction when he said that 
employers of labour preferred to have their labour close at hand. The proximity of 
labour enabled the employers to minimise on costs which would otherwise go into the 
reproduction of labour, for instance, transport costs, if they were to be accommodated 
elsewhere. The requirements of employers, however, ran counter to those of the 
practitioners of segregation to whom African presence in the heart of the city was 
"anathema" or taboo save when they were ministering to their needs. Elaborating on 
the same contradiction between the local state and capital, Yoshikuni succintly wrote: 
To dream, as citizens of an official location removing "racial problems" 
from their door steps was one thing but to place, as employers, their 
87.MA, MP BC579 B9.35, Report on Africans, 1941. 
88.MA, MP BC579 B9.35, Report on Africans, 1941. 
89.CA 3/CT 4/2/1/1/620, Town Clerk's memorandum to the 
Native Affairs Committee, 8 July 1942. 
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own African employees into the location and to pay high rents for them 
was another. 90 
All this non-municipal accommodation was clearly inadequate to house the ever 
increasing African population. Even though the Council was reluctant to establish 
alternative residential areas, the pressure from the Government and widespread 
"squatting", compelled the Council in the 1940's to take that option it dreaded most 
because of the financial and administrative implications this entailed. 
In 1946, only 16% (1 289) of the 7 938 African women in Cape Town lived in Langa. 
The low numbers of women in Cape Town and Langa can be attributed to two factors. 
Firstly, the migrant labour policy coupled with state influx control regulations did not 
encourage the migration of women to the cities. Secondly, the 500 mile distance 
between Cape Town and the nearest African reserves of Ciskei and the Transkei is long 
enough to promote any rapid migration. Further prohibitive factors were the shortage 
of formal accommodation particularly for single women and high rents. Above all, the 
racial and gender divisions of labour made the employment of females in the cities very 
difficult. 
This explains why women in Langa, because of their low numbers, did not, 
exclusively, occupy the centre-stage of local politics. This was in total contrast to, for 
instance, the women of East Bank Location in East London, whose number almost 
equalled that of men. 91 They were also able to set a formidable and brisk trade in beer 
which saw them in constant virulent clashes with the East London Municipality. 92 
What was common about the occupational patterns of the Langa residents was that the 
majority of working men were confined to manual jobs as they lacked the necessary 
90.T.Yoshikuni, 'Black Migrants in a White City: A Social 

History of Africans in Harare, 1890-1925 1 , (D.Phil. thesis, 

University of Zimbabwe, 1989), 74. 

91.G.Minkley, 'Marrried to the Beer: Gender and Class in the 

East London Location, 1930-1963 1 , Africa Seminar Paper, 

(Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 25 

March 1992). In 1936, 12 951 African men and 12 437 African 

women in East London. p.5 

92.Minkley, 'Married to the Beer'. 
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skills. These men worked with the brickyards and construction industry, quarries, food 
and clothing industries, with the municipality, in the domestic service sector and the 
transport and commercial sectors. It is, however, not easy to construct or obtain 
definitive statistics to determine the number of men from Langa in each service sector. 
Very few women were lucky to find jobs in the domestic service sector. Otherwise the 
majority turned to hawking, the selling of foodstuffs, and the brewing and selling of 
beer. 
There was a relatively small petty bourgeoisie class in Langa which comprised 
teachers, court interpreters, clerks, ministers of religion, a few African female nurses, 
and businessman (or traders - in the parlance of the time). Because the Cape Town 
Municipality, like any other municipality was not in favour of the growth of a powerful 
African entreprenuership, the Langa businessmen were often locked in a struggle with 
the former. The local political leadership was derived from this class. An important 
point that needs to be made right from the onset is that while class divisions existed in 
Langa, the same classes of .people shared common grievances which reJ~J¢. to living 
conditions and shared oppression as one race made possible the growth. Qf.~ orgC!Ilic 
sense of unity in community struggle. Inspite of the existence of such "distinct" classes 
in the township, the nature of the housing and the system of allocation tended to 
obfuscate these strata. The following chapter examines in detail the type of 
accommodation in Langa. 
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It is important a study of this nature to focus on institutional aspects of 
the Township v~,a.u.:,..... of the profound impact and it had on the development 
of the life of the Langa community. 
Langa Township is 11 kilometers from the City! on Flats railway and 
adjacent to the 's sewerage works. This echoes the apnpr~ observation of the 
South African Tuberculosis Commission of 1914 that: 
The location is placed on the outskirts of the town 

many cases generally ---not far the town 

refuse dump, and the slaughter poles ____ I 

Proctor's observation disposal and African locations seem to have historical 
connections as Township, in Johanneshurg, constructed 
in 1918 at the depositing at Newlands, opposite Sophiatown, is this 
link. 2 
The provision of housing in _.,..,_ was influenced by the basic tenets of 
(Urban Areas) Act of 1923, that majority of Africans were 
sojourners", in the cities. is context within which the barrack system, which 
formed the main core of housing at was initiated. There was also a growing 
realisation about the need of, providing accommodation to 
urban Africans. was thus an amalgamation of the two systems 
were adopted on the recommendations of a City Council delegation, 
which consisted of the Mayor, an ex-Mayor, and the City Engineer of Cape Town, 
IDavenport, south African 
72 
I 'Class struggle, and the City', 53. 
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who in 1923, inspp.,cted the African locations in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and 
Bloemfontein, with a view to adopting the most suitable system of accommodation to 
Cape Town conditions. Their recommendations were based on the assumption that 
Cape Town had some Africans who wanted to settle with their families and others who 
only sought work of a more or less temporary nature and afterwards return to the rural 
areas. In order to meet this dichotomy, they recommended the adoption of the barrack 
system along the lines of the compound at the City Deep Mine in Johannesburg, for 
single men. For married persons they recommended the Bloemfontein system where 
Africans settled with their families. 
Because Langa was built in phases, the residents tended to identifiy sections of the 
Township with those phases and gave them meaningful names which encapsulated a 
particular experience they lived through. For instance, the first phase of the Township 
which was built in 1926 was called the "Old Location". It comprised houses for 
married people, the Special Quarters, the Main Barracks and the North Barracks. It 
was old in the sense that under the new and succeeding development scheme, the 
houses were a relative improvement on the first one. The streets in the 'Old Location 
were not macadamised, there was no electricity3, and the houses were not as attractive 
as those in the second development phase (completed between 1927 & 1928) or "New 
Location", called Bhongweni (which means "People's Pride"), for married people. 
Explaining why it was called Bhongweni, an informant said this was 'In order to bring 
the people together so that they could stay with the hope of fulfilling what the name 
carries' , i.e., what the name means. 4 This, in away, symbolised the general unity that 
the people of Langa enjoyed although there were obviously some differences between 
the married and single sections. After Bhongweni, there was Thembani, the Third 
Phase (completed in 1935), which means "Trust". It was hoped that the houses in 
3.Levin, 'Marriage in Langa Native Location', (M.A. thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 1946), 5. 
4.Interview with Mr. PricE siqwana, 640 Special Quarters, 
Langa, 5 September 1991. 
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Thembani would "bestow comfort" because there was electricity. The Fourth Scheme 
(completed in 1941) was called Bubani. 5 The Fifth Scheme was called Bulawayo 
(which means "to kill"). It was so called because the houses were not as "spacious" as 
those in the" Old Location". Mr S iqwana said ; 
They were tightly built and very little area for kids to fiddle about and 
for gardening as well, it was very small. The people were not pleased 
with the house~n Bulawayo and they felt that it was one way of trying 
to do away with blacks ---- these houses were considered to be cheaply 
built ---they did not have the necessary qualities that would bring 
comfort. 
On the relevance of the name Bulawayo, he said: 
----what we were all concerned about is that they were sort of trying to 
kill the blacks in a polite manner giving them small houses where they 
had no comfort and these small houses seeing them from afar one would 
see that there was not sufficient space even to keep the kids happy 
inside. 6 
Judging from the names given to some of these phases, the development of Langa did 
not portray such a rosy picture of a model location as the one painted by newspapers 
and Municipal officials. Such names and the names of roads and streets like 
Mdolomba, Ndabeni, Mendi, Harlem, Jabavu, and Brinton, all form an impressive 
reflection of the residents' perceptiveness, creativeness and imaginativeness. They also 
show their interest in upholding a sense of their history (as expressed through a name 
like Ndabeni, from they had come). (see Street Map of Langa on the next page). 
The Main Barracks and the North Barracks (next to the Hospital) were built during the 
flrst develpment scheme to accommodate 2 000 and 900 single men respectively and 
both had the trappings of a compound system which Rex defined as, 'a kind of bachelor 
barracks in which workers retire when off-duty to bunk beds in communal dormitories 
and receive their food in specially provided communal kitchens'.7 
5.Meaning not clear but an informant guessed that it might 
have originated from the term "bubonic" in reference to the 
1901 bubonic pandemic. 
6.Interview with Mr Siqwana. 
7.J.Rex, 'The Compound, the Reserve, and the Union 
Location', cited in R.Granelli and R.Levitan, Urban Black 
Housing: A Review of Existing Conditions in the Cape 
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Similarly, the Main Barracks which were situated at the remote end of the Township 
from the railway station, were built in the form of a square surrounding a bare 
quadrangle. The blocks comprised big identical rooms each of which accommodated 
between 24 and 32 men. The floors were made of brick and the roof was made from 
corrugated iron sheets with no ceilings at all. This made the large rooms, "impersonal, 
cold, damp and draughty" and because of these circumstances, 'the possibility of 
creating a warm, private area for relaxation or personal needs seems remote (eg.-In 
each room were double bunks on which the men slep~(see picture on the next page) 
They were built along the walls and were made from hard boards. They had no 
mattresses nor lockers. Because there was no space in the rooms, those who would 
have wanted to buy wardrobes could not do so. The men, therefore, kept their 
paraphernalia under the bunks. 8 
Out of the 84 rooms into which the Main Barracks were divided,S rooms served as a 
Reception Depot where newcomers to the Township were admitted for a period of 
strictly less than fourteen days.9 The appointment of African wardsmen to monitor 
people's movements in the Barracks and the Depot reinforced the Council's objective 
of overall social control. Their duties entailed the supervision of the inmates of the 
Barracks and visitors to the Reception Depot. The Wardsman on duty had to check the 
permits of the newcomers every night. He also collected those that had expired and 
warned the owners to report to the township administration. 10 
During their inspection errands they were occasionally accompanied by the European 
personnel from the Langa Administration. 11 Although documents do not state exactly 
what they inspected in the Barracks,it appeared that, among other reasons, they were 
looking for liquor and women, possibly smuggled in. 
Peninsula with some Guidelines for Change, (Urban Problems 

Research Unit, University of Cape Town, 1977), 18 

8.Granelli and Levitan, Urban Black Housing, 64. 
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However, the task of the Wardsmen was not, usually, enviable because the occupants 
of the Barracks, 'generally either feign ignorance or give false information regarding 
absentees'. They had also developed skills to undermine social control. For fear of not 
wanting to antagonise the residents (because doing so, especially in the 1930s when 
they were being forced to move to Langa, would have increased their antipathy), the 
wardsmen had learnt to conduct their inspections "with circumspection without unduly 
harassing the residents" .12 
There were separate ablutions in the quadrangle where men did their washing. Each 
block served 500 men. The toilets, fixed with some timber rails for the support of the 
user were communal. Underneath them were uncovered channels in which water ran 
continuously. Such a plan was naturally fertile ground for unsanitary conditions. 13 
In the same quadrangle and not far from the ablutions block, was a small communal 
kitchen where the bachelors were supposed to have their meals, although the majority 
usually preferred to make their own. It was barely furnished, with very few tables, no 
doors and wide openings for window. 14 
Complementing the barrack-type of accommodation was the compound of single 
quarters for single men otherwise known as the "Special Quarters". They 
accommodated 544 single men. Each room contained a bunk and was intended for the 
"better" class of Africans who could pay a little more rent per week than their counter­
parts in the barracks. 15 The rooms were constructed from a simple form of brick and 
either brick or concrete walls partitioned them. Such partitions always raised the " 
12.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1243. 

13.Granelli and Levitan, Urban Black Housing, 64. 

14.Granelli and Levitan, Urban Black Housing, 67 

15.CA 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/1 Main Buildings for the New Township. 

THE MAIN BARRACKS IN LANGA. The small building in 
the cent~e is the kitchen and the ablution block 
is on the ~ight 
The inte~ior of a communal toilet. 
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problems of lack of privacy because the partitioning walls were not high enough, so 
that, "one could see the next man in the other room", said Mr Ntshuntshe of Langa. 16 
This lack of privacy often led to jealousy, envy and thefts among tenants. The same 
informant pointed out that when some young people, who often roamed the streets of 
the "Old Location", 'felt that these tenants were dressed a lot better than him, he would 
just jump on (their) beds taking what he wanted'.17 Apart from thefts, the lack of 
privacy and overcrowding, the prohibition of women had a deleterious effect on the 
minds of the inmates. In a survey of 'The Male-Female Dynamic Amongst Migrant 
Workers In the Western Cape', Ramphele, observed that the lack of privacy inhibits the 
development of a meaningful love relationship between a male migrant and his lover. IS 
There is always the problem of poor communication between the two, which is a direct 
result of :­
(1) Estrangement, which is caused by the physical separation of a family for a long 
time and this militates against the development of a mutual understanding and tolerance 
of basic differences as persons. 
(2) Lack of Privacy: The overcrowded conditions in the barracks deny couples the 
chance to share their problems in confidence. Ramphele went as far as to say that: 
It is actually difficult to conceive of how these people actually manage 
to make love under such conditions. Lovemaking is such a personal and 
private thing that it must be difficult for 
self- respecting people to engage in it given the constraints of the 
si tuation .19 
Another informant who was privileged to have lived with his parents in the married 
Quarters, wondered how the bachelors earned their sexual satisfaction when he said, 'it 
16.Interview with Mr. Zandi S. Ntshuntshe of Special 
Quarters, Langa on 31 August 1991 
17.Interview with Mr. Ntshuntshe. 
18.M.Ramphele, 'The Male-Female Dynamic Amongst Migrant 
Workers In The Western Cape', in Social Dynamics, 12 (1), 
1986, 15-26. _ 
19.Ramphele, 'Migrant Workers', 20 
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was hard for people to stay like animals----to think that these guys leave their homes 
for almost a year not having someone to stay with of the opposite sex', was difficult to 
imagine. 20 Besides this "assault on the ego" 21 of the migrants, these Spartan-like 
conditions under which they lived had a debilitating psychological effect on some of the 
migrants. This probably explains their readiness to respond to crises sometimes in a 
riotus manner to vent this frustration. 
Along Harlem Avenue, next to the Hospital was the "Spinsters' Quarters", which could 
only accommodate 200 single women i.e. the up and coming, grown up women, 
divorcees and widows. 22 Each dormitory was designed to contain twelve separate bunk 
beds. Separate lavatory and wash-house provisions were made in the centre of the 
court yard. 23 Since women were by law, after 1937, not allowed to settle in the urban 
areas, the Council hoped that such accommodation would make it possible to exercise 
control and limit their numbers whenever necessary. 
Accommodation for the married people consisted of two, three and four-roomed 
houses. (see picture of Basic House Types A, E, and D) in Langa The most outstanding 
characteristic, monotonous feature of these houses, (as well as the Special Quarters), 
was that they were all built in endless identical rows which made identification 
impossible. 
The monotony of this arrangement was well captured in a very euphemistic article by 
Rev. Citashe of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa in Langa, which he wrote to The 
Argus newspaper called "Passenger-Train Architecture: Native Housing -- Through A 
20.Interview with Mr. Fisher Gallo of Langa, on 24 August 
1991 
21.A phrase used by Ramphele t~refer to the undermining of 





44.Interview with Mr.Bernard Nozeu of 19 Sandile Extension, 

Langa, on 25 July 1992. 

23.CA 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/1, Main Buildings in Langa. 
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Native's Eye; Ragged Nerves in Crowded Quarters", Describing the rows of the 
buildings of houses in Langa, the Rev. said: 
The Langa architects or engineers and contractors must either have been 
engine drivers or ticket examiners. The whole place resembles trains. 
The houses are linked up into chains of several houses. The bedrooms 
consist of one window, each with a roof that looks like falling on the 
occupants. 24 
But the married quarters were not only notorious for their "Passenger-Train 
Architecture" but also for their small size in which even a modest family could hardly 
fit Rev. Citashe I s description paints a very vivid picture of what it looked like and what 
it meant to be a tenant in such type of accommodation; 
Looking at Langa----- and the passenger 
train- like married quarters in blocks of six or ten houses with low 
roofs, nine by nine (ft.) bed- rooms, with the fourteen by eleven living 
room combined into a kitchen, dining and sitting room with its small 
yard and back- to- back houses with just enough space for motor-cars to 
pass between the houses, where residents can look straight into the 
house of the neighbour opposite, one cannot be surprised at the question 
of a 15- year- old boy who asked for the difference between a house 
built for a Langa European (in reference to the Superintendent and his 
white staff) with only two children as against his own family of six with 
only two bedrooms and so small in size. 25 
It was not uncommon to find that a couple of houses in every row in the married 
quarters section had their "verandahs" trellised, i.e.converted into another make-shift 
room to expand the living or sleeping space.(see picture on the next page). These 
alterations were not just a manifestation of need but also an expression of dissatisfaction 
about the inadequacy of housing units; dissatisfaction, because those who had the 
money to build their own spacious houses could not do so and there were no "superior 
neighbourhoods" to which they could move. This assault on their status increased 
dissatisfaction. 26 The size of these houses and other issues such as the condition and 
the distance of lavatories from the house was to become one of the many issues from 
24.Cape Argus, 28 November, 1947. 
25.Cape Argus, 28 November, 1947. 
26.Granelli and Levitan, Urban Black Housing, 21-22. 
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which and around which resistance against moving to Langa by the residents evolved 
and revolved. 
The Police Station was strategically located in order to maintain an efficient control of 
the Township. The station was positioned in relation to the roads to ensure an efficient 
policing of the Township. A police officer patrolling on the roads running North and 
South (viz. Meridian, Station and Jungle Walk), could get an immediate view east and 
west down all the other roads and across the open spaces. 27 
Adjacent to the Police Station was the Superintendent's seat of power, the central 
administration block which was centrally situated in the Township_ The building 
consisted of the offices of the Superintendent, and the Registering Officer. It was from 
here that the Superintendent, 'ruled with absolute authority aided by a specially 
recruited police force concerned with implementing the dozens of laws which in his 
everyday life the migrant or his wife or his children might break'.28 It is also here that 
rents were collected and recorded, social welfare issues were dealt with, and domestic 
disputes were settled. 
There was also a Periodical Court presided over by the Native Commissioner and it 
was held daily. It tried cases of Africans accused of contravening the Natives (Urban 
Areas) Act and its amendments and regulations. These included the Location 
Regulations, the unlawful possession of Kaffir beer, and being in the Proclaimed Area 
(ie. Langa) without permission. Its powers of punishment were restricted to "minor" 
cases such as rent default, fights, etc. Serious cases such as riots, and assaults were 
tried at the Wynberg Magistrate's Court. The Periodical Court, therefore, bolstered the 
Superintendent's powers of control over the Township.29 
27.CA 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/1, Development of Proposed New 
Township at Vyge. 
2B.J.Rex, 'The Compound, the Reserve and the Urban Location: 
The Essential Institutions of southern African Labour 
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Between 1927 and 1948, there were twenty-two churches in Langa. Sixteen of these 
were separatist churches. Very few had buildings of their own. The first to be 
established in Langa, the Presbyterian Church of South Africa, the Wesleyan Church, 
the Church of England and the Methodist Episcopal Church (A.M.E.), had buildings in 
the centre of the Township.30 Church buildings usually comprised a spacious house 
for the Reverend-in-charge. This distinguished him from the rest of the rank and file 
of the Township. Those churches that did not have their own buildings, conducted 
their services either in the Township Civic Hall, or in the houses of the ministers. 
Most churches drew their membership from within and outside Langa, some as far as 
Woodstock, and Retreat. This suggests that Langa was not socially isolated from other 
areas .31 
Apart from providing spiritual succour, the churches' vestries were used as classrooms, 
before, and even after, the erection of school buildings and this suggests the double 
role that churches played in the shaping of a close-knit community. It is also 
significant to note that the first five shools in Langa were built by Mission Churches, 
although they were taken over by the Bantu Education Department in the 1950·s. 
These were S1. Cyprian (later called Elukhanyisweni) by the Anglican Church, St.Louis 
by the Roman Catholic Church, Langa Methodist School (Tembani Lower Primary), 
and the Langa Mission School of the Dutch Reformed Church (later Moshesh Higher 
Primary). Lastly, there was the A.M.E. Church school, later called the Henry Bonner 
Lower Primary.32 
African traders' shops were located at various points on the streets of Langa. There 
were General dealers shops, Eating Houses, Butcheries, Milk Shops, Handicraft stalls 
and Hawkers' stores. In terms of the Urban Areas Act, trading was confined to 
3D.Botto, 'Some Aspects of the Leisure Occupations of the 
African Population of Cape Town', 
31.Levin, 'Marriage in Langa', 7. 
32.CA AWC 3/27/1b. 
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Africans residing in Langa but although this was the case in theory, the City Council 
itself engaged in business enterprises. 33 This, in it itself, became a significant site of 
struggle. 34 
In terms of transport the Township was served by a branch line off the Cape Flats 
railway line. There was also a bus service operated by the Golden Arrow Bus 
Company between Mowbray station (about 3.8 miles from the Administration offices). 
This was only introduced in 1943.3-5 
There were recreational facilities in the form of large playgrounds on the periphery of 
the Township. They served as soccer and rugby fields. There were also facilities for 
athletics and, cricket and tennis. Although the provision of sports facilities in many 
workers I residential centres was necessitated by the need to keep men from 
"undesirable associations during leisure hours", in Langa there was a growing 
perception by the authorities, particularly the Superintendent, that emphasis should be 
shifted from that point of view. Instead, the Superintendent argued that increased 
sporting facilities should be an all-time necessity from the point of view of health. 
"Well-equipped playgrounds, both for children and seniors, are a necessity and will 
repay any expense by the better health of the people'. Furthermore, an increase in 
such amenities would be 'an added attraction for parents to settle in the location I, 
argued Mr Cook as he urged the Municipality to increase the recreation facilities. 
For once, the Superintendent had become pragmatic and quite forward 100king.36 A 
healthy workforce was a concern of employers and location superintendents from the 
late 19th century. The provision of amenities to the residents would, according to the 
Superintendent, serve as 'an added attraction for parents to settle in the location '.37 
33.CA AWC 3/27/1b. 
34.See Chapter 3. 
35.CA AWC 3/27/1b. 
36.CA AWC 3/1/3, Superintendent's Monthly Report, 31 
December 1937. 
37.CA AWC 3/1/3, Superintendent's Monthly Report, 31 
December 1937. 
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There were obviously many other important institutions but the ones examined are 
particularly significant for their centrality in the issues discussed hereafter. What can 
be gathered from the structure, lay-out of the accommodation as well as the strategic 
location of the police station, administration block etc, is that these were 
meticulously designed to overcome the underlying problems of social control. But, by 
the same token, this also bred and accentuated a somewhat perennial opposition from 
the inhabitants of Langa. 
OCCUPATIO1\": 1927-1936. 
The transfer of Africans from Ndabeni and the City of Cape Town to Langa from 
1927 -1936, was a complex and troubled affair which Municipal authorities little 
expected. Notwithstanding the fact that Langa was a relative improvement on Ndabeni, 
Africans strenuously objected to being removed. The reasons for this apathy ran the 
whole gamut from high rentals, high rail-fares, lack of genuine consultation, inadequate 
accommodation to allegations that Langa was synonymous with gaol. But the most 
outstanding grievances centred around rents and the exorbitant cost of railway travel to 
and from Langa. These and other grievances caused so much resentment that it became 
paradoxical that whilst the Council fought against "squatting" in and around the urban 
area, its actions and the failure or reluctance to genuinely consider the rationale behind 
the Africans' unwillingness to move, led to intense squatting. 
The people's refusal to settle at Langa largely took the form of passive resistance. It 
was so effective that the Municipality abandoned its initial persuasive approach and 
decided to meet it with force, but with mixed results. Rather than settle at Langa 
some Africans chose to leave Ndabeni for the Athlone, Cape Flats, Elsie's River, 
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Kensington, Lakeside, Muizenberg, and Retreat. 38 This was another conscious way 
that urban Africans resisted being pushed around. Further to this, was the "freedom" 
to choose where to go without taking cognizance of the Regulations which most of 
them may have been unaware of. 
For those who remained and chose to launch a community-based resistance, what was 
spectacular was their ability to organise themselves and seek legal aid and question the 
legality of the Municipality's powers to evict them. Although they finally succumbed 
to the force exerted, they at least succeeded in extracting some concessions such as rent 
reductions from the ever adamant Council. Their protracted resistance cost the Council 
about 13,000 pounds worth of revenue every year. Conceding that this opposition had 
dealt them a telling blow, it became almost habitual, henceforth, for the Council to 
slightly soften its radical position. 39 
Initially, the Council made it voluntary for the Ndabeni residents to go to Langa and 
select the rooms they would have wanted to move into. But this seemingly preferential 
treatment yielded disappointing results for the Council as few people responded to the 
Council's offer. The Ndabeni residents were reluctant to be removed to Langa on 
account of the high rental scales which were two-and-half times as much as those at 
Ndabeni. The comparative rents for the two areas were as follows: 
LANGA NDABENI 40 
Barracks lOs 4s 

Special Quarters l5s 6s 





Spinsters Quarters 24s lOs 

In fixing the rents for Langa, the Council did not consider the low wage earnmg 
capacity of Africans. Having incurred a capital expenditure of about 382 000 pounds 
38.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1266, Correspondence Between the Town Clerk 
and the Secretary for Native Affairs, 28 November 1927. 
39. 
40.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1266, Report from the Native Affairs 
Committee 
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on laying out the roads, drainage system and the construction of housing, it became the 
Council's policy to make the residents bear the costs for the administration and future 
expansion of the Langa. This was chiefly done to relieve the white rate-payers of the 
responsibility. 41 
The residents contended that they could not afford these rents. At a meeting held on 16 
October, 1930 they argued that there was a huge difference between their net earnings 
and gross wages ( on which their ability to pay was based). Moreover, there was the 
added expense of commuting to and from Langa and the costs of buying food, not to 
mention clothing. These factors made it virtually impossible for them to pay more than 
they did at Ndabeni and they refused to move on account of that. 42 
The City Council was accordingly criticised by a liberal organisation, the Ioint 
European-Bantu Council of Cape Town, for failing to take into account the people's 
earning capacity. In its statement to the Council it said: 
The responsible committee of the City Council considers nothing but the 
financial aspect of Langa, so much capital sunk, so much interest and 
redemption fund must be forthcoming. On that, and not on the natives 
capacity to pay, they fix the rents. That they are hopelessly beyond their 
capacity does not enter into the question. 43 
It was this sort of myopia which cost the City Council thousands of pounds when 
residents refused to budge. It is no wonder that since Langa was opened up to about 
1930, the loss to the Municipality on the administration of the Township, including 
interest on the capital expenditure was about 40 000 pounds. 
The Africans were not blind to the fact that most of the construction at Langa had been 
done exclusively by unionised European labour at very high wages. Interest on this 
was included in the rent demanded from them. They argued that if unskilled African 
labour had been used, the preliminary cost of building Langa could have been far less. 
41.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1266, N.A.C Report. 
42.The Cape Argus, 17 October, 1930. 
43.The Cape Argus, 15 semptember, 1930. 
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They refused to be made reponsible for the huge capital expenditure incurred in the 
construction. 44 
They were also sensitive to the fact that they were being compelled to reside and pay 
for "model cottages" built by highly skilled European labour while at the same time, 
the City Council was aiding unskilled Coloured people and Europeans to put up their 
own housing complexes on various sites. They also wanted to build their own houses 
with Council assistance. Many Ndabeni residents were heard asking 'Why may we not 
be allowed to build our own houses too?'. 45 Thus their opposition was also influenced 
by their realisation of this discrimination. 
The consequence of their resilience was that Langa remained a white elephant as all 
attempts to f'Of"'C£ them into the location were proving a failure. By the end of April 
1930 there were only 663 single men residing in the Main Barracks, and 248 families 
in the two-roomed houses for married people. The total popUlation of 911, was a far 
cry from the envisaged maximum capacity of 5 000. Apart from the loss of revenue, 
and the embarrassment to the Council caused by the slow rate at which Langa was 
being occupied, the Council felt the heavy financial burden of administering two areas 
simultaneously. It was calculated that if the transfer of Ndabeni residents was 
expedited and Ndabeni closed down eventually, the Municipality would save about 
3000 pounds per annum. 46 
To speed up the process the Council began to issue notices of eviction to residents, 
particularly single men. The Council's action was, however, checked by the courts, 
after the Ndabeni residents challenged the legality of the Council's action. The 
Magistrate at Caledon-Square ruled that the Superintendent had no right under the 
Township regulations, to shift the residents from one area to another. This judgement 
44.The Cape Argus, 20 May 1930. 
45.The Cape Argus, 20 May 1930. 
46.CA 3/CT 4/1/1/1262. 
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had the effect of upsetting and temporarily halting the transfer. 47 The mere fact that 
the residents challenged the Council and won the case, was to them an achievement of 
no mean feat as this emboldened them in their future dealings withi.t. It also 
proved that the Council was not entirely invincible. 
In times of a crisis, the residents of Ndabeni came together to form a formidable 
challenge to whatever force threatened their community. So it was that they set up a 
common law fund which they used to seek legal advice and assistance as they did in the 
case rek J to above. This spirit of togetherness was a clear testimony that their 
reaction against removal was a well planned and well co-ordinated. 
For those who went to settle at Langa earlier, resistance did not end. They continued 
to wage an "internalised resistance". For example, the City Council's financial losses 
were worsened by the fact that, of those who had taken up residence at Langa, very 
few paid rent. From 21 May 1929, to 31 August, new Langa residents refused to pay 
and the Council lost 3 155 pounds and 180 pounds was owed by those who sneaked out 
of Langa and settled surrounding areas. These residents managed to do this by 
capitalising on certain legal formalities which made it impossible for the Council to 
compel them to pay. 48 Again this has echoes of the early history of Ndabeni. 
Under the Langa Township Regulations, the Couincil had the power to collect rents 
without taking recourse to civil action. But owing to an oversight there was a technical 
irregulariij in the promulgation of the regulations in 1927, which had not received the 
formal blessings of the Provincial Executive Committee. 49 It became difficult for the 
Council legally to enforce the payment of rent from defaulters and the residents took 
advantage of this loophole. 
47.The Cape Times, 21 May 1930. 
48.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/265, Memo from Town Clerk to the Secretary 
for Native Affairs. 
49.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/265, Memo, Town Clerk to Secretary. 
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The frantic efforts made by the Council to force urban Africans into one township 
only resulted in more peopling leaving for the outlying areas of the city. In May 1930, 
it was estimated that there were about 2 000 Africans in Kensington Reserve which fell 
outside the boundary of the Proclaimed urban area. Some stayed on the Cape Flats in 
pondokkies. Most of these people, about 1 500 lived for a short time in Langa and 
decided to leave surreptitiously. The figure shook the Council out of its complacency 
as it realised that it had been labouring under the false illusion that Langa had been 
gradually filling. As if this was not enough, Ndabeni which had been closed to further 
admissions to people in 1928, was filled up by about 400 people who impersonated 
those who had left. 50 This, in effect reversed the process which the Council wished to 
accomplish as a matter of urgency. 
There was nothing as conspicuously segregationist as the distance of Langa from the 
City centre, 11 km being almost double that of Ndabeni. In establishing the Township 
greater emphasis was put on segregation rather than the effects a long distance would 
have on the workers and how this would in turn affect productivity at work. The 
transfer to Langa disadvantaged the workers seriously. To start with, the wages and 
hours of work bore no relationship to the time spent on the journeys. The travelling 
time was charged to them. Worse still, under the Industrial Conciliation Act, they did 
not fall under the definition of employees and did not have recognised trade unions to 
protect their interests as workers. The planners of Langa may have learnt something 
about the effects of long distance on workers if they had read The Barlow Royal 
Commission Report on " The Distribution of the Industrial Population". The 
Commission stated that: 
Travelling -----can hardly fail to have adverse effects on health and to 
result in fatigue and loss of energy. There can be no doubt too, that 
these adverse effects on the workers are reflected in no small measure on 
their efficiency and output, and in turn on the employers' cost of 
production. 51 
50. The Cape Times, 10 July 1930. 

51.Cited in the Evidence to the Native Laws Commission of 

Enquiry, 25 February 1947. 
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The assumption was obviously that the workers would use a train service to travel to 
their respective work-places, but quite a number of were forced to go to work on foot. 
These observations make sense if we consider the other complaint against removal to 
Langa, namely the infrequent train service and the high train fares. Transport 
problems to and from Langa were, in the early days, worsened by the fact that the 
Township was served by only one means of transport. There were no buses as yet. 
The irregular train service to Langa as compared to the one to Ndabeni, was a 
substantial cause for resentment. They demanded that additional workmen I strains 
should be provided, particularly an earlier train in the morning leaving at or before 
5.00 a.m. and another leaving in the evening. Worse still there was no train service on 
either Saturdays or Sundays to ferry them to town and there was no obvious alternative. 
Furthermore, the type of carriages that were reserved for them were of an inferior type 
to the third class carriages on other lines. 52 
All this militated against settlement in Langa. Superintendent Cook confirmed the 
gravity of the matter when he reported that the cry for an additional train service to and 
from Langa was such a vexed question that he urged the Council to find an urgent 
solution: 
The Natives feel this train question more than anything. After all it must 
be remembered that probably the native is the largest user of the Cape 
Flats line and considers himself entitled to greater consideration from the 
Railway Department.53 
Closely linked to the complaint about the poor train service was the question of high 
railway fares. As in the case of accommodation rentals, Ndabeni residents had become 
accustomed to paying 6s, per month or Is 6d a week from the City to Ndabeni. From 
Langa, they were expected to pay nearly double those amounts, i.e. lIs per month, or 
52.CA 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/1. Minutes of the interview between 
the Native Affairs committee and the General Manager of 
Railways, 22 October, 1927. 
53.CA 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/1, Superintendent's Monthly Report, 11 
July. 
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2s 9d a week. '54 The difference between the two fares was a material one to the 
residents and even worse for the unemployed/job-seekers. 
The contradictions over the question of responsibility for the "management­
reproduction"55 of labour surfaced again on this issue in 1930. Appeals by the Native 
Affairs Committee to the General Manager of the Railways, to reduce the fares to the 
Ndabeni level fell through because, since it operated on business principles it was 
uneconomic to consider any reductions. Meanwhile, as the Council called upon the 
Railways Administration to review its fares, it shifted its responsibility by pointing out 
that the high fares and the establishment of Langa were the consequence of Government 
policy. The Council also refused to subsidise the Railways and clearly stated that, as a 
matter of policy, it did not subsidise cheap labour. 56 At the same time the employers 
of labour denied that they underpaid their workers. The inevitable outcome of this 
game of "passing the buck", was that Africans became the victims since they had to use 
the service will-nilly. 
By February 1932, all the single men had been evicted from their dwellings. The 
Council turned to the eviction of the remaining 400 families and it embarked on the 
erection of forty-eight 2-roomed houses in Langa which were completed by the end of 
1932. The approval of a 50 000 pound loan on 22 April 1933 made possible the 
building of two hundred more houses which were completed in 1934.57 
The removal of the married people was also not an easy task for the Council as they 
had specific grievances which were unique to their class and position. They objected to 
54.CA 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/1, Minutes of the Interview between 
the Native Affairs Committee, and the Manager of the 
Railways. 
55. 'the process of active intervention by the state to 
secure an essential condition of capital accumulation, that 
is, the continued existence of a labour force sufficient to 
meet the demands of the capitalist economy for labour 
power', Blocn and Wilson, 'Urban Control and Popular 
Struggle', 5 
56.The Cape Times, 21 May 1930. 
57.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1262. 
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the inadequate accommodation as well as the condition of buildings at Langa. A whole 
family was expected to live in two rooms, each measuring 12ftby 10ft· As some of 
them had acquired some furniture, they found it extremely difficult to fit it in.58 In 
fact, those who finally went to Langa, had to store their furniture in the Municipal 
store.59 The complaint by Mr Fassie of the Ndabeni Advisory Board probably 
encapsulates the general feeling prevalent in Ndabeni against the unsuitability of this 
type of accommodation: 
I have got three children. One of them is in school in standard six, but 
how disgraceful it is when I go to bed with no privacy with the children, 
and the mother and everybody in the same room. If I want to have to 
have a little chat with mother the children already understand what I say 
to mother. 60 
Nurtured and groomed in such circumstances, children could not fail to lose respect for 
each other as brothers and sisters as well as for their parents. Overcrowded conditions 
certainly made life difficult. 
There was a level at which the Africans viewed Langa as synonymous with jail and 
they unambiguo'!;ly made it clear that they could not move into jail with eyes wide 
open. What baffled them most was the fact that if they lived elsewhere they were 
arrested and sent to jail and if they lived at Langa they were sent to jail for failing to 
pay rent. They argued that their reasons for failing to pay rent were not considered at 
all. As a result some people chose to drift away from Ndabeni to Langa and those 
already in Langa just slipped out owing unspecified large amounts of rents. The 
people's dilemma was well summed up by one member of the Cape Joint European­
Bantu Council when he derided the City Council's policing attitude: 
No wonder the native has learnt to regard Langa with dread -- to him it 
is only the road to gaol if he does not go there. If he does go there and 
any misfortune makes it impossible to keep up to date with the rent 
which is making such heavy demands upon him, he is again threatened 
with gaol. Thereupon, he loses his job and with it all the hope of 
making up his rent. What then, can he do, but take refuge to the bush.6J 
58.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1267, Ndabeni Advisory Board Minutes: 

Transfer of residents to Langa, 12 September 1934. 

59.The Guardian, 1 September 1939. 

60.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1267 Details of meeting between the NAC and 

the Residents of Ndabeni/Langa. 

61.The Cape Argus, 15 September 1930. 
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It was this fear of courting a double tragedy, i.e. going to jail and subsequently losing 
one's.job that some people decided rather not to go to Langa. 
The resemblance of Langa to a jail was often caricatured by those who, at some point, 
had had the misfortune of being convicted. Such people even said that they were much 
better treated in jail than at Langa 62 Some residents remembered, with horror, the 
insensibility of the Council when it arrested Mr. James Gardley of Langa and sent him 
to Wynberg for failing to pay his full rent. He was imprisoned and died in prison. 63 
Whether he died of "natural" causes was, to them, besides the point. The mere fact 
that this tragedy had happened in jail taught them to be "careful" not to go to Langa 
lest they failed to pay rents and be incarcerated with probable consequences too ghastly 
for them to contemplate. 
A Supreme Court Judge also ruled that it was a monstrous thing that people were sent 
to prison in an ordinary matter such as the failure to pay rent. The same Judge when 
quashing the conviction of a rent defaulter, argued that if whites failed to pay rent they 
were not convicted as was done to Africans. 64 The Judge's ruling was a vindication of 
the fact that the laws were morally reprehensible. 
The removals to Langa were not simply an issue that affected the people of Ndabeni 
alone. Shopowners and Churches, particularly Independent Churches, were equally 
affected but the rationale for their opposition stemmed from vested interests. The '11ost 
prominent shopowner in Ndabeni, Mr. J.B. Cook (it's not clear whether he was related 
to Supt. Cook), the proprieter of J.B. Cook and Son Ndabeni Trading Stores, 
bemoaned the transfer of all the single men, in particular, in 1932. He complained to 
the Native Affairs Committee about the diminshing profits which resulted. His 
business was always brisk because the single men bought their groceries from his store 
62.The Cape Arg9s, 7 January 1932. 
63.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1266, Minutes of meeting between the NAC 
and Langa residents, 25 October 1930. 
64.The Cape Argus, 19 August 1929. 
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upon their return from work at night. Cook was not enthused at all by the prospect of 
seeing married people left behind temporarily, not to mention the complete evacuation 
and destruction of Ndabeni. His contention was that married women did not buy from 
his store as they had time to wander about during the day and found time to buy from 
outside the location. 65 With the destruction of the barracks at Ndabeni, which he saw 
as his catchment area for his customers, Cook-complained to the NAC: 
We now find it extremely difficult with the decreased takings, to meet 
our obligations in general i.e. site rent, merchant accounts, business 
expenses e. t.c. 66 
He appealed to the Committee to grant him a site at Langa on which to put up 
temporary structures of wood and iron for trading purposes until such time a suitable 
building had been erected, obviously oblivious to the fact that Langa, unlike Ndabeni 
was not going to be open to outside traders under the Urban Areas Act. Cook's 
protest, as is evident, did not stem from any moral considerations but the profit­
making motive. He felt betrayed by what he regarded as the Council's inconsiderate 
actions which robbed him of a realiable source of income. 
Churches in general, but specifically African Independent Churches, also bore the brunt 
of the Council's forced evictions. They argued that since they had asked to move, or 
to be moved, they should be compensated. But the City Council adamantly refused to 
do so. On 21 March 1927, a deputation representing an organisation called the Cape 
Peninsula Church Council from the Wesleyan Parsonage in Woodstock, met the Native 
Affairs Committee to discuss the subject of compensation upon moving to Langa. But 
their request was turned down. 67 
The Church Council seems to have acquiesced in the Council's reply without protest 
but the same is not true of the Independent Churches, especially the A.M.E. and the 
Presbyterian Church. Rev. J.Geo Matshiqi, pastor-in-charge of the A.M.E., had his 
65.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1256, J.B. Cook's letter to the NAC, 11 
February 1932. 
66.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1256, Cook's letter to NAC. 
67.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1247, Churches, Ndabeni. 
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request for compensation turned down by the Council and the Rev. did not acquiesce at 
all. He decried the Council for making such an arbitrary decision as it adversely 
affected independent denominations such as his. These churches were not as financially 
sound as the Wesleyan and Anglican Churches, which had depended on, European 
help. A good example was that of the Church of England which had appealed, with 
great success, to Europeans for funds for their new Langa Church. The Rev. Matshiqi 
lamented the Council's position which did not take into consideration the unfortunate 
circustances of such churches. 'By its decision, the Council will crush the life out of 
these churches', complained Rev. Matshiqi. 
The Council's decision was motivated by what had, previously, happpened in Port 
Elizabeth and Bloemfontein (where Superintendent Cook had once worked) with 
regards to the question of compensation in 1902. Upon his request, the Superintendent 
of Langa had been told by the Town Clerk of Port Elizabeth that when Africans were 
removed from the city to New Brighton, the separatist churches were simply" bought 
out of existence". 
In Bloemfontein, no compensation was paid. Applications by Church authorities for 
assistance to erect church buildings were considered on their merits. 68 What these 
merits were is a matter for conjecture. It is, perhaps, not an exaggeration to surmise 
that the Council's attitude against separatist churches was influenced by the general 
perceptions by Government authorities that these churches had both religious and 
political ramifications. Independent Churches had long provided fora for political 
tirades against the discriminatory practices of the State. 69 Be that as it may, these 
churches struggled and eventually succeeded in establishing themselves without the 
Council's compensation. 
68.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1247, Superintendent's Monthly Report, 
1927. 
69.B.G.M. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa, (London, 
1961), 38-64 
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The last families in the Ndabeni Location were transferred to Langa on 4 January 1936, 
upon the completion of sixty additional houses in December 1935. This necessitated 
the closure and subsequent completion of the agreement between the Government and 
the Council with regards to the disposal of the ground for industrial purposes. In their 
final act of opposition, whilst they were still in Ndabeni, the residents demonstrated to 
the Council that they were acutely aware of the fact that it was the need to create 
industrial space for the manufacturers that Ndabeni was being disposed of. They 
questioned the Council's ingenuity in ordering them to vacate Ndabeni on the basis of 
unhealthy conditions and wondered how the same conditions would be suitable for 
industries. Many were heard to ask, 'if the Council was contemplating making the spot 
a healthy one, why could they not make those arrangements for the present 
inhabitants?'.70 
True to its name, NDABENI--which means "the place of talk", formally became "the 
place of dead silence", by a Government notice of May 1936. However, the formal 
closure of Ndabeni Location did not lead to the full occupation of Langa. 
Accommodation for 3 000 single men had been provided at Langa but about 50% of 
this remained empty up to January 1937. Not even half of the 1 900 men removed from 
Ndabeni in 1932 registered at Langa. The total population of Langa after the closure of 
Ndabeni stood at 3,730 as of 31 December 1935. This figure, obviously, fell far short 
of the original target of 5 000. 
In spite of the small population that had settled at Langa by 1936, and the high-handed 
methods that had been employed to remove it from Ndabeni, what is significant is that 
the nucleus of a dynamic, stable and politically conscious urban African community 
had been established. Once settled it was no longer possible for both the Government 
and the local authority to ignore or regard the Langa community as a docile urban 
entity. What is also evident about the people's resistance is that there was virtually no 
conspicuous party political agitation which normally accompanied such developments. 
70.The Cape Argus, 1 June 1931. 
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This changed quite drastically such that in the late 1930's and the 1940's when African 
political organisations, such as the ANC, the SACP, and the NLL in particular, seize 
the peoples' grievances against the Cape Town City Council to establish themselves and 
the people, too, respond favourably to these organisations. This, however, is the 
subject of Chapter 6 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: THE MUNICIPALISATION OF BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE IN LANGA TOWNSHIP A~'D THE AFRICAN RESPONSE . 
1927-1948. 
When Langa was opened to African occupation in 1927, the Cape Town City Council 
was against the idea of encouraging African trade there. Langa residents were 
compelled to purchase their personal requirements from the city and the profits were 
pocketed by European proprieters instead of circulating among the African community. 
There was, thus, an unwritten covenant between the city local authority and white 
business capital that the denial of trading rights to emergent African entreprenuers 
would create a large pool of customers for the businesses in the city. Although the 
policy of territorial segregation ostensibly meant the paramountcy of European interests 
in European areas, and African interests in African areas, the municipality spread its 
tentacles into what was "exclusively" the African's domain. The outcome was a 
municipal monopoly over what had been the petty African trader's sole means of eking 
out a living. This initiated incessant struggles between the rulers and the ruled over 
the latter's only indispensable means of subsistence. 
The municipalisation of trading activities in Langa was embarked upon by the City 
Council from the late 1930s to 1948 under a thinly veiled paternalistic justification - the 
welfare of of the Langa populace. For instance, in 1938 the Council argued for the 
virtues of a municipal beer hall to cater for the drinking requirements of the "bachelor" 
class which could not brew its own beer in terms of Location Regulations. Again, 
under the guise of combating malnutrition amongst the bachelors in the Main Barracks, 
it expropriated the eating house from the African traders who operated their businesses 
there. What is characteristic of the Council's trading activities in Langa is that it closed 
all the existing avenues through which such enterprises could find an outlet. 
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PART ONE: 
LA~GA - A TO\VNSHIP OF TEETOTALLERS? 
The question of liquor in general and "Kaffir beer" in particular runs 
threadlike through the history of the African working class in South 
Africa. I 
Purporting to have the welfare of its subjects at heart, the City Council of Cape Town 
decided to inaugurate the new African township of Langa in 1927 with the total 
prohibition of liquor including utshwala, commonly but disparagingly referred to as 
"Kaffir beer". Relying on its experience in Ndabeni - the location which preceded 
Langa, where a permit system was in operation, the Council argued that a permit was 
open to abuse and 'detrimental to the morale of the native in that it creates a sort of 
monopoly, only a certain number being able to get a permit to brew'. Permits were 
issued to married householders for domestic brewing only, and they were not issued to 
the more than 3,500 single men who formed the largest part of Ndabeni's and Langa's 
population.2 The municipality maintained that this permit system created a temptation 
both to these single men and to the permit holders who were tempted to sell to them 
illegall y . 3 
Evangelical organisations in Cape Town such as the Wesleyan Methodist Church of 
South Africa, the Cape Town Diocesan Synod of the Province of Southern Africa, and 
the South African Temperance Alliance including the Ndabeni African ministers of 
Independent Churches, were alone in congratulating the Council on this unrealistic 
policy. Their moral and Christian view-point was blended with their apparently racist 
fears that, 'the native, once he has acquired the alcohol habit, is physically much less 
capable of moderation than a European I .4 (my emphasis) 
1.P. La Hausse, 'Alcohol, the Ematsheni and Popular Struggle 

in Durban: The Origins of the Beer Hall in South Africa 





2.Cape Archives (hereafter CA) 3/CT 4/1/5/1262. 

3.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1262. 

4.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1262, Memorandum to the Mayor of Cape Town 






From the beginning, the regulation on total prohibition was a dead-letter since people 
had not been consulted. It was bound to be transgressed as long as Langa remained a 
dry island, and as long as alternative forms of entertainment and recreation continued to 
be virtually absent. Beer drinkers in Langa soon asked why they were the only ones not 
allowed to brew their own beer. Why Langa was governed by regulations totally 
different to Ndabeni remained a mystery to them) This denial of what they 
considered to be a privilege, if not a right, was to bring together the beer brewers, the 
consumers, and in some cases teetotallers, against the municipality in a struggle over 
the liquor traffic. There is nothing new about this. Ndabeni residents had built a 
reputation for defending what they considered to be their inalienable rights. 6 What 
tended to bring together the beer brewers and their consumers was the symbiotic 
relationship between them: 
In fact that was one of the most prosperous businesses you could run 
then, because people had nothing to do from work - coming back just to 
prepare their food, the next thing ....drinks [beer].7 
As with women elsewhere in Africa, the migrant labour system, with its 'rigid sexual 
and racial division of labour ... [which] excluded African women from jobs in the 
formal, industrial sector' meant that the women of Langa depended on beer brewing, 
the smuggling and selling of whiteman I s liquor, and petty trading, for survival. 8 
The women of Langa reworked the tradition of beer brewing and adapted it to a 
survival strategy by commercialising utshwala which traditionally had been used for 
ceremonial functions only. In the words of P.A. McAllister: 
People do not generally preserve old habits or customs for their own 
sake, but adapt these or introduce new ones, as the need arises. New 
institutions emerge from the old; established customs may be 
reinterpreted or give new meaning. 9 
5.CA 3/CT 4/1/5/1262, Memo to the Mayor 
6.Saunders, 'The creation of Ndabeni', 165-195. 
7. Interview, Mr F. Galo, Langa, 24 Aug. 1991. 
8.C. Walker, Women and Gender in southern Africa to 1945, 
190. 
9.P.A. Mc Allister, 'Beer and the Unity of Study: notes on 
the history of Xhosa beer drinking and on combining cultural 
analysis and "political economy" approaches in 
anthropology', Rhodes University Conference, 1987, p.1. 
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In the light of the above considerations, in 1930, three years after the opening of 
Langa, the Superintendent of Langa, Mr. G.P. Cook, was to report that it had become, 
'practically impossible to stop illicit brewing of kaffir beer, and to control the 
introduction of bottled liquor', 10 in spite of frequent police patrols. In the previous 
month, December 1929, sixty-nine bottles of liquor were confiscated at Langa and 
£97.lOs in fines imposed, one thousand gallons of utshwala confiscated and £297.15s 
in fines imposed. II 
That total prohibition was an unwelcome regulation among the concerned Langa 
residents was made overtly clear by a resolution they made at a meeting with the 
Superintendent on 22 January 1930 in connection with beer permits. They called upon 
the Native Affairs Committee of the City Council to 
consider the urgent necessity of granting permits for the domestic 
brewing of Kaffir beer on the same conditions appertaining to Ndabeni 
Location, as many of our people are getting into trouble through the 
drink question. 12 
The Superintendent's readiness to endorse the demand vindicated the point that the 
situation had become untenable. The Council rescinded its resolution and removed the 
anomaly by regulating the brewing of utshwala in Langa on the same terms as Ndabeni 
by permits. 13 
The municipality hoped that, armed with this regulation, it could still effectively 
control the liquor trade. After all, the Liquor Act No. 30 of 1928 was in place and 
could be invoked any time to check the smuggling of liquor. It provided for the denial 
to Africans of brandy and bread-yeast. There were also restrictions on methylated 






spirits, used mostly by the "well-to-do" Africans,14 for the lighting of primus stoves ­
for fear of their being used as intoxicating gases. IS 
Even so, Africans often managed to obtain liquor by hook or by crook. White or 
"Coloured" shebeen operators purchased liquor at retail outlets and clandestinely sold it 
to them. Alternatively, Africans could send "Coloureds" to buy it for them,16 although 
this alternative could be unreliable as they could easily disappear with the money or 
liquor. 17 
Under the Natives Urban Areas Act No. 21 "intoxicating liquor" could also be obtained 
"for bonafide sacramental purposes" .18 This was not as easy as it might sound. The 
ordeal one had to go through was described by Rev C.N. Citashe of the Ethiopian 
Church of South Africa: 
The Native Clergyman must apply to the Magistrate who refers the 
matter to the liquor branch of the CoLD. whither the applicant is called 
and interrogated and the final approval obtained and the Clergyman is 
permitted to buy his Sacramental wine by the production of his PASS 
which must be endorsed by the storekeeper every time he buys. He must 
frequent the Bottle Store as the permit does not allow another to deputise
for him.19 
If the process of obtaining wines for sacramental purposes was cumbersome, that for 
obtaining permission to brew beer for traditional ceremonies such as the Fingo and 
Moshoeshoe celebrations was equally tedious and people considered themselves very 
fortunate to have beer until the end of the ceremony. Mr. F. Galo testified: 
14.Liquor Act No. 30 of 1928. 
15.Manuscripts and Archives, U.C.T. (hereafter MA), BC579 
01. 9. 
16.W. Scharf, 'The Impact of Liquor on the Working Class 

(with particular focus on the Western Cape). The 

implications of the structure of the Liquor Industry and the 

role of the State in this regard', (M.Soc.Sci. thesis, 

University of Cape Town, 1984) 1984, p.78. 

17.Interview, Mr. Galo, Langa, 24 Aug. 1991. 

18.Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923 section 19 (1). 

19.MA, BC 579. 0.1.9. 
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when there was what we call "Umcimbi" maybe circumcision then we 
would see there's some beer there, or maybe it was through the 'mercy' 
of the officials if they come there and they decide that they can allow 
this, if they decide to spill everything they just kick that bucket [of 
beer]. 20 
Clearl y, the liquor laws were a threat to the religious and cultural beliefs of the 
Africans in Langa as the successful completion of any ceremony, Christian or 
traditional, was at the mercy of those in the corridors of power. 
Although the Langa residents had clamoured for the introduction of the permit system, 
they soon discovered it was open to abuse. The Superintendent of Langa used the 
system to extort rent from defaulters. The forced removal to Langa from 1927 had 
been characterised by resistance to the higher rents compared with Ndabeni. Very few 
of those who took up residence at Langa paid rent regularly. Now the Superintendent 
issued permits allowing four gallons per day for every married resident who was not in 
rent arrears. 21 That the Superintendent was using his discretion, independent of the 
municipality, is clear from his admission: 'Whether I am, by law, allowed to refuse a 
permit if the applicant is in arrears with rent, is a moot point' .22 To a local authority 
which by 1930 had an accumulated deficit of £42 500 on Langa,23 its "loyal and 
obedient servant" 24 was being administratively efficient and deserved a pat on the 
back. 
Ironically, however, those householders who were refused permits depended on the sale 
of utshwala to raise the money for their rents. Failure to do so usually led to summary 
ejection from the township. Caught in this dilemma, the tendency by the affected 
women was to continue brewing and risk being raided, arrested and imprisoned.25 The 
sentences ranged from fines to imprisonment with hard labour. Cases in point are 
20. Interview, Mr Galo, Langa, 24 Aug. 1991. 









23.Cape Times, 1 Oct. 1930. 

24.CA, 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2. 

25.CA, 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2. 
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those of Kopolo Siyaya of No. 274 Married Quarters who was sentenced to one month, 
suspended for one year, for being in possession of ten gallons of utshwala, together 
with a fine of £10 or three months in jai1. 26 Maria Mashoba, of No. 442 Married 
Quarters, was sentenced to three months with hard labour for being in possession of 
two flasks of brandy and six bottles of wine. Again, Emily Labule was sentenced to 
three months with hard labour for possessing brandy.27 The list is endless, but these 
severe sentences were not a deterrent at all for the liquor traffic continued unabated. 
For the shebeen operators the most unsavoury part of the raids was the high-handed 
approach of the Superintendent who conducted the raids himself. There were 
numerous cases where he met with a severe reprimand from his victims and one 
incident on 9 April 1939 will illustrate this. On this fateful day, the Superintendent 
went into the Langa Location in the early morning around 6,30 am to raid for liquor. 
At about 7.00 am he got to No. 457 Married Quarters where he asked for admission to 
the house, which was refused. After being delayed for twenty minutes, the 
Superintendent forced his way into the house and, according to him, found fourteen 
gallons of beer - ten gallons in excess of the permitted quantity. While the beer was 
being measured about sixty women took part in a "hostile demonstration" outside the 
house and the two African Wardsmen accompanying the Superintendent were assaulted. 
The woman of the house also assaulted the Superintendent. 28 Realising the threatening 
mood of the women, the Superintendent sent for the police, who apprehended the two 
ring leaders but again, two European policemen were assaulted. When the prisoners 
were taken to the police station, the rest of the women followed and 'created a 
disturbance in the streets and became very rowdy outside the police station, shouting 
for the release of the two accused and demanding admittance to the Charge Office' ,29 













The two ring leaders were charged with assault on 26 April before the Magistrate at 
Wynberg. The first accused was fined £10 or two months' imprisonment with hard 
labour, and the second, £5 or one month with hard labour. Moreover, the registered 
occupier of the house, No. 457 Married Quarters was fined £3 or three weeks with 
hard labour for obstructing the Superintendent 'by failing or refusing to open the door 
of his house in the execution of my duty' and fined £5 or five weeks for being in 
possession of ten gallons excess quantity of utshwala. 
A few observations can be made about the women's conduct. Initially, they were 
protesting against the Superintendent'S raiding for beer as they considered that he was 
doing a police duty. They accused the Superintendent of taking an active part in order 
to bring the system of domestic brewing into disrepute to justify the Council's 
proposals for the establishment of a municipal brewery. 30 At the heart of these 
allegations was a rejection of the Superintendent's interference with their way of life. 
While they did not necessarily approve of shebeens, the Superintendent's actions were a 
naked challenge to an institution which was not only traditionally and culturally 
significant but which was economically indispensable. For others, it was an 
opportunity to vent their anger against the harsh treatment meted out to them by the 
registration office when they entered the location. 
In this incident one can also observe some incipient tendencies towards female 
assertiveness over male authority. It was unusual, if not unheard of, in predominantly 
patriarchal societies, the Xhosa-speaking one included, for a woman to beat up a man. 
But in this case, the women of Langa, without much ado, assaulted everyone from the 
Superintendent and the Wardsmen, to the European Policemen - collectively a symbol 
of oppression. Most remarkable, though, was the extent to which the women of Langa 
rallied behind a fellow woman to the point of physically defending her. Whatever 
reason made them act in the manner they did, it was their ability to fight single-
3D.CA, 3/CT 1/4/6/6/6/4/1/2, Superintendent's Report, 8 May 
1939. 
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handedly (without men) against a system that threatened their very existence that is so 
striking. 
In September 1939 there was a general attack on the beer regulations by the Langa 
Advisory Board. The arrests for the possession of unfermented beer, the heavy fines 
imposed for the possession of even a small excess of beer over the prescribed quantity, 
and the fact that tired workers, as householders, had to queue for hours every week for 
permits, were all intensely disliked. As there was also much talk about establishing 
municipal beerhalls nation-wide in 1938, the Advisory Board attributed these 
difficulties to the municipality's 'campaign against home-brewing to make way for the 
"beerhall mania" of the politically-motivated Native Administration'.31 
The Langa Advisory Board was not alone in voicing its discontent. The Langa branch 
of the National Liberation League (NLL) , a political organisation which claimed to 
fight for "Equality and Freedom", petitioned D.B. Molteno, the parliamentary 
representative of Africans in the Western Cape, on 2 November 1939. Firstly, the 
Langa branch sought clarity on who exactly was responsible for conducting searches in 
houses for beer. 32 Of late the Superintendent had increasingly assumed the role of the 
police in conducting raids, which the Langa residents felt were "manifestly 
undesirable" since 'the Superintendent of Natives (Mr. S.A. Rogers) who is head of the 
Native Administrative Branch of the Council and source of appeal by residents in 
matters affecting the location, should be placed in the position of having to discharge 
duties of a police nature'.33 As the women's assault indicated, the Superintendent was 
no longer trusted by the residents. I 
31.CA, 3/CT 1/4/6/6/6/4/1/2, Minutes of the Langa Advisory 

Board meeting, 12 sept. 1939. 
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The second grievance was against a police pick-up van stopping anywhere in the 
location and searching people for liquor.34 Amongst the numerous cases reported was 
that of D. Mahloane, Vice-chairman of the Langa Vigilance Association. Mahloane 
was stopped by an African constable on 25 October 1941 who demanded to search his 
attache case on the street. Mahloane refused to be searched publicly and asked to go to 
the police station. The African constable complied. Little did Mahloane know how his 
request would be interpreted. Although no liquor was found Mahloane was charged 
with obstructing the policeman in the course of his duty. He was refused bail and a fine 
of £1 was demanded from him which he refused to pay. Afterwards a senior 
policeman allowed bail of £2.35 
The secretariat of the Langa Vigilance Committee was later to condemn the treatment 
given to Mahloane in the strongest terms: 
We wish to protest against the rough and bullying treatment meted out, 
and the bad and obscene language used by responsible officials at Langa 
Police Station, to people arrested and detained there. (Mahloane's case 
furnishes an excellent example of these). Instead of achieving its 
purpose, such undignified behaviour casts a very bad reflection on both 
the victims and officials responsible for them. 36 
Their voice of protest was also echoed by the Episcopal Synod of the Province of South 
Africa.37 
Finally, the Langa Branch of the NLL queried the conduct and right of the African 
police to search passengers alighting from the train at Langa for liquor. People 
resented being pitched into the pick-up van, which was always parked nearby, when 
they objected. An informant vividly recalled how an African policeman nicknamed 
NDIYAKUKROKRELA ("I suspect you"), would stand at a strategic position at the 
railway station and 'as people were coming home from the sub-way, he would look at 
34.MA, BC579 A24.55. 








them and say "Ndiyakukrokrela!" then you must just go to him'.38 The interviewee 
also confirmed that if one refused to be searched or was found with liquor or wine, one 
was thrown into a pick-up van. 39 Nothing indicates more strongly the people's deep­
seated hatred of the system than the fact that a certain Ndiyakukrokrela was stabbed to 
death as a protest against these searches. 40 
The struggles between the Langa residents, the police and the City Council, through its 
administrative branch in the location, were characterised by fear, mistrust, and 
animosity. The Langa residents were not cowed into subservience whoo...they witnessed 
their rights being trampled. The brewers' resolute stand against the Superintendent's 
frequent raids for beer, the failure of the high fines and severe sentences with hard 
labour to act as deterrents and the refusal of the general Langa residents to kowtow to 
police searchings all demonstrate the nature of their implacable resistance. 
PART TWO: 
THE CITY COUNCIL AND THE "BEERHALL MANIA" OF THE LATE 1930s 
AND 1940s 
Nowhere else in southern Africa has the beerhall institution been so violently opposed 
and assumed such political overtones as in South Africa. Its origins in the form of the 
Durban system forms the major part of Paulla Hausse's seminal works.41 Briefly, the 
beerhall system originated in Durban. A commission appointed in 1906 to enquire into 
matters connected, inter-alia, with the illicit sale of liquor to Africans and the 
restriction of beer drinking. recommended that the manufacture and sale of beer in the 
38.Interview, Mr Zandi S. Ntshuntshe of 61 Special Quarters, 
Langa, 31 Aug. 1991. 
39.Mr.Ntshuntshe 
40.Mr.Ntshuntshe 
41.For example P. la Hausse, 'Alcohol, th Ematsheni and 
Popular Struggle in Durban: The origins of the Beer Hall in 
south Afric 1902-1908', (Africa seminar, center for African 
Studies, University of Cape Town, 1983), and la Hausse, 
'Drinking In A Cage: The Durban System and the 1929 Beer 
Hall Riots', Africa Perspective, No. 20, (1982). 
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urban areas should be regulated and placed entirely under municipal control. This 
recommendation became the foundation upon which the Natal Native Beer Act of 1908 
was passed. It provided for the licensing, by municipalities, of individual Africans to 
sell beer. Alternatively, the municipalities could establish a monopoly in their areas. 42 
For obvious reasons, the latter was preferred. In terms of the Act profits from the 
municipal beerhalls were channelled into the Native Affairs Administration Fund 
(which became the Native Revenue Account in 1924). The fund was supposed to meet 
the expenses incurred in the administration of the Act for the "welfare" of the African 
population residing in the locations, but in practice it never did SO.43 Thus the Durban 
system became the model of African administration which was not only applied in 
South Africa but was also exported to Zimbabwe, Zambia and East Africa. 44 
But la Hausse is by no means the only historian who worked on the beer hall system 
and the subsequent riots in Durban in 1929. Helen Bradford plugged a glaring 
lacuna in her illuminating article which showed that women were at the helm of the 
struggle against the Durban system. 45 Her main concern was to bring to the fore the 
hitherto subsumed role of women in the 1929 riots in Natal. They were fighting 
against two oppressive systems, namely the tendency of patritchal society to 
" 
subordinate them to second class status, and the racist oppressive state that instituted 
the discriminatory policies against them. For example, the 1908 Act made the drinking 
of beer in the municipal beerhalls a privilege entirely exclusive to men, and also made 
it illegal to brew beer in their homes for commercial purposes. This robbed women of 
their sole lucrative source of income as their potential male customers gravitated to the 
42.Report of the Native Affairs commission, 1941. Also, la 
Hausse, 'Alcohol, Ematsheni and Popular Struggles', 15. 
43.la Hausse, 'Alcohol, the Ematsheni and Popular 
Struggles', 15 
44.H.F. Wolcott, The African Beer Gardens of Bulawayo, (New 
Jersey, 1974); E.Colson and T.Scudder, For Prayer and 
Profit: The Ritual, Economic and Social Importance of Beer 
in Gwembe District, Zambia 1950-1982, (California, 1988), 
55. 
45.H.Bradford, '''We are now the men": Women's Beer 
Protests in the Natal Countryside, 1929, in B. Bozzoli 
(ed.), Class, community and Conflict, (Johannesburg, 1987). 
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municipal "drinking cage".46 Bradford transmitted "history" into "herstory", thus 
ascribing a significant role to women which, previously, had been ignored by radical 
feminists.47 
Although riots against the beerhall system were a frequent occurence in South Africa's 
rural and urban centres, they were not the only manifestation of African discontent. 
The riots of the 1920s were not merely against municipal beel'-halls. There were no 
beerhalls in Bloemfontein. But there was an equally bloody riot in April 1925 staged 
by women against the series of political raids and arrests for domestic beer as Baruch 
Hirson has graphically shown. 48 The women of Langa were not an exception to this 
kind of resistance. 
The total prohibition of domestic beer-brewing and the permit system were ineffective 
in checking an illicit liquor traffic which was a product of economic pressures. As a 
result, the Native Laws Amendment Act No. 46 of 1937 reversed this policy and 
provided for the operation of three methods of manufacture and sale of traditional beer 
VIZ: 
l.Municipal monopoly - this system, if adopted, would automatically exclude both the 
following methods; 
2.The Licensed African Brewer - under this system, one or more African brewers could 
be allowed to operate under licenses issued by the local authority or regulations made 
by the responsible Minister; 
46.Africans regarded the beerhall as being synonymous with a 
cage in which they would not drink freely as they would do 
at their homes because of the watchful eye of the beerhall 
policeman and and the restrictive times during which it 
would be open - hence the term "drinking cage". 
47.Bradford, '''We are the men", 316-317. Bradford made the 
point that radical feminists promote a 'tendency in 
patriatchal society for "her story" to be transcribed into . /... .
"hlstory"', by WhlCh she meant that the role of women ln 
history is almost always made to be overshadowed by that of 
men. 
48.B.Hirson, 'The Bloemfontein Riots, 1925: A study in 
community Culture and Class Consciousness', Collected 
Seminar Papers, Vol. 13, University of London, Institute of 
Commonwealth studies, 1984. 
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3.Domestic Brewing and Possession of traditional beer.49 
The effect of this Act was tremendous as local authorities in the malO cities of the 
Union implemented it forthwith. From January 1950 50 when the Act became officially 
operative, ten local authorities in the Transvaal and one in the Cape Province 
implemented the first system. These numbers subsequently increased to seven in the 
Cape, fifteen in Natal, eighteen in the Transvaal and six in the Orange Free State. 51 
The Cape Town Council was not to be outdone in the race to establish beerhalls, but, 
although it had the will to do so, it lacked the requisite power because of the concerted 
opposition to municipal trading by a wide spectrum of the Cape Town community. 
Following visits to urban centres with beerhall establishments in the Union and 
Zimbabwe, Colonel W.H. Quirk, Chairman of the Native Affairs Sub-Committee of 
the City Council, and Mr. S.A. Rogers, the Assistant Superintendent of Langa 
Location, recommended that the Municipality assume the exclusive right to 
manufacture, sell and supply beer within the urban area of the City of Cape Town. 52 
The merits of a beerhall, from their point of view, were three-fold: firstly, it would 
cater for the requirements of the bachelor population of Langa who 'have no legal 
method of obtaining their customary beverage except through friends or relatives living 
in the Married Quarters'. 53 Secondly, it would reduce the consumption of liquor and 
thirdly, it would torpedo the illicit liquor traffic. 
The sub-committee believed that domestic brewing was so profitable that men from the 
Transkei sent for their wives and started breweries. There were also, allegedly, 
instances of "loose" men and women who claimed married quarters in Langa on the 
grounds that they were married according to African custom, proliferating the 
49.The Native Laws Amendment Act No. 46 of 1937. 
50. Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1941. 

51.Report of the Native Affairs Commission 1941. 

52.MA, BC579 B.25 Report of the Native Affairs 

Sub-Committee, May 1938. 

53.ibid. See also CA, 3/Ct 1/4/10/1/1/12 Reference by 

Council 10 March 1947. 
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breweries. 54 The third justification for the municipal monopoly was that it would bring 
an end to the, again allegedly, "disgustingly filthy conditions" under which the beer 
was often brewed - a specious concern about the health of the bachelors, whose 
overcrowded conditions were ignored. 
The financial position of the Council may perhaps throw some light on the local 
authority's real motives. The Native Revenue Account suffered from a perennial 
annual deficit almost every year from 1927. For the years 1937, 1938 and 1939 they 
were £6,041; £7,031 and £9,624 respectively. For a local authority which did not 
want to burden the white taxpayer by subsidising the Native Revenue Account, which 
was supposed to be self-balancing, these amounts were quite large. Moreover, the base 
for the Native Revenue Account was very limited. Funds from the Langa residents 
came from fines, pass and contract registration fees and rents.55 Given the historically 
erratic payment of rents, the deficit continually increased. As most of the Langa 
residents were migrant labourers and received very low wages, and there was no large 
scale business sector in the township, there was no reliable tax base.56 If the policy of 
African self-reproduction was to work, Africans had to fund their own administration 
out of beer consumption profits. 
Developments in other urban centres show beyond reasonable doubt that the Cape 
Town's proposal was economically motivated. Two examples demonstrate this. Since 
the beginning of 1938, the Johannesburg Municipality had made handsome financial 
returns from its beerhall centres. In 1938, the profit was £7,092; in 1939, £32,768 and 
in 1940, it spiralled to £63,752.57 The profits for Durban were £38,775 in 1940. 
For the Cape Town Municipality to say that the financial aspect was purely fortuitous58 
in its desire to establish a beerhall, was to hide behind a transparent veil. 
54.MA, BC579 B.25.9. 
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It it partly this exploitative profit-raising aspect of the Council's proposal which was 
objectionable in Langa. In June 1938 the Council's offices were inundated with protests 
from individuals, church, civic and political organisations. The African traders viewed 
the competition of municipal enterprise with intense dislike. A municipal monopoly 
was also to the detriment of the consumer. The Bantu Commercial Union, an 
organisation of African traders, as well as the Langa Vigilance Committee argued that 
the brewing was better done by private enterprise. 59 The municipal scheme would 
throw the majority of African traders out of business as most of their trade was made of 
items required in the manufacture of beer. 6o Moreover, it was not in accord with the 
Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 which provided for the restricted promotion of 
African business or trading. 61 
Municipal intentions were made abundantly clear by the deliberations at a conference of 
municipalities on 28 and 29 September 1938 to discuss the provisions of the Native 
Laws Amendment Act of 1937. The system of licensing African brewers was rejected 
as undesirable. 62 Essentially the Councils wanted to limit African economic 
competition and control the traders tightly. The municipalities pointed out that it was 
not necessary at all to 'concentrate so lucrative a business in the hands of one native. 
however hi&h his repute mi&ht be '63 (my emphasis). The implication of their 
rationalisations were indicative of the extent to which the municipalities viewed the 
African as a "temporary sojourner" in the city who should never join the ranks of big 
businesses.64 
59.CA, 3/Ct 1/4/6/6/4/1/2 Statement of views of the Bantu 
Commercial Union June 1938. 
60.Report of the Native Affairs Sub-Committee July 1939. 
61.Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923. 
62.CA 2/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, Memorandum to Town Clerk on 
Conerence of Municipalities, 22-29 Sept. 1938. 
63.CA 2/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, Memo to Town Clerk 
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The beerhall proposal was also disturbing to the Christian fraternity. The Methodist 
Church of South Africa, Women's Auxilliary, the Western Association of 
Congregational Churches and the Western District Congregational Women's 
Association of South Africa all protested at the detrimental effects of a municipal 
beerhall on the welfare of the Langa residents. They vehemently argued that the 
municipal beerhall militated against the spiritual, . social and moral upliftment of the 
Africans at Langa. 65 
The Christian churches considered it ungodly to sell beer on Sunday under the proposed 
system. They contended that it was biblically unethical and blasphemous to do so. 
They feared that if beer was sold on Sundays, very few people would attend church 
services.66 The churches called for the diversion of funds earmarked for the beerhall 
scheme to the provision of educational facilities which were badly needed in Langa, 
given that municipal participation in the provision of education in Langa was virtually 
nil. 67 There were no proper classrooms and church vestries had to be used. 
The Langa residents also resented the European "overstaffing" and the monopoly of 
jobs in the Langa Administrative Offices, whilst blacks were relegated to menial 
ones. 68 They regarded this to be an 'unfair and unreasonable practice of grabbing the 
African people's rights'. In 1938, they were witnessing yet another attempt by the 
Council to create employment opportunities for Europeans in the form of a beerhall. 
The Langa residents complained through the Cape Peninsula Joint Council of 
Europeans and Africans that: 'The reason for the ever mounting "bureaucratic incubus" 
appears, in large measure, to be the creation of more and more posts for European 
administrators·. 69 
65.CA, 3CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2. 
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The beerhall proposal also threatened to regiment the Langa residents' social, 
traditional and cultural practices. 7o Beer-drinking was part of an indigenous system of 
hospitality which meant that one consumed one's beer with one's friends and relations 
and important social and political issues would be discussed. 71 Some of these customs 
were still being observed in Langa although there is a strong possibility that they were 
changing in form under the influences of urbanisation. The beerhall system threatened 
to alter this much prized custom of limited social consumption. The conservative 
traditionalists argued that the white conception of the "public house" was completely 
alien to them,72 The beerhall system was akin to "drinking in a cage",73 where all and 
sundry would congregate, making it difficult for them to drink only with their chosen 
friends and guests. 
Traditional norms dictated that only senior men and their immediate juniors, who were 
established heads of households, could drink beer. It was taboo for boys, let alone 
girls, even as teenagers or in their early twenties. 74 Although this was changing, 
parents and elders in Langa could still exert their control over the young people. But 
with the coming of the beerhall the older generations feared that the lever of control 
would slip out of their hands: 
The younger boys, who would not be allowed to partake in home 
drinking by reason of their age, acquire the habit of drinking in the open 
public bars. No one is responsible for another and each one drinks his 
fill in a rowdy atmosphere. Under such conditions the social custom of 
drinking together is degraded into drunkenness resulting in violence and 
crime.75 
Langa elders also lamented the fact that juvenile delinquency would increase. Home­
brewing was an institution whose decorum checked drunkenness and rowdiness, 
particularly among the young generation. 76 They were vindicated in this belief as the 
70.MA, BC579 B25.64. 
71.MA, BC579 B25.11. 
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levels of drunkenness, gauged by the number of convictions, was quite low according 
to the the Office of the District Commandant of the Police, compared with that of 
Bellville and Cape Town.77 Prosecutions for traditional beer offences were, in fact, 
much lower than those for the possession of hard liquor. 78 This record, according to the 
Langa Advisory Board and Vigilance Committee, was one that a township of 4 000 
inhabitants need not be ashamed of. 79 
There was support for this view that home-brewing was socially useful from the Native 
Economic Commission of 1932, set up to enquire into beer brewing. It recommended 
that home-brewing and other institutions and customs of the Africans should not be 
broken down. The Commissioners stated that: 'this can only be granted if a case is 
made out for it, but that it should only be refused if a strong enough case can be made 
against it. '80 Invoking this recommendation, the Advisory Board and Vigilance 
Committee challenged the municipality to allow home-brewing to continue undisturbed. 
The strength of the collective arguments persuaded the City Council to shelve its 
proposal in 1940 81 and later it postponed consideration of the Native Affairs Sub­
Committee report on 28 July 1938 and only revived the matter twelve months later. 82 
But in spite of the stinging criticism it had received, the Council decided to put the 
proposal to a second test. Again, it met with resistance. 
The suspension of the beerhall proposal in 1939 was by no means the end of opposition 
to the system. The Native Affairs Commission of 1941 presented a much wider 
77.33, 27 and 22 convictions for 1938, 1939 and 1940, 
compared with 3501, 3577 and 3711 in Cape Town. MA, BC579 
B25.32 Figures from the Office of the District Commandant 
Aug. 1941. Report of the Cape coloured Liquor Commission of 
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platform for the articulation of protest. The evidence given to the Commission by the 
All African Convention Committee (Western Province), the South African Communist 
Party (S.A.C.P.) and the African National Congress (A.N.C.) was significant for its 
radical departure from the mundane issues that had previously been highlighted. Their 
contributions were based on an in-depth analysis of the economic conditions which 
obtained in the Langa township. 
The approach of these organisations, particularly the S.A.C.P. and the A.N.C., can 
only be understood within the context of the political developments of the 1940s. 
Unlike the decade prior to 1940, during which political activity was dormant, the 1940s 
were quite fervent politically. It was an era in which political movements started 
coming to grips with the new challenges and opportunities wrought by the wartime 
industrial expansion which in turn produced an increase in numbers of the African 
proletariat. 83 
At the outbreak of the Second World War there rose a sharp demand for labour and 
Africans moved to the major cities and towns from the countryside. Movement was 
encouraged by the relaxation of influx and labour controls by the State up until 1948. 
This, in no way, symbolised a fundamental change of heart on the part of the State, but 
was a strategy of appeasing the Africans so as to avoid political confrontation at a time 
when its efforts were directed towards the war and also when black labour was badly 
needed. Wages, too, were relatively higher than before the war. However, because of 
widespread poverty, both in cities and the countryside, and shortage of labour in the 
post-war period, the wages were undermined tremendously. At the same time there 
was a sharp rise in commodity prices of staple food and fuel, not to mention shelter and 
clothing.84 This bleak situation saw an increase in the adoption of survival strategies 
that the urban cities could offer to the unemployed, such as hawking, beer-brewing and 
prostitution. To the working class there were so many grievances to be addressed that, 
83.T. Lodge, Black Politics in south Africa since 1945, 






with the non-recognition of African trade unions by the State, strikes ensued. It is 
against this background that the S.A.C.P. and the A.N.C. began to champion the cause 
of the African urban proletariat. 
One of the many issues that political organisations tried to address was domestic 
brewing. The All African Convention (A.A.C.) Committee (Western Cape) took issue 
with the "undue prominence" that the City Council of Cape Town gave to the plight of 
the more than 3500 bachelors who were not provided with their own beer. Giving 
evidence to the Native Affairs Commission, the A.A. C. attacked the paternalistic 
attitude of the Council. 85 Most of the bachelors were migrant labourers whose object 
was to earn and save money to support their families in the rural areas. The beerhall 
system, unlike domestic beer drinking, encouraged wasteful expenditure which was 
undesirable socially and economically.86 The Cape District Committee of the South 
African Communist Party and the President-General of the A.N.C., Dr A.B. Xu rna 
urged that what needed to be radically addressed was the economic position of the 
Africans in Langa and elsewhere. 87 The root cause of the commercialisation of 
domestic brewing was the low economic status of the Africans which no magic wand or 
a beerhall could exorcise. 
The S.A.C.P. and the A.N.C. argued that it was not enough just to improve wages to 
salvage the people from their economic plight. The solution lay much deeper. They 
attributed the African I s miserable economic position to the denial of basic human rights 
and personal liberties. The freedom of the African had to be restored first by the total 
removal of the Pass Laws, Native Service Contract, Masters and Servants Act and the 
Native Laws Amendments. 88 This discriminatory legislation placed severe restrictions 
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on the free movement of the Africans as they could not sell their labour where they 
deemed fit. Their bargaining power was limited or stripped altogether. Thus they 
became potential victims of any unscrupulous employer. The City Council's proposal to 
municipalise beer brewing tended to create an erroneous impression that African rights 
in urban areas were dependent on their right to brew and sell beer and not on their 
political freedom, economic prosperity and social advancement. With the churches, the 
two organisations proposed that instead of spending money on a beerhall, more schools 
and playgrounds should be built. 89 
Lobbying against the Council's proposal by church, civic, commercial and political 
organisations and above all the Langa residents demonstrated the effectiveness of 
passive resistance. There was nothing really revolutionary about it. Although the 
solutions proposed by the S.A.C.P. and A.N.C. were radical, they were not calling for 
revolutionary overthrow of the state but for reforms. Understandably, the political 
organisations' approach was also a way of seeking a political base in the cities by 
addressing the African urban dwellers' problems at a time when there were few 
effective means of articulating grievances. 
The tradition of resistance explains why the municipality failed to establish a beerhall 
on three occasions before 1948. Even though the Council succeeded in opening a 
beerhall in Langa sometime between late 1965 and early 1966, this was a transient 
victory.90 The Student Uprisings of 1976 saw the destruction of 250 bottle stores and 
beerhalls across the country including the Langa Beerhall. 91 This was a veritable 
manifestation of the extent to which the beerhall had become not only a political target 
but also a symbol of exploitation and oppression. 
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MUNICIPAL TRADING IN LANGA 
If the municipality of Cape Town failed to establish a beerhall as part of a new system 
of controlling trade and business on the Durban model, it did succeed in eliminating 
private African enterprise. In achieving this, the time-honoured pretext of improving 
the health conditions of the Africans in Langa was invoked by the CounciL92 In 1938 it 
was the condemnation of the "disgusting filthy conditions", under which domestic beer­
brewing was practised in Langa that led to the Council proposal for the beerhall 
system. 93 In 1943, it was ostensibly the malnutrition of the bachelor class and the 
unhygienic conditions of the eating houses at the Main Barracks operated by African 
traders, which caused the municipality to take over the business. In the same year, the 
Council resorted to health regulations to terminate the trading activities of the women 
in Langa when, in realitY,it wanted to do away with the threat they posed to the eating 
house business. 
Ironically, when taking over the eating house from the four African traders on 1 June 
1943, the municipality described its monopoly scheme as a measure against the 
'prevalence and pernicious advance Ofn1 ! i)'y.!;~mongst Natives, particularly those 
residing under bachelor conditions 1 ;94 conditions for which they themselves were 
responsible. Their actions occurred against the background of an inquiry by the Union 
Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health and Economic conditions of Urban 
Natives (1941-2) which found an appalling amount of malnutrition amongst urban .; 
Africans. 95 The Committee recommended municipal distribution of protective food-
92.For details see M.W. Swanson, 'The Sanitation Syndrome: 
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stuffs. The nature of this involvement was left to the discretion of the municipalities 
and the Cape Town Council decided to administer a dining hall that would provide: 
'good, wholesome meals, giving a properly balanced diet, at cheap rates in the interests 
of the health and well-being of Natives in the Barracks and quarters at Langa' .96 
But malnutrition was not the only problem affecting the bachelors in Langa. The same 
Committee also noted the inadequacy of general health care. 97 Residential conditions in 
the locations were appalling, contributing to chronic disease. Instead of attacking these 
problems the City Council chose to concentrate on a cost-effective project- the eating 
house. 
The municipal trading scheme gave rise to considerable opposition from vested African 
interests. They perceived it as an incursion into their natural domain: 
If White and Black are divided into separate camps, it is manifestly fair 
and in accordance with the basic conception of segregation that the black 
man should be permitted to serve his own people in his own camp.98 
What also exasperated them was the Council's back-tracking from a principle it had 
"wholly" committed itself to, namely that only Africans would carry on the trade in 
Langa location.99 It was this betrayal that was disturbing to the traders, particularly 
those directly affected by the take-over of the eating house. 
Since 1927, municipal policy had been a "progressive" one. It had hired out the eating 
house premises at the Main Barracks, which was comprised of four sections, to four 
African tenants, to sell food to the bachelors. The policy worked quite well as the 
bachelors were not allowed to cook their own food in the barracks.loo However, the 
premises suffered from lack of maintenance. When the Committee visited the eating 
96.CA, 3/CT 1/4/6/1/1/10, History of Main Barracks. 
97.Smit Report (1941-2). 
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house in Langa in November 1941, they described the condition as a nightmare. 101 
This became the excuse for removing the four lessees as the Council blamed the bad 
conditions on 'the incompetence and indifference of the lessees who, lacking energy 
and enterprise, rested on their somewhat monopolistic position to maintain their 
livelihood. '102 
But the up-keep of the premises was the responsibility of the local authority. In protest 
to the eviction orders the four tenants, Messrs Plaatje Petu, Henry Cuba, Julius 
Malangabi and Harry Siyaya, put it to the Mayor that for a number of years they had 
operated their businesses under practically impossible conditions because of the 
Council's total neglect in repairing the premises. Almost every year the Council had 
been reminded about the near derelict conditions. lo3 Each section of the eating house 
consisted of one bare room in which both cooking and serving were done. Now the 
wooden window frames had rotted and the window panes had fallen out. The tenants 
had to cover these apertures with sacks. The worn out stoves installed by the Council 
were broken, so that the smoke, instead of escaping through the chimney, passed into 
the eating house, depositing soot and grime everywhere. 104 
Repeated complaints were also made by the customers through the Langa Advisory 
Board. The Board wrote to the Council in 1940: 
The Eating Houses from which the men obtain their food are in a very 
bad condition, through no fault of the Proprietors. The Ovens smoke, 
there is not adequate room for storing flour and meat and everything gets 
covered in soot and dirt. The Eating Houses should be reconstructed. I05 
The limited variety of foodstuffs provided, along with bread and "vetkoekies", did not 
justify the Council's take over of the eating house. The Council restricted the tenants to 
cooking certain foods and to supplying specific commodities only. In spite of the fact 
that the lessees paid the same licence fees they were not allowed to trade in an 
101.The south African Outlook, Dec. 1941. 
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assortment of goods like other General Dealers in the city.l06 These restrictive 
conditions militated against the growth of a strong African business class in Langa. 
Thus Council policy can be described as one of ensuring the submergence and not 
emergence of an entrepreneurial African class. 
The municipalisation of the eating house shook the pillar of the African tenants' 
survival. It generated a feeling of disgust against the Council which was determined to 
'rob us of our means of livelihood built up after years of effort, without even 
consulting us first and giving us an opportunity of discussing the matter with the Native 
Affairs Committee and making representations. We feel this is harsh and unjust. '107 
The trauma suffered by these men is evident as the three of them, Petu, Cuba and 
Malangabi wondered how they would fend for their families of eight, three and four 
children respectively, some of whom were at Colleges and required school fees. lOS 
As an alternative the Council offered to erect two bakeries at the Main Barracks and 
two at the North Barracks. If the tenants objected to the offer, and it was obvious that 
they would, bread would have to be bought outside the location. The rent for the 
bakeries was prohibitive. Firstly, the tenants faced an increase of rent from £2. lOs to 
£10 a month. Secondly, they would find it impossible to subsist out of these bakeries, 
as they were restricted to selling bread and "roosterkoek" only, unlike the bakeries in 
town which made most of their profits out of the sale of cakes. 109 Unlike the eating 
house business, they stood to lose the profitable trade in boiled meat, beans, mea1ies, 
"vetkoek", amarewu and amasi. 110 
These restrictions were further compounded by yet another set of regulations for the 
bakeries. As licensed bakers they had to operate under the general regulations that fixed 
106.MA I BC 579 B11.40. 
107.ibid. 
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bread prices and wages at certain standards which they could not afford, gIver. the 
nature of their market. For example, they used to sell bread in the eating house at 2 lAd. 
per lb. loaf, compared with the 3d. charged outside the location. II I While pretending to 
be considerate, the municipality made the offer and set regulations in the full 
knowledge that the tenants would find it difficult to comply with them. As the 
municipality expected, the four tenants could not accept the bakery business. The 
Council put itself effectively in control of the business without competition. 
The municipality demonstrated its creeping monopolistic tendencies by arbitrarily 
terminating the licences of the tenants. At two meetings, held on 24 October and 2 
November 1941, resolutions were passed, largely by the bachelors, rejecting the 
municipal scheme. 112 This was symptomatic of the strong communal spirit among the 
residents of the barracks and the tenants, as well as women traders, as will be seen 
later. The eating house was important to the bachelors in that they could get food on 
credit, and could get loans and aid when they were not working. 113 They could not, 
therefore, support the take-over by Council of their reliable form of "social security". 
The Langa Advisory Board and the Vigilance Committee urged the Council, instead of 
establishing a municipal eating-house in the location, to emulate what had been done in 
other cities. For example, in Durban, the municipality opened eating cafes near places 
of work in the town itself. Such a cafe was desperately needed in Cape Town as well 
as in the Docks area, where most workers bought from Greek shops at exorbitant 
prices. 1l4 They argued that in Langa the eating house should be renovated and the 
tenants supported. 115 
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Without giving the Langa residents and other organisations a platform to state their case 
as they had done before, the Council unilaterally decided to take over the eating house. 
Its disregard of the voice of the official African body - the Advisory Board - suggests 
that both the Council and the residents viewed it as a "sham democracy". 
Contrary to its pronouncements that it was not interested in profiteering, the Council 
recorded some handsome financial returns on the eating house. Takings at the kitchen 
rose from £397 in June 1943 to an average of approximately £1,200 per month, with 
the revenue fluctuating broadly between £1,100 and £1,400. 116 It suggests that, by 
eliminating competition, the people had no alternative but to buy at the municipal 
eating house. 
The proceeds earned from the eating house made the Council more ambitious as it set 
about introducing new profit-generating projects in Langa. The Council also approved 
the municipal distribution, at cost, of milk, vegetables, fruit and fuel. 117 Further to 
this, the City Council took over the selling of these items in April 1944 "for the 
benefits of the residents of the Location" .118 In order for the fruit, vegetable and coal 
depot to be self-supporting, the Manager of Native Administration, Mr S.A. Rogers, 
developed a garden next to the Main Barracks-He did so, ejthough no land had been 
made available to the residents for such a purpose, despite the 1942 Union Inter­
Departmental Committee's recommendation that: 
The production of vegetables and fruit in the locations 
themselves by the private efforts of their occupants (my 
emphasis) is potentially a very useful method of 
supplementing dietaries otherwise deficient in these 
protective food-stuffs. 119 
The Committee went on to suggest that the inhabitants be offered free seeds or 
seedlings (from a municipal nursery) and prizes for well-kept domestic vegetable 
gardens. The Johannesburg Municipality tried the scheme and it proved a success, 120 
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but the Cape Town Council chose instead to own and monopolise the vegetable 
gardens. By July 1945, Mr Rogers was able to report that he had made a profit of £18 
on the fruit, vegetable and coal depot and a profit of £256.6s on the vegetable garden 
for the five months ending 31 May 1945. 121 
What was perhaps resented most about the Council! s unpopular trading practices was 
the way in which they nibbled at the means of survival of the women of Langa. It has 
been pointed out elsewhere in this chapter that the 1940s was generally a politically 
turbulent decade. Poverty, the rising cost of living and food shortages became the 
order of the day in the Union. Prices of staple foods rose sharply by 91 % between 
1939 and 1944 with the result that both the cost of living allowances and wages were 
far outstripped. 122 This had been further compounded by dislocations in the supply 
system during the Second World War, which led to a shortage of basic food-stuffs in 
ShOpS.I23 This scenario had a direct impact on African mothers in that: 
Price rises and food shortages directly threatened the health and stability 
of their families and infringed on their daily lives in such a way as to 
force them to look outside the home to the wider political and economic 
context in which they were located. 124 
It is precisely within this context that women in Langa reacted with bitterness to the 
Council's interference with their mainstay. 
For the women of Langa, petty trading was nothing new. In Ndabeni they had 
successfully supplied foodstuffs such as cakes, bread, fruit, vegetables, ginger and hop 
beer to the bachelors. Before 1943, they used to operate "freely" despite the existence 
of the Health Regulations. But the women's small-scale trade was a direct challenge to 
the municipal eating house business and the Council was determined to see it eliminated 
because it was '... losing hundreds of pounds as food at the Eating House was left 
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over. '125 It was in this situation that the Council invoked sanitary considerations. Dr 
T.S. Higgins, the Medical Officer of Health reported: 
When the central eating-house in the township was taken over by the 
municipality the practice [of selling cakes and bread] grew considerably 
and children and others are seen hawking the cakes in the bachelor's 
quarters under undesirable conditions and also selling ginger beer and 
hop beer. .126 
The Council's crackdown policies against the women becomes clear when it is observed 
that this type of trade had been going on for years and no action had been taken against 
them before. Not surprisingly the women questioned the Council's sincerity in 
enforcing the Health Regulations. They protested: 
Dr. Shaddick Higgins condemned the Barracks at Langa only a couple of 
years ago and yet these are still not improved, in fact they are worse. 
Further, when the eating houses were run by private African individuals 
the Council neither cleaned nor renovated them - the condition of these 
deteriorated and became unsafe for HEALTH. 127 
What is striking about the women is their perception of their petty trade as a survival 
strategy and not a hobby. The selling of refreshments, home-made cakes, minerals, 
sheep heads and sheep "feet" and other foods showed the resourcefulness and 
innovativeness of the hard-working and economically active women who could not 
penetrate regular wage employment. For those doing "piece-jobs", 128 petty trading was 
a way of supplementing their meagre incomes or their husband! s. Their husbands 
received low wages ranging from £5 to £10 per month. But it was not every husband 
in Langa who worked and it was also not every woman who had a husband to fend for 
the family - some were widows. 129 It was such a background that forced the women to 
devise strategies of surviving. Accordingly, the Women's Council Section of the 
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Western Province loint Vigilance Association (W.PJ.V.A.) entitled its statement of 
protest to the Mayor in 1943, "NECESSITY IS THE MOTHER OF INVENTION."13o 
Theirs was not a business of such gigantic dimensions as to warrant any trading 
licences, or one that could subvert the Council's monopolies. It was: 
a sort of reciprocal supplementing of earning power; an agreement is 
made whereby a house-wife agrees to help a certain number of friends 
with these commodities that appeal to them. The friends, in tum agree 
to repay the housewife, in cash, for her humane services. 131 
The women felt that their system was one that was not only geared towards the 
generation of profit but was also characterised by magnanimity - it was a kind of social 
service based on mutuality, as payment was made by friendly agreement on the 
convenience of the "debtors". 132 They unreservedly condemned Council actions: 
We are totally against any form of trading at Langa by the Municipality. 
Africans are not allowed to trade anywhere else except in the locations, 
so therefore, instead of taking away this only right of ours, we feel that 
the Council should rather extend suitable facilities for our trading ego 
building premises and letting these to Africans .. \33 
It is no wonder that the African women of Langa joined the Women's Food 
Committee, an organisation that was formed in response to the unbearable pressures 
brought to bear upon them by the rising costs and uncertain supplies of food. The so­
called "food crisis" forced the Government to bow to pressures from the Food 
Committee to ensure a systematic rationing of basic foodstuffs. In response the 
Government introduced mobile food vans. The vans sold groceries that were scarce in 
townships and suburbs at regular prices. It was out of the queues of women that 
formed to wait for the vans that the Women's Food Committees grew. 134 It was to 
become the recruiting ground of both the ANC, the Communist Party and the NLL in 
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What emerges from the discussion is the centrality of the economic conditions among 
Africans to struggle, not only to keep the municipal monopoly system at bay, but also 
to survive. The success of this enterprise could only be realised if the social, political 
and economic conditions of the people were radically improved. Municipal beerhalls 
serve as part of a whole range of recreation and entertainment provisions where people 
could go freely to steam off the mind after a hard day's work. Its success depended on 
competition, as this ensured maximum efficiency and provision of the best quality of 
goods. None of these indispensable ingredients existed in the Cape Town municipal 
proposals for a beerhall and therefore it could not appeal to would-be patrons. 
Denied the right, Africans could not utilise their business acumen to improve their 
status. The problem of malnutrition was one that could not be solved at branch level by 
the establishment of an eating house. The root of malnutrition was the ridiculously low 
purchasing power of the urban Africans. Malnutrition could only be overcome by a 
general rise in wage levels, and a non-paternalistic effort by both Government and local 
authorities to promote the socio-economic community projects that raised people's 
living standards. This could be realised by the extension of legislation, such as that 
which operated for the benefit of European women and children, like the Children's 
Act, to include all the races, particularly Africans. This could only materialise in 
circumstances in which Africans were not denied their political rights. 
The municipalisation of trading activities in Langa and the Council's attempts at social 
control, form a distinct area of urban conflict. Not only do they strike at the centre of 
African urban existence but they also lay bare the contradiction between official versus 
popular perceptions about life in the city. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE OUEST FOR DIRECT ~lCIPAL REPRESENTATION IN CAPE 

TOWN: THE LANGA CASE. 1927 - 1948 

"Certainly it would be difficult to name a city in any part of the world in which 
the governing class has either known or done what justice demanded for the 
poorer or more needy sections of the community, so long as those sections have 
had no effective say in the government of the city. " 
(1 P R Maud, City Government, the Johannesburg Experiment (Oxford, 1938) 
The quest for direct municipal representation is an aspect of the African urban 
experience that does not feature in great detail in the already documented urban history 
of Cape Town. Kinkead-Weekes's most recent article, 'Donald Molteno and the 
Politics of "Native Representation" in Cape Town, 1936-1948' ,I does not help in this 
respect. This is because it is primarily concerned with electioneering strategies 
employed by Molteno versus his opponents in the 1936 and 1942 House of Assembly 
elections. How and why Africans in Cape Town became involved in the campaign for 
or against Molteno as their parliamentary representative is unclear in his paper. What 
has, perhaps, made this aspect a "forgotten" one is the very nature of Cape liberalism 
which tended to cloud the localised African struggles from the eye of the observer. 
The celebrated Cape f native' ranchise as well as the nwnicipal f'ranchise - the 
hallmarks of the Cape (jberal tradition are misleading in this regard. 
The Cape Native Franchise was until 1936, a measure which allowed African 
males of 21 years and above, to vote with and for whites at Parliamentary and Cape 
Provincial elections. Further conditions werewere that they were supposed to be 
gainfully employed and had to be bona fide residents of the Cape Province. They also 
had be owners of fixed property to the value of £75 or earnings of not less than £50 per 
year. 2 At local government level was the Municipal Franchise. In terms of Cape 
Ordinance 22 of 1925, the qualification for the exercise of the municipal franchise was 
1 B Kinkead-Weekes, "Donald Molteno and the Politics of 
'Native Representation' in Cape Town 1936-1948", South 
African Historical Journal, 25, (1991) 
2 BC 579 B28.23 
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either ownership of property worth £100 or occupation of such property of £200 value 
regardless of race or colour. 3 
Whilst it is true that both franchises gave a semblance of direct representation to 
those Africans who qualified, it is also true that the qualifications for the Cape Native 
Franchise and the Municipal Franchise were prohibitive. Given the already prejudiced 
economic and social position of Africans in the Cape, just as elsewhere in the Republic 
of South Africa, where Africans were regarded as no more than "temporary sojourners" 
in the city, it was difficult for them to qualify for inclusion on the common voters I roll 
let alone for the Municipal Franchise. Because of the restrictive laws on and lack of 
house ownership, the majority of Africans residing specifically in Langa Township 
were naturally cut out of the municipal franchise. Although in 1946, the Cape Town 
City Council, in giving evidence to the Native Laws Enquiry reported that the 
occupants of 204 dwellings in Langa could qualify for enrolment as municipal voters,4 
there is no evidence to suggest that their votes were canvassed for in practice. 
THE ADVISORY BOARD SYSTEM: ORIGlNS AND DEVELOPMENT 
Although advisory committees had existed in Pretoria and other towns before, 
the Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923 formally provided for the setting up of 
Native Advisory Boards in every Aflican residential area that was constituted as a 
location or village. 5 
The 1920 Transvaal Local Government Commission had recommended that a 
form of consultation between the Location Superintendent and the location residents 
3 E Hellmann, Handbook on Race Relations in south Africa, 
(Cape Town 1949), 265 
4 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/12 Native Laws Enquiry: Answers to 
Questionnaire 1946 
5 L Reyburn, The Urban African in Local Government: A 
study of the Advisory Board Svstem and its Operation, A Fact 
Paper, South African Institute of Race RElations No.9, 
1960, 24 
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was necessary. Thus the formation of a body such as the advisory board would make it 
possible for the Superintendent to 
keep in close touch with the Natives under his charge - their needs and 
aspirations - thus ensuring prudent administration and general contentment. 6 
The Urban Areas Act left the duties and functions of Location Advisory Boards 
open-ended and this probably explains why the system was often abused. Initially, 
there were only two issues on which the board had to be consulted by the local 
authority. In terms of Section 10 (2) of the Act, the local authority had to consult the 
advisory board before it passed or withdrew any regulation. According to Section 
21(1) of the same Act, a municipality could not pass a resolution asking the Minister to 
give it the exclusive right to manufacture and sell "kaffir-beer" unless it had first 
referred the matter to the advisory board. 7 
However, the Native Laws Amendment Act No. 36 of 1944, widened the scope 
of the advisory board functions. Added to the initial two functions were that the board 
had to consider and report upon any regulations which the urban local authority 
proposed to make or adopt, any matter affecting the interests of Africans in urban areas 
and submit the report to the local authority or the Minister through the local authority 
as circumstances demanded, and any matter referred to it by the Minister or by the 
local authority. Over and above this, the board could take the initiative in 
recommending regulations. 8 
Before 1945, local authorities were not obliged to submit their estimates on the 
Native Revenue Account to the advisory boards for consideration. For example, a 
survey conducted by the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1939 revealed that 
out of the thirty municipalities investigated, only five submitted estimates to the 
advisory boards. 9 But under Act 36 of 1944 (amended into Consolidation Act 25 of 
6 ibid. 24 
7 The Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923 
8 The Native Laws Amendment Act No. 36 of 1944 
9 Be 579 B10.38 
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1945) local authorities were obliged to submit the estimates to the boards before their 
adoption. 
These functions only served as broad guidelines for the framing of location 
regulations governing the constitution, and other matters, of advisory boards by 
respective local authorities. Put differently, it became incumbent upon the local 
authorities to decide and define the modalities of constituting an advisory board within 
the broad parameters set out by the 1923 Act and its subsequent amendments. 
THE LANGA ADVISORY BOARD 
The first Advisory Board in Langa Township was constituted against the 
backdrop of a long and protracted resistance by Africans to the forced removals from 
Ndabeni to Langa from 1927 to 1936. 10 They were opposed, among other things, to 
the high rental charges as well as the transport costs they were supposed to pay upon 
moving to the new Langa Township. From the onset therefore, relations between the 
nascent urban African community at Langa and its landlord, the Cape Town City 
Council in the early years, can at best be described as antagonistic. This probably 
explains the apathy by the residents towards the Superintendent I s attempts to constitute 
the first location advisory board in 1928. 
Advisory Board Regulations applicable to Langa Township were promulgated in 
the Cape Provincial Gazette on Friday 13 January 1928. 11 The Langa Advisory Board, 
which was to be reconstituted annually, was to consist of six members elected by the 
registered occupiers of the Married Quarters, Special Quarters and the Main Barracks, 
and three members appointed by the Council according to Advisory Board Regulation 
53. 12 The Superintendent of Langa was to be elected by the Council and serve as ex­
10 For a detailed treatment of the subject see C C 
Saunders, "From Ndabeni to Langan studies in the History of 
Cape Town Vol. 1, 1984 
11 3/CT 4/1/5/1243 
12 BC 579 B12.5.1 
94 
officio chairman of the Board 13 - this, and the appointment of Council nominees, was 
to arouse considerable resentment among the residents. Of the six members that were 
to be elected, two were supposed to be registered occupiers of, and would represent, 
the Married Quarters, two were to be registered occupiers of the Special Quarters and 
two were to be registered occupiers of the Main Barracks.14 This system of 
representation was rather arbitrary. There was no attempt to make it proportional. For 
example, the Main Barracks housed about two-thirds of the single male population but 
it had just two representatives out of nine. IS They thus could not influence a decision 
of the Board on those issues in which the Barracks residents held views contrary to 
other sections of the location. 
For the Cape Town City Council, the grievances of the Africans, and the heavy 
financial loss it was running into due to their reluctance to go to Langa, underlined the 
urgency of setting up an advisory board. Without an advisory board there was no 
representative or intermediary body that served as a point of contact between the 
Council and the residents. But it was the Council that badly required such a body. The 
Council had made attempts to make use of the Ndabeni Advisory Board to deal with the 
Langa problems, but Langa was not within its jurisdiction. So it was that the 
Superintendent, Mr G P Cook, held a meeting with the Langa residents in February 
1928 to discuss the election of an advisory board. The residents plainly pointed out 
that they did not want to elect a board but rather preferred to have their complaints 
attended to through the Ndabeni Advisory Board. 16 This seems to have been a very 
modest and subtle protest and it appears that the Langa residents knew consciously or 
unconsciously that the Ndabeni board did not have any legal powers to deal with 
matters arising from Langa. It is however not clear whether the Superintendent 
succeeded in having the board elected for the year 1928. What is clear, is the election 
13 3/CT 4/1/5/1243 
14 BC 579 BI2.5.1 
15 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9 
16 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/3 
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of an advisory board in February 1929. This had also been achieved with some relative 
difficulty. 17 
The apparent apathy that had been displayed by the Langa residents regarding 
advisory board elections was one that necessitated an enquiry by the City Council. 18 
\Vhat emerged from the enquiry was that the Advisory Board did not serve any useful 
purpose as it existed in name only. More serious than this was the Langa residents' 
objection to the provision that was contained in the Langa Advisory Board regulations 
for the appointment of the Superintendent of Langa as the Chairman of the Board. 
While not calling for the total dissolution of the advisory board system, they put 
on record the opinion that the myriad grievances the residents had could best be 
addressed if the functions of the board could be strengthened. 19 In this regard they 
suggested the appointment of a European Chairman who was 'entirely independent of 
and unconnected with the Council's administration, but one who knew and understood 
the native people' .20 Although very little changed in future, the Langa people managed 
to extract their first concession from the City Council. It agreed to the proposal and 
immediately took steps to amend the regulations accordingly.2J 
The amended Advisory Board regulations for Langa were promulgated in the 
Provincial Gazette on 2 May 1930. The Council, however, much to the chagrin of the 
Africans, reserved the right to appoint the Chairman of the board who under whatever 
circumstances was supposed to be a European. The first incumbent for the post was a 
Mr Bennie, a former General Inspector of Native Education in the Cape Province, in 
1930.22 This was, thus, a piecemeal reform which did not substantially change 
anything. To this end, Hellmann rightly concluded that: 
17 ibid. 
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... these fundamentally procedural modifications do not touch upon the core of 
the problem, which is to devise a means of allocating definite functions to the 
boards and rescuing them from the slough of sheer futility in which they now 
founder. 23 
There was nothing that could stop the Council from manipulating or influencing its 
appointees whenever it deemed it necessary. 
The Langa residents were so sensitive to the idea of relying on the Council's 
communication channels that, with the many clashes they had with the municipality, 
they decided to set up a central fund to enlist the services of a legal adviser. As a 
result, a representative group of men from Langa approached an attorney, Mr F W 
Burton, in December 1930 and voiced their concern about the election of the advisory 
board that had been proposed. This time they had become a somewhat more radical in 
their demands. The representatives pointed out that the Langa residents were in a 
position to elect a board which consisted of six members and a Chairman, but that all 
should be nominated by the residents of Langa Township so that 'pure and unfettered 
consultation can take place between themselves and the Council. '24 
They also expressed their resentment of the presence of Council nominees upon 
the board. Referring to their experience with the Ndabeni Advisory Board, but without 
being specific, they stated that they viewed such nominees with great suspicion. They 
further contended that the regulations that imposed a European Chairman were ultra 
vires. In their representations to the attorney, they also dwelt on the point of semarltics 
as they argued that the word "may" in the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act gave room 
for the election of an African. 25 Although there can be no doubt that the authors of the 
1923 Act were referring to the appointment of none other than a European incumbent 
23 E Hellmann, Handbook on Race RElations, 267 
24 3/CT 4/1/5/265 Memorandum from Town Clerk to the 
Secretary for Native Affairs, The Natives (Urban Areas) Act 
No.21 of 1923, stated that a European "may" be appointed as 
chairman of an advisory board. This, therefore, was 
construed by the Langa Board to mean that such an 
appointment was discretionary and could mean an African 
could also be appointed. 
25 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/4 
97 
for the post, it is the use of such ambiguous terms as "may" which incensed the Langa 
people because they were not specific on what they were actually referring to. In his 
correspondence with the Native Affairs Committee, Mr Burton put it neatly to the 
former that: 
In view of the fact that the Council have to consult a Native Advisory Board, 
the Natives cannot understand why such words should be construed that the 
Council has to consult itself (that is its own nominees on the Board). They 
desire that the Board shall represent native views pure and simple. 26 
The Native Affairs Committee's response to these representations was curt and simple, 
'the Advisory Board regulations do not permit the appointment of a Native 
Chairman' .27 The refusal by the municipality to move even an inch towards 
rationalising its code of regulations in order to accommodate the residents' demands 
was in itself a recipe for future mutual mistrust and suspicion between the advisory 
boards and the Council on the one hand and the Langa community and the Council on 
the other. Worse still, it reflected adversely on the indifferent and paternalistic attitude 
of the City Council towards the grievances of the residents. But above all, it increased 
the lack of confidence, trust and hope in the Langa residents about the whole 
significance of the advisory board system. 
The question of the Langa residents' dislike of the Council's nominees on the 
board was to feature extensively as from 1943. The case of Mr James Msutu, a 
Council appointee on the Advisory Board, illustrates the Langa residents' disapproval 
of the system. At a public meeting of Langa residents on 25 July 1943, Mr L 
Nonyaza, an Advisory Board member elected by the residents, heavily criticised the 
action of his colleague in submitting a motion in support of the Council's extension of 
trading activities in Langa. Nonyaza's brief speech was punctuated by shouts from the 
audience abusing Msutu for having proposed such a motion. When Msutu was 
summoned to explain why he had tabled a motion to that effect, there were even more 
threatening shouts: "Mbeta! Mbeta!" (Hit him! Hit him!). 28 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
28 CA AWC 3/75/44 
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The residents saw in Msutu a representative of the Council's exploitative 
interests in the location. The heckling and castigation of Msutu is also understandable 
in terms of the Langa traders' and hawkers' interests which were seriously undermined 
by the Council's trading schemes in the location. 29 
A Cape Town City Councillor, Sam Kahn, reminded the Council that the three 
members of the Langa Board it had appointed were extremely alienated by the Langa 
residents. Their views and ideas were perceived as representing the official viewpoint 
of the municipality and hence their position on the board was regarded with 
suspicion. 3D To this end, the Langa Advisory Board on 11 June 1945 adopted a 
resolution calling upon the Council to clearly explain in full the aims and objectives of 
its nominees on the Langa Advisory Board. The response of the Native Affairs 
Committee to this request was rather ludicrous. As if to shift responsibility from itself, 
it replied that the board's request should be directed "not to the Council but to the 
nominees themselves", and went further to state that, 'The Council merely appointed 
three members of the Board in terms of Advisory Board Regulation No. 53. Such 
members did not in any way represent the Councilor owe allegiance to it: they were 
perfectly free and independent members of the Board whose aims and objects were such 
as they themselves determined. '31 
The Council's flagrant response speaks volumes about the manner in which it 
regarded the advisory board and its status. For the Council to pretend that its members 
on the Board had nothing to do with it was to fly in the face of evidence, the story of 
Msutu being a case in point. Moreover, the same Council prided itself on nominating 
the "most intelligent members on the Board".32 It can, in my opinion, only be 
surmised that the Council nominees served as the Council's spies during board 
29 For details on municipal trading activities at Langa, 
see 
30 CA AWC 3/75/44 (?) (?) 
31 3/CT 4/2/1/1/617 
32 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/11 
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meetings, as well as in the everyday life of the location . detecting those issues that 
were seditious or constituted political action against the local authority and the State. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note the Council's preference for Ministers of Religion as 
nominees on the Langa Advisory Board. In the 1933 advisory board elections the Rev. 
J Mvambo of the Wesleyan Mission Church in Langa was nominated by the Council as 
its representative. 33 The Rev. C N Nontshinga-Citashe of the Ethiopian Church in 
Langa was nominated for the 1941 Board. It is highly probable that the Council was 
exploiting the social and religious status of these ministers to further its ends. 
Presumably, in times of crises they could be relied upon by the Council. As church 
leaders they could appeal for calm and understanding. 
Leo Kuper has observed that generally, as far as Africans were concerned, 
participation in European governing bodies did not mean subordination as those 
positions equipped them with skills to organise the people. 34 For Africans participation 
did not necessarily imply subordination. Kuper argued that positions on the statutory 
bodies could be used as a basis for undermining the structure of domination. Such 
structures provided opportunities for organising the people and there were small 
advantages to be gained in the improvement of conditions. 35 This, coincidentally, is a 
fine hypothesis for what Shula Marks aptly called the"Ambiguities of Dependence" - a 
motif that runs through in this chapter. Explaining how colonial domination breeds this 
ambiguity, Marks said: 
a concept of ambiguity is crucial to any understanding of 
domination, even while demanding obedience, and provoking resistance, 
domination operates not simply through coercion but also through 
concessions that theemselves are shaped by the nature of resistance. 
These in tum become the basis of consent as well as of further struggle 
by the dominated. 36 
33 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9 
34 L Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, Race, Class and 
Politics in south Africa, (Yale University Press) 1965, 328 
35.Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, 328 
36 S.Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in south Africa: 
Nationalism and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal, 
(Johannesburg, 1986), 2. 
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Certainly some of the Council nominees were to serve in very important and 
powerful positions in the Langa Vigilance Committee - a civic organisation formed in 
Langa as an alternative, though unofficial organisation, to the Langa Advisory Board. 
For instance, the Rev. C N Nontshinga-Citashe was to serve as Chairman of the 
Vigilance Committee in 1944. His deputy was to be Mr H Gcilishe with whom he had, 
coincidentally, served on the Board as Council nominees in 1941. So too were Mr E 
Mlambo who became the Treasurer, Mr T Faku, the Interpreter, and Messrs G 
Nongauza, J Mafu and J Papu as committee members of the Vigilance Committee.J7 
Therefore, while the Advisory Board system may have had numerous negative 
attributes, it served positively as a training field for the organised leadership that 
Langa could boast of as from the mid-1940s. 
THE LANGA ADVISORY BOARD'S GRIEVANCES Al\1J) THE RESPONSE OF 
THE CITY COUNCIL 
The Langa Advisory Board's significance and prestige were largely dependent 
upon two things. On the one hand, the Board depended on the degree and level of co­
operation, mutual understanding and respect that could be created in the process of 
representations and references as well as consultations that took place between the 
board and the N.A.C. of the Council. On the other hand, it depended on its ability to 
win the confidence of the Langa residents. This it could only get by genuinely 
representing them and being able to extract tangible concessions from the Council. 
More than anything else, this could only be proved by a significant improvement in the 
people's mundane living conditions. 
Because of the contradictory nature of the expectations of the City Council and 
the Langa community, the Langa Advisory Board almost always found itself in an 
intercalary position, a position that was described by M Wilson and A Mafeje as "one 
37 Be.5 9 A24.546 
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linking opposing groups in an authoritarian system" .38 It was, indeed, an invidious 
position in which the Council expected the Board to keep it informed about 
developments in the location, on one hand, and the location residents expected the same 
Board not only to air their grievances, but also to deliver the goods, on the other. But, 
be that as it may, securing the goodwill of either side again depended on the strength of 
the position of the Advisory Board. Clearly, as has already been established, the board 
lacked the authority or executive power to get things done without having to seek 
approval from the local authority. Hence, the incapacity to implement its resolutions, 
let alone its failure to get the approval of the N.A.C., not only adversely affected the 
Board's image and performance, but it also reduced the Board to a mere "complaints 
department" in the location. 
Because of the intercalary position of the Advisory Board, Leo Kuper observed 
that: 
The elected members in particular are faced with a basic dilemma: they are 
accountable to the people they represent, and yet they can do very little to 
remedy their urgent grievances. They can do nothing at all about the major 
Government policies which bear so heavily on their people such as influx and 
efflux control and the payment of economic rentals; these policies are 
sacrosanct. 39 
Caught up in this dilemma, the elected Langa Advisory Board members who 
were equally SUbjected to the policies that affected the people they were representing, 
chose not to succumb to the interminable pressures that were brought to bear upon them 
by the City Council. They judiciously used their positions to hit back at the whole 
municipal machine - thus in a way undermining, from within, the structure of 
domination. The problematic issues that the Board members dealt with were: the 
unilateral imposition of economic rentals, railway fares, the outlawing of beer brewing 
and trading, police raids. Th~also dealt with the arbitrary powers exercised by the 
authorities, particularly the Superintendent or the so-called Manager of Native 
38 M Wilson and A Mafeje, Langa: A study of Social Groups 
in an African Township (Cape Town) 1963, 147 
39 L Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, 334 
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Administration, the policy of influx control and the general indignities suffered by 
Africans as a result of any of these matters. 
One of the many frustrating concerns of the Advisory Board during any year 
was the reluctance or refusal by the Native Affairs Committee to submit the estimates 
of the Native Revenue Account before it. In June 1935, the Advisory Board moved a 
motion requesting that this be done and that the N.A.C. be requested to authorise the 
submission, to the Board, of the details of the salaries paid to the employees of Langa 
Admi nistration. 40 
These requests were necessitated by the Board's and desire to be kept informed 
about the financial administration of the location. It was the Board's contention that it 
could not effectively deal with the problems that inhibited the improvement of living 
conditions in Langa, as it was 
ignorant of the various formalities and restrictions governing capital and 
ordinary expenditure and that a knowledge thereof would no doubt assist the 
Board to a proper understanding of proposals it might be desired to submit for 
the consideration of the Native Affairs Committee. 41 
The N.A.C. refused to accede to the Board's request concerning in particular 
the submission of details of salaries paid to employees of the Council at Langa for the 
benefit of the Board. It however, agreed to authorise the submission to the Board of 
the mon thl y statement prepared for the information of the N. A. C. by the City 
Treasurer relative to the Native Revenue Account. But the statement did not show any 
item except the arrear rents that were owed by residents, the total rents due in the 
location each month, and the amount of cash collected. It also indicated a comparison 
of rents with the corresponding months of the previous year. 42 As far as the Board was 
concerned, the financial statement served no useful purpose, as it did not give the 
slightest clue as to the expenditure on the Native Revenue Account. 43 





The Council's attitude put the Board in an embarrassing position. All that the 
members of the Board could do was to express regret and their utter dismay at the 
N.A.C. 's refusal to honour their requests. The Board was also not blind to the 
incapacitation the N. A. C. I S actions caused it, as the Board clearly stated that: 
without a more particular knowledge of items of expenditure than that to be 
gained from an examination of the printed estimates, the Board was restricted in 
its usefulness as an instrument for advising the Council. 44 
Before 1945 the local authorities were under no obligation to submit the 
estimates on the Native Revenue Account to the Advisory Board. Submission 
depended on the nature of the relationship that subsisted between the local authority and 
the Board. In the case of the Langa Advisory Board, relations with the Cape Town 
City Council were not altogether smooth, with the result that the board was not 
provided with the opportunity of seeing the financial statement in its entirety. 45 
But even with the passing of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 
25 of 1945, very little changed. Section 19(5) of this Act provided that: 
The appropriation of moneys from the Native Revenue Account shall not take 
place otherwise than in accordance with the estimates of expenditure which have 
been passed by the urban local authority and approved in writing by the 
Minister: Provided that before such estimates are passed by the urban local 
authority, they shall be referred by it to its Native Advisory Board or boards for 
consideration and report, and any relevant report submitted by such board or 
boards shall be duly considered by the urban local authority. 46 
Although from 1945, henceforth, Board members were furnished with copies of 
the estimates, they were not entirely pleased with the submission procedure. The 1945, 
1946 and 1947 draft estimates, for example, not only lacked sufficient detail but were 
submitted too late for the Board to discuss and comment upon. The Langa Advisory 
Board protested against the N.A.C. 's common practice of requiring it at short notice to 
deal with the draft estimates. This gave the Board virtually no time to consult the 
residents of the township on any proposals. In a majority of cases it had to call for an 
44 ibid. 
45 3/CT 4/2/1/1/617 Response by the N.A.C. to complaints 
made by the Langa Advisory Board, 10 Feb. 1947 
46 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945 
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adjournment in order to enable it to get sufficient time to debate, but this was often 
rejected by the N.A.C.47 
The manner in which the whole question of the Native Revenue Account was 
dealt with by the N.A.C. not only showed the low esteem in which it held the Board, 
but its refusal to lay before the Board all the details seems to suggest that it had 
something to hide. 
The somewhat unfair treatment meted out to the Board members by the N.A.C. 
over the estimates of the Native Revenue Account issue was enough to prod the 
Advisory Board members into protesting against the Council's indifferent response to 
other matters. Instead of submitting their memorandum of protest to the N. A. C., 
which was the normal procedure, the Board bypassed it and submitted it to the Mayor. 
In this memorandum it accused the N.A.C. of not dealing with the Advisory Board 
according to the letter and spirit of the Urban Areas Act. To quote it, the Board 
pointed out that the N.A.C. did not meet their 
reasonable requests in a sympathetic and cooperative spirit, that it refuses such 
requests without sufficient reason, that it fails to explain adequately to the Board 
the reasons for its decisions on the Board's requests and it does not ensure that 
matters raised by Board members with the Township Administration are 
considered in a manner befitting the representative character of such 
Members.48 
The Board went further to enumerate a list of grievances that were illustrative of 
the manner in which it was treated by the N.A.C. Among them was obviously that of 
the estimates of the Native Revenue Account. The Board's request to appoint its own 
Chairman and Secretary was refused and no reason was given for the refusal. So too 
was the Board's request that its elected members be increased to nine instead of six to 
correspond with the increase in population. 49 The Board's request that the "notoriously 
bad and unhealthy condition of the Barracks and Special Quarters be remedied" was 
casually met with a promise of "investigation". This was in spite of the numerous 
47 3/CT 4/2/1/1/617 
48 BC579 A24.279 
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investigations that had been carried out in the past, including the significant one by the 
Native Affairs Commission in 1941, which had proved beyond doubt that the 
conditions were incredibly unsatisfactory. 50 
Nothing seems to have materialised from these representations, and in a way 
this vindicated the Board I s view that the N. A. C. did not I treat matters in a manner 
befitting the representative status of such Members'. The year 1947 began without any 
improvement in the conditions in Langa or in the relations between the Board and the 
N.A.C. Rather than continue performing its ill-defined duties the Langa Advisory 
Board convened a meeting on 10 February in 1947 at which it decisively resolved to 
adjourn its activities sine die: 
till all the decided matters are effectively implemented and considerate reference 
be effected to every matter pending consideration by the City Council. The 
failure of the Council in carrying out its agreements on these matters dates as 
far back as 1943.51 
To this resolution was attached a list of thirty-one demands andlor grievances which the 
Council was supposed to immediately attend to. Among these were: 
(a) 	 That trading by the City Council at Langa should be terminated forthwith.52 
(b) 	 That the Board objected to the "raw manners and unforgivable attitude" of some 
of the Langa Administration and Registration Office staff members towards the 
residents. 
(c) 	 The practice of the City Council of carrying out measures at Langa to the 
disadvantage of the residents without the approval of the Board and residents 
had to be stopped. This was an apparent reference to the Council's unilateral 
decision to take over the running of the Eating House from African traders in 
Langa in June 1943.53 
(d) 	 That the Board had to be asked to make recommendations when the Chairman 
of the Advisory Board was to be elected. 
But perhaps the most challenging of all the demands was one in which the Board 
had the audacity to demand the abolition of the Native Affairs Committee. In 
expressing its vote of no confidence in the N.A.C. the Board resolved: 
50 	 ibid. 
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52 	 see Chapter 3 
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That since the Native Affairs Committee has repeatedly failed to effect progres~1 
the authorities be requested to abolish this Committee for a better method of 
advancing the desires of residents of the Township. '54 
Although this marked a turning-point in the relations between the Board and the 
Council, the Board's resolution was the result of a combination of a number of forces 
that joined the campaign for the democratisation of urban local government in Cape 
Town. We now turn to the alternatives sought by Langa residents in creating their own 
independent, that is, relatively uncontrolled representative structures and their attempts 
to exploit any available communication channels to air their grievances to local 
government vis-a.-vis the failure by the Langa Advisory Board to serve as an effective 
communication instrument. 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE ADVISORY SYSTEM 

I The Lanea Vieilance Association "Iliso Lomzi Wakwa Lanea" 

The formation of the Langa Vigilance Association in the early 1930s was a 
direct reaction to the increasing ineptitude of the Advisory Board system. Its 
establishment represented the Langa community'S independent initiative and a rejection 
of official municipal control. As an independent non-statutory body, the Vigilance 
Association refused to kowtow to the frequent overtures of the City Council. Despite 
its relatively aggressive and forthright stance the Association attracted a large 
membership surprisingly from the "older and more conservative rent-payers in the 
married quarters of Langa" and not the "younger and more radical people" ,55 especially 
the bachelors.56 The latter viewed the Vigilance Association as being no different from 
the Advisory Board. They scornfully referred to it as the "Superintendent's 
Association" and frequently dubbed it a "collaborationist organisation".57 However, 
this cleavage between the young and the "old guard" did not seriously undermine the 
54 3/CT 4/2/1/1/617 
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56 Mr Jack interviewed by Monica Wilson, 5 April 1956, 
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importance of the Association in the community affairs of Langa. There was no 
evidence to indicate the membership of the Association but it seems that it enjoyed 
widespread support when it took up issues affecting the Langa community at large. 
The Langa Vigilance Association's tasks were no different from those of the 
Advisory Board. They included making appeals to the Langa Administration against 
increased rents, police searchings and raids on individuals, poor sanitary conditions and 
general living conditions. While it had no direct access to the Council as it lacked 
statutory recognition, it nevertheless served as an important pressure group. 
The Association's strength lay in its unique composition. Its representative 
structures were probably a reflection of what the Langa residents would have wanted 
the Advisory Board to approximate. All the office-bearers of the Association were 
elected by the rent-payers at an Annual General Meeting in the Langa Civic Hall. 58 It 
is interesting to note that most of the members who were elected to the Association's 
committees had at one time or another served on the Advisory Board. This may 
account for the future co-operation between the Association and the Board not only in 
criticising the advisory board system but also in demanding direct municipal 
representation. A look at the 1944 Langa Vigilance Association provides us with a 
useful insight into the representative nature of the Association, because that was the 
year its committee was enlarged. Before 1944 it had only four members in its 
executive and seven committee members. 
The Association's executive consisted of the posts of Chairman (occupied in 
1944 by the Rev. C.N. Nontshinga-Citashe, once a Council nominee on the Advisory 
Board), Vice-Chairman (occupied by Mr H Gcilishe; he too was once a Council 
nominee in the same year with the Rev. Citashe), Secretary, Assistant Secretary, two 
posts of Treasurer and that of Interpreter. Besides these, there were twenty-eight 
58 Mr Jack 
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Committee members. 59 Added to this were eleven committees which, to a large extent, 
were a comprehensive representation of the vital aspects of the socio-economic and 
political life of the Langa people. The Association comprised committees dealing with 
the following issues: 
1. 	 ADVISORY BOARD, JOINT COUNCILS AND MEETINGS 
2. 	 AFRICAN CHIEFS - this dealt with issues involving the visit of chiefs to 
Langa 
3. 	 BUSINESS AND ENTERPRISE 
4. 	 CHURCH, HOSPITAL AND SCHOOLS 
5. 	 DISTINGUISHED AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN VISITORS 
6. 	 JUVENILE, DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 
7. 	 LIQUOR 
8. 	 RENTS, HOUSES AND STREETS 
9. 	 SPORT 
10. 	 TRADE UNIONS AND POLITICS 
11. 	 TRANSPORT 60 
A cross-section of these portfolios stands in stark contrast to the ridiculously 
narrow and limited scope of the Advisory Board. The structure of the Association 
shows, among other things, the Langa people's clear vision of what genuine and 
democratic governance should entail. Unfortunately, there are no records which 
indicate the various day-to-day activities of these organs. 
One of the many positive and progressive elements about the Langa Vigilance 
Association is that it was not an exclusively male organisation. Women too were 
represented. There is, however, not much evidence about women's representation save 
some vague references. An informant did confirm that there was a women's section of 
which the structure corresponded in almost every detail with that of the Vigilance 
59 BC 579 A24 546 
60 BC 579 A24 546 
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Association. The women also attended the Annual General Meeting in Langa. They 
however did not even amount to a hundred. 61 
It is highly probable that it is this same Women's Council section of the 
Western Province Joint Vigilance Association (W.P.J.V.A.)62 which presented a 
statement of protest to the Mayor of Cape Town in 1943. Langa women were 
protesting against the City Council's policy of outlawing hawking business in the 
Township at a time when there was a high cost of living, high transport fares and 
rentals. 63 Again women's representation was a marked departure from that of the 
Advisory Board system which never made reference to the position of women in local 
government. 
In principle, the Langa Vigilance Association was forward-looking, as is borne 
out by its motto: uPro~ressu 64 which seemed to undercut the Advisory Board's relative 
lack of success and progress in handling the Langa residents' grievances. 
Although the Langa Vigilance Association had been founded as an alternative to 
the Advisory Board, the two civic bodies did not sever links, but instead their co­
operation increased in opposing the policies of the Native Affairs Committee. There 
was an unwritten agreement between the two about their mutual dependence. The 
Langa Advisory Board at least was the only statutory body which could seek and get 
audience with the N .A. C. and thIS the Vigilance Association could not do unless it 
went through the Board. The Vigilance Association could only get access to the 
61 Mr Jack 
62 The W.P.J.V.A. was a joint organisation of Cape 
Peninsula Africans formed to negotiate with relevant 
authorities about the acute shortage of housing for Africans 
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members from Langa Vigilance Association, Kensington, Cape 
Town, Retreat and Bellville. 
63 BC 579 A24.403 
64 BC 579 A24.546 
110 
Superintendent or Manager of Langa. Similarly, the Advisory Board with its 
progressively waning popularity had no choice but to rely on the popular Association. 
But the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Association were not operating in a 
political vacuum and neither were they the only bodies taking a lead in the local politics 
of Langa. The period after 1936 saw a renewed intense political activity which was 
encouraged by the promulgation of the Representation of Natives Act and the Native 
Land and Trust Act in the same year. This aroused African nationalism which had 
temporarily been in a slumber and there was at the time a very strong crusade for 
political unity between Africans, Indians and Coloureds in order to protest against the 
disenfranchisement of some Africans in the Cape Province who had hitherto enjoyed 
voting rights.65 During the mid-1930's there were a host of branches of political 
parties in Langa, namely the ANC, the CPSA, and the NLL. 66 Their political activity 
perfectly coincided with the calls by the Langa Vigilance Association and Advisory 
Board for direct municipal representation, given the farcical representation that the 
Advisory board system offered. 
The Langa Vigilance Association and the Langa Branch of the National 
Liberation League, organised a meeting of Langa residents in October 1941 at which 
demands were made that it was high time the African people residing in locations had 
their own representatives on the City Council. It was also resolved that the Council 
should amend the Municipal Council Ordinance to enable Africans to return their own 
representatives to the City Council who had to enjoy the same rights and privileges 
accorded ordinary Municipal Councillors. 67 
65 L Kuper, "African Nationalism in south Africa 1910­
1964", M Wilson & L Thompson (eds) , The Oxford History of 
South Africa II, Oxford, 1971, 437 
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History Dept., UCT, 1989, 50 
67 BC 579 B10.22 
11.1. 

The campaign for municipal representation seemed to be gathering momentum 
by the end of 1941, as two months after the Langa meeting the Location Advisory 
Boards Congress68 passed a similar resolution urging all Municipal Councils to consider 
the possibility of having African people residing in urban locations represented on 
municipal councils in much the same way as Africans represented in the Senate and the 
House of Assembly.69 
Beginning from the 1940s, the people of Langa, and elsewhere in the country, 
had quite evidently shifted from the practice of simply criticising the weakness of the 
Advisory Board system to a radical demand for genuine municipal representation. The 
Vigilance Association, which was fairly representative and more active than the 
Advisory Board, embarked on and led a massive campaign for direct municipal 
representation. On 17 June 1942 a deputation comprising members of the Langa 
Vigilance Association, the Langa Advisory Board and the Langa Branch of the National 
Liberation League, submitted a memorandum to the City Council on the subject of 
African Municipal Representation.7o 
In support of the principle of African Municipal Representation, the deputation 
put forward a number of motivations coupled with demands to that end. They argued 
that Africans at the national and local levels unanimously and badly desired that 
municipal representation be accorded to them. They questioned the logic of providing 
direct African representation in Parliament and the Cape Provincial Council whereas 
the same principle could not be used in local government. As far as they were 
concerned, local governments were charged with important powers, functions and 
duties with respect to the governance of the urban population in aspects such as 
housing, social services, trading licences, beer control and the regulation of residential 
68 Location Advisory Board Congress - founded in 1928 ­
was a body of affiliate location Advisory Boards that met 
every year to discuss issues concerning the running of 
African urban locations. 
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70 BC 579 BIO.22 Memorandum for Presentation to the 
Finance and General Purposes Committee of the City Council. 
112 
rights. They therefore argued that since that was the case, it followed that Africans had 
to have a voice in relation to these important matters that affected their everyday lives, 
if the principle that "Africans should have a direct voice through their elected 
representatives, in national and provincial policies affecting their interests", was to be 
upheld. 71 
The delegation dismissed the provision for the election of an Advisory Board in 
every township and the existence of a Native Affairs Committee as an adequate reason 
that could be invoked to explain why direct representation could not be granted. They 
further argued that, no matter how much interest and concern the members of the 
Native Affairs Committee showed in the welfare of the African community, it was 
common knowledge that they were elected by the white ratepayers which apparently 
excluded the residents of Langa.72 In relation to this E Hellman had this to say about 
the fallacy of white councillors "representing" African location residents: 
No councillor, no matter how genuine his goodwill, can promote African 
interests without antagonizing at least a portion of his white electorate. 73 
To a large extent, the conduct of the Native Affairs Committee in its treatment or 
handling of matters brought before it by the Langa Advisory Board, reveals a careful 
attempt not to engage in issues that could end up in ratepayers subsidising the Langa 
residents. 
There is also a kernel of truth in J P R Maud's observation which neatly relates 
to the deputation's contention. He stated that: 
There are few occasions in history where a privileged section of any community 
has succeeded even in knowing what are the needs and just demands of the 
unprivileged, still less in satisfying them ... so long as those sections have had 
no effective say in the government of the city. 74 
This fitting summation encapsulates the contradictory causes of the ever frictional and 
sometimes volatile relationship between the Langa residents and the N.A.C. This state 
71 ibid. 
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of affairs was largely the result of the N.A.C. 's failure, or, to respond to, and show an 
appreciation of, the needs of the Langa community. This leads us to the second 
contention of the deputation. 
It unreservedly criticised the Advisory Board system. 'The Advisory Board, as 
its name implies, has advisory functions only - it has no statutory powers. '75 The 
deputation went further to point out that Africans no longer wanted nominal 
representation but desired a 'direct voice in the body that makes regulations affecting 
their interests and frames the estimates of the Native Revenue Account to which they 
are the chief contributors. '76 
They put forward three precise demands/proposals to the CounciL Firstly, they 
demanded the inclusion of three African representatives on the Cape Town City 
Council and that these had to be elected by the Langa rent-payers. They also demanded 
an extension of the rights of Africans to purchase and lease land in the municipal area 
generally. If this was done, it would not only naturally increase the extent of African 
municipal representation, but also enable some of the Langa residents who were 
precluded from voting for Councillors because they occupied municipal houses, to do 
so. 
Lastly, the deputation emphasised the need for electing only those Africans who 
resided in Langa Township and only by the Langa rent-payers. They contended that 
such a condition served to guard against the election of any African from outside 
Langa, because, as the law stood, there was nothing that precluded an African from 
being a Councillor even if elected by European or Coloured ratepayers. 77 




Similar calls for municipal representation nationwide weie made by the Natives' 
Representative Council in the same year. 78 Other political organisations such as the 
Cape African Congress and the Cape District Committee of the Communist Party of 
South Africa backed the campaign as well. 79 
These requests were snubbed by many local authorities. In 1942, the Union 
Native Affairs Department asked Provincial Secretaries to solicit the views of 
municipalie~ on the question of granting Africans direct participation in local 
government. A few of them accepted the idea, but the majority, including Cape Town, 
rejected it outright. 80 In fact, in the same year, out of forty municipalities represented 
at a meeting of the Municipal Association of the Transvaal, thirty-seven opposed the 
idea. Again, almost all municipalities that submitted evidence to the Fagan 
Commission, 1946-8, remained obdurate in this regard. 81 
The Langa civic bodies were not daunted by the fruitless outcome of their 
demands. Instead the Vigilance Association and the Advisory Board continued to press 
for direct representation on numerous occasions. After 1942 these two bodies entered 
into a marriage of convenience and increasingly acted jointly in either protesting against 
unpopular Council measures, or mediating in local community disputes. This, in a 
way, served to undermine the Council's grip on the Advisory Board, particularly when 
it was allegedly "infiltrated" by communists, as we shall see. 
In October 1943, the Langa Vigilance Association, the Advisory Board, as well 
as the Retreat Vigilance Committee, jointly reacted to the Report of Mr Slarke, 
Inspector of Urban Locations on Conditions of Africans in the Cape Peninsula, of 21 
April 1943. They criticised some of the views in the Report as misrepresentations of 
the truth. They attributed this to the fact that the most affected people, the African 
78 Be 579 B10.38 
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people, were not consulted on the subject. 82 They further pointed out that they ha.d not 
been invited to a Conference considering the proposals of the Report: 
Our Parliamentary Representatives were invited to the Conference with the local 
authorities in the capacity of auditors only and no Africans were invited to 
attend. s3 (my emphasis) 
The joint bodies also emphasised their right to be consulted: 
We wish to press most strongly our claim to be consulted in relation to the 
whole position, more particularly as we note with concern the irresponsible 
attitude of so many of the representatives of the local authorities who attended 
the Conference. 84 
Their claim justifies their call for genuine and direct representation without 
which their condition would always be misrepresented. Lack of genuine representation 
and the resulting ignorance bred suspicion which in turn led to hostility. 85 Hence the 
joint bodies questioned the legitimacy of the authorities' actions of discussing the 
condition of an unrepresented, let alone unconsulted, people. 
The Advisory Board in Langa seems to have lost a lot of ground to the 
Vigilance Association by the mid-1940s. What the Board was losing in terms of 
influence, the Association was gaining. In some instances the Association, dispensing 
with established protocol, by-passed the Advisory Board as the legally constituted 
mechanism for channelling grievances to the N.A.C. But what is all the more striking 
is the Association's protest activities on behalf of the Advisory Board to the Council. 
A sound example is one resulting from the Langa Advisory Board meeting of 11 
October 1943, at which Board members queried the failure by the Council to consult 
the Board, as laid down by the Urban Areas Act, about the scheme of supplying soup 
to school children in Langa. 
82 BC 579 B10.241, Memorandum by the Langa Advisory Board 
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The Chairman of the Board, Mr. S.l.Fort, instead of responding to the query, 
openly retorted that the members had "stupid senses". When Board members called 
upon him to withdraw his "unjustified utterance and apologise for his unwarranted 
behaviour", Mr Fort declined to do SO.86 
After a public meeting of Residents at which a report was given of what had 
transpired at the Board Meeting, the Langa Vigilance Association, acting upon the 
authority of the residents, dispatched a strongly worded protest to the Town Clerk (and 
not to the N.A.C.) against the behaviour of Mr Fort. It read in part: 
His attitude was both unjustified and unreasonable and his utterance has 
been calculated to cast a reflection on the abilities and capabilities and 
integrity of the Board Members and the Langa Electorate as a whole. 87 
Whilst the Langa residents as well as the Vigilance Association no longer 
seriously approved of the functions of the Advisory Board, it would seem that they still 
upheld the dignity and integrity of the Board Members as individual~. Hence, they 
were prepared to lodge a common protest against the affront and, worse still, one 
coming from an unelected European incumbent whose replacement with their own 
elected African Chairman, they had always campaigned for, time and again. The 
Vigilance Association's concern too about the besmirched 'abilities, capabilities and 
integrity of the Board Members' says a lot about its relationship with the Board. The 
Board seems to have been used as an instrument for political or other ends. 
The Association managed with a measure of success to influence the Advisory 
Board, as it was responsible for organising the election of the Board members who 
were then co-opted into one of the Association t s committees as ex-officio members. 88 
Political parties also fielded their candidates to stand for election. Both the Langa 
Vigilance Association and the Langa Branch of the Communist Party of South Africa 
(CPSA) registered a victory when they won five positions out of the nominated six for 
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the Langa Advisory Board in 1944.89 Details on the participation of political 
oganisations are considered in Chapter 6. 
II Dependence on D B Molteno: liThe Native Representative" 1937-1948 
It is quite paradoxical that while Africans in the Cape hated all that the 
Representation of Natives Act of 1936 stood for, especially the establishment of a 
separate voters' roll, the very same people increasingly came to rely on the separate 
political institutions that it provided. The Act provided for the election of five white 
representatives by qualified Africans in the Cape on a separate roll, three in the House 
of Assembly and two in the Cape Provincial Council. Provision was also made for the 
election of four whites to represent Africans in the Senate as well as for the 
establishment of a Native Representative Council to serve only in an advisory capacity. 
It would include African members indirectly elected. 90 
In spite of the numerous protests against this arrangement, Africans eventually 
chose to rely on these structures of representation for want of anything better. Political 
organisations, as noted, particularly the ANC, the CPSA and the All African 
Convention (AAC) at least before 1948, came to accept this as a "useful" structure 
which they could, with expediency, use to their benefit. 
But for the Langa residents who did not qualify for the vote at all, because of 
reasons already stated, it was not so much the need for parliamentary representation 
that they came to rely on Donald Molteno, the first "Native Representative" for the 
Western Cape. Evidence suggests that they did not see him, in the first instance, as a 
Parliamentary Representative, but as someone who could, because of his influential 
89 N Mohamed, "Langa High School: The Struggle for 
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position and probably to a large extent his liberal disposition, help them in redressing 
their grievances with the City Council. This dependence was particularly reinforced by 
the failure of the Advisory Board to effectively and meaningfully represent them. Put 
loosely, Molteno served as an "ombudsman" - investigating complaints against the 
municipality, the Langa Administration, and the police and advising people on legal 
issues. 91 As if to acknowledge its ineffectiveness, the Advisory Board and the Langa 
Vigilance Association too, enlisted his services. 
One of the many grievances that the concerned Langa residents took to Molteno 
was about the seemingly changing role of the Superintendent. On 2 November 1939 
they put it to Mr Molteno that it was unbecoming for the Superintendent in his capacity 
as the substantive head of the Administrative Branch of the Council to assume the 
duties of a policeman, viz., conducting beer raids and searching for liquor in their 
houses. They contended such conduct made it extremely difficult for them to appeal to 
him for help, because their trust in him was fast eroding.92 
They also complained about the embarrassing and indiscriminate searches for 
liquor by the "Native Police" to those who had just returned from work at Langa 
Railway Station. In November 1943 Molteno wrote to the District Commandant of the 
South African Police, investigating the numerous complaints about "Native Police" 
conduct and the whole practice of searching. He cited the arrest of a prominent Langa 
resident, Mr Daniel Mahloane, the Vice-Chairman of the Langa Vigilance Association, 
as highly representative of the many similar cases brought to his attention. Molteno 
highlighted the view that no consideration had been taken of the fact that Mr Mahloane 
did not drink at all - something well known by the Langa police - but that he was 
simpl y a dealer in patent medicine and yet the police searched and fined him. 93 
91 D Scher, Donald Molteno "Dilizintaba - He-Who-Removes­
Mountains", (Johannesburg, 1979), 48 
92 3/CT 1/4/6/6/6/4/1/1, Memorandum from the Langa 
Advisory Board to the Town Clerk 1 July 1939 
93 BC 579 A24.431 
119 
On another occasion, Molteno wrote to Mr S A Rogers following an appeal to 
him (Molteno) by representatives of the Main Barracks residents. Molteno stated: 
I was much disturbed at the unsatisfactory relations which apparently exist at 
present between the Administration and these residents, to a large extent based 
on misunderstandings. 94 (my emphasis) 
Molteno's express disappointment underscores the significance and the residents' desire 
to have genuine and direct representation which would have ensured that "mis­
understandings" did not occur. 
In reference to one of the "bachelor's" grievances - that they were expected to 
take tickets from the Administration as permission to collect wood, when previously 
they had never used tickets - Molteno warned the Manager about the unpleasant 
consequences of making abrupt unilateral changes in administrative practice, 'simply 
because some individuals have cut wood is, I submit, going a bit too far without 
warning' . 95 
From 1938 onwards Mr Molteno became a popular and outspoken spokesman 
for the Langa residents, against the proposal by the City Council to establish a beer hall 
in Langa Township. The crux of his anti-beer hall stance was that the fact that the 
"bachelors" did not have a place from which to consume beer, unlike the married 
people who could, if granted permission, brew beer in their houses. So the provision of 
a beer hall did not solve the underlying problem. According to Molteno, the problem 
was the Council's policy of building many structures for bachelors and very few for 
married people. This imbalance made it impossible for the Council to allow for 
domestic beer brewing.96 
Molteno, however, did not always succeed in getting the Council to positively 
respond to the residents' complaints and neither did he always manage to placate the 
Langa residents. In March 1947 he tried without success to persuade the Langa 
94 BC 579 A24.488 
95 BC 579 B25.64 
96 ibid. 
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residents not to engage in a riot against the long-drawn-out beer hall question in Langa. 
But after the small-scale riot, Molteno successfully defended twenty-two residents who 
had been charged with either inciting this show of resistance or damaging the Eating 
House which was earmarked for the beer hall. 97 
The local leadership in Langa, especially from the Advisory Board and the 
Langa Vigilance Association, maintained a close working relationship with Molteno up 
until 1948 when he declined to seek re-election. This relationship was either in 
appreciation of the services and contributions to the Langa community, or the benefits 
likely to accrue to some of the leaders from such a relationship. What immediately 
comes to mind is example of the Rev. C.N. Nontshinga-Citashe who, it seems, never 
missed an opportunity to appeal to Molteno for contributions towards the construction 
of a building for his Ethiopian Church of South Africa, the official opening of the 
Church, the celebration of the Church's Silver Jubilee, and his completion of twenty­
five years' service for the Ethiopian Church.98 
But perhaps, on a more profound note, the mounting disillusionment resulting 
from the ineffectiveness of the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Association and the 
outright refusal by the Council to grant direct municipal representation, motivated the 
leadership to rally behind Molteno, particularly in times of his election campaigns. 
During the election campaign of 1942, Molteno drew most of his support, as 
well as members of the election committee, from the All African Convention. His 
election committee consisted of the AAC's regional committee chairman, Mr A V Coto 
and its secretary, Mr A J Jayiya. The two became chairman and secretary of Molteno's 
election committee. Included in the committee were Messrs. Bill Ntshinga from the 
Langa Vigilance Association, J Malangabi and C N Nontshinga-Citashe of the Langa 
Voters' Association and P Petu and W Ndunyana, both Advisory Board members in 
97 B Kinkead-Weekes, "Molteno and 'Native 
Representation''', 123 
98 Be 579 A24.599 
121 
Langa. Added to this list were also A Ndlwana of the Langa branch of the National 
Liberation League and finally Welcome and Veldtman, both representatives of the 
Dock Workers' Union. 99 
The leaders' political relationship with the "Native Representative" was, 
however, brought to an end by Molteno's decision not to seek re-election in 1948. 
This was to coincide with the climacteric rise to power by the Nationalists in the same 
year which dashed the Africans' hopes of attaining direct representation in 
governmental structures. 
The politics of non-representation in Langa formed part of the jigsaw puzzle of 
social and political control over Africans residing in urban locations. It was also a 
struggle between the Council to control the Langa residents and the latter to control 
themselves. In this respect, the City Council was not prepared at all to surrender its 
control over Langa to any organisation. The Council's position was clearly stated in no 
uncertain terms by the Acting Town Clerk in December 1941, 
"The Council can obviously not invest the Board with any form of control in the 
administration of the location which would have the effect of abrogating its own 
judgement and discretionary powers. "100 
Disillusionment resulting from the Municipality's grip on location affairs and its 
reluctance to respond meaningfully to the residents' demands, saw the Langa residents 
taking recourse to initiatives of their own. 
99 Kinkead-Weekes, 118 




COMMUNITY AND CLEAVAGE IN LANGA: 1927-1948. 

The ties of kinship, ethnicity and clientage can either be a source of 
mobility or the basis of a dangerous autonomy - cultural as well as social 
- among the poor that ruling classes might contain but cannot penetrate. l 
THE COMMUNITY AT NDABENI: 1901-1927 
Any serious analysis of the growth of the community in Langa from 1927 cannot be 
attempted without turning the clock back to the days of Ndabeni I s existence. The life­
span of this once "sprawling" African Location, among other things, tells the story of 
commmunal solidarity which even the threat of forced mass removals could not 
destroy. Such a reference helps us to establish the continuity of the tradition of 
resistance which was to characterise the existence of Langa, albeit, in a regenerated 
form. 
Communal solidarity in Ndabeni manifested itself in the existence of kinship and family 
ties, church groups and other forms of social mechanisms which promote and 
demonstrate the existence of such communality. 2 Naomi Barnett has celebrated the 
growth of such a community in Ndabeni.3 Although the Ndabeni residents were a 
people who had been forcibly brought together they immediately went about structuring 
and organising themselves into a formidable closely-knit community. There emerged a 
strong leadership from the location I s clergy, luminaries such as Rev. Elijah Mdolomba 
of the Wesleyan Church, and Rev. Ebenezer Makabulo, an Evangelist. Outside the 
church were people like Alfred Mangena, one of the founding members of the A.N.C. 4 
1.Cooper, 'Urban Space, Industrial Time and Wage Labour in 
Africa', 38. 
2.B.Bozzoli, 'Class, Community and Ideology', 29. 
3.N.Barnett, 'Ndabeni 1901-1910, Towards A Social History: 
The First Ten Years of Cape Town's First Official Location', 
(B.A. Hons. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1985). 
4.Barnett, 'Ndabeni 1901-1910', 92. 
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These community leaders became the people's spokesmen against central and local 
states policies. 
The people's participation in the Legislative Council meetings in 1908, and in meetings 
in 1909, to discuss their destiny in relation to the constitution of the proposed Union of 
South Africa is something Barnett hailed as a clear sign of the emergence of 'an 
articulate and informed community·.5 Religious and educational institutions were 
established. By the end of 1901 there were six established churches, the African 
Methodist Episcopal, the Salvation Army, the Church of England, the Presbyterian, 
Congregational and the Wesleyan Methodist. A government- financed school and 
denominational schools were established to cater for all children of school-going age. 
Churches provided night schools where adults within and without Ndabeni could go and 
study after work, a significant development that was, however, not approved of by 
some employers of domestic labour who felt inconvenienced by the absence of their 
domestic servants in the evenings. 6 
The continuation of traditional-cultural practices, adapted to suit and meet urban 
conditions also demonstrated the nature of the community that was evolving in 
Ndabeni. Because of the interactions necessitated by these institutions, there emerged a 
strong community whose presence the white community and the local authority could 
not take for granted. 
But it was also a community upon which the first experiment on the effectiveness of the 
Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 was attempted. The Act, however, also provided 
an opportunity for the Ndabeni community to test its own resilience. From 1927 this 
community was uprooted and broken up and it only managed to come together, again, 
in 1936 but with new and daunting challenges to face, namely struggles around high 
5.Barnett, 'Ndabeni 1901-1910', 100. 
6.Barnett, 'Ndabeni 1901-1910', 117. 
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!"ents, bus fares, rigid influx controls, the brewing and selling of beer, trading 
activities, lack of freedom for political activity, denial of municipal representation etc. 
In Ndabeni and Langa, there were different classes of people- a small African petty­
bourgeoisie which comprised ministers of religion, small traders, businessmen, school­
teachers; the working-class, probably the largest class; and a 'rapidly expanding 
"underclass", where the unemployed merged, for shorter or longer periods, with the 
Location's lumpenproletariat',7 were "squashed together", as it were. Their only 
distinguishing feature was "race". 8 Subjected to the same debilitating, living 
conditions, high rentals, overcrowding, rigorous controls and very restricted avenues of 
self-advancement imposed by the domineering central and local states in Ndabeni, a 
spirit of defensiveness, which transmuted into collective popular protest, was forged. 9 
It is interesting to note the instances of individualised forms of resistance which 
perfectly merged with generalised resistance. Certain individuals were fighting for 
entirely different aims from those of the majority of people who happened to be 
struggling against identical pressures. A good illustration of this, is that of William 
Sipika of Ndabeni whose life-long dream was that of establishing a business enterprise 
in a location and resigning his job as a dock labourer. When Sipika realised that his 
long-term ambitions remained a pipe-dream, he joined a campaign of mass protest 
against rent-payments in the location in 1901-1902.10 It is possible that there were 
many like Sipika who went unnoticed even in Langa. 
7.I.R.Phimister and C.van Onselen, 'The Political Economy of 
Tribal Animosity: A Case study of the 1929 Bulawayo Location 
'Faction Fight" " Henderson Seminar No.44, (Dept. of 
History, University of Rhodesia, 1978), 25. 
8.Bozzoli, 'Class, Community and Ideology', 28. 
9.Saunders, 'The Creation of Ndabeni', 176. 
10.Saunders, 'The Creation of Ndabeni', 176. 
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THE LANGA COMMUNITY: 1927-1948 
The forced relocation of Ndabeni residents to Langa in 1927 and the protracted 
collective resistance they resolutely put up was a demonstration of an internal solidarity 
that had been weaved since 190 l. This "externalised" protest continued in the form of 
an "internalised" resistance once all the people had been moved to Langa by mid-1936. 
But this begs the question, what made that collective communal response in Langa 
possible, especially among people who were physically and structurally divided into 
migrants and permanent residents, single/bachelor and married men? However, we 
need to go, not only beyond this, but also deeper and bring to the surface the 
subterranean social and political cleavages which existed among the Langa community 
but were almost obliterated by communal action. 
In answering the question posed above one is immediately reminded of Yoshikuni's 
sound criticism that community-formation is not mathematical. ll He argued against 
making an 'automatic equation between the process of industrialisation and the making 
of African working-class communities' . Why? Because, 
This equation, if made in a rigid and collective and static way, would 
take us nowhere towards the explanation of collective action among 
urban Africans at the earliest stages of industrialisation and would make 
unintelligible the "stratigraphical" nature of African urban culture, each 
stratum of which was the product of a particular African experience. l2 
He went on to say: 
In the face of the history and nature of African participation in wage 
employment, it is rather natural that the "base" strata of African urban 
culture received strong injection of peasant traditions; so, workers were 
bound together, among others, by human relations very familiar to them, 
that is ethnic and regional ties. 13 
Several forms of human relationships went into the formation of the Langa community 
as manifested by the creation of social institutions. The residents' cardinal objective 
11.T.Yoshikuni, 'strike Action and Self-Help Associations: 

The Emergence of An African Working Class in Zimbabwe, 

1918-21', (unpub.Seminar Paper No.68, Dept. of History, 

University of Zimbabwe, no date), 26. 

12.Yoshikuni, 'Strike Action and Self-Help Associations', 26 

13.Yoshikuni, 'Strike Action and Self-Help Associations', 26 
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was to make their existence livable, me.ar.ingful and fulfilling. A sense of common 
geographical origin (expressed through what was known as "home-boyism") prevailed. 
Black African labour was extracted largely from the Eastern Cape and Transkei as far 
back as the late 1830's. From these areas came the Mfengu and the Xhosa-speaking 
people who formed the overwhelming majority of Africans in Cape Town. l4 Wilson 
and Mafeje attested to the view that the concept of common origin was a very 
important facet in the formation of a close-knit community especially among the 
migrant labourers. They stated that: 
Common origin may provide a basis for friendship and co-operation, and 
a townsman who originally came from Middledrift will call a friend 
from that district his home-boy , and those who have grown up in Langa 
are home-boys vis-a-vis country migrants, or workmen from 
Johannesburg, but nOfoup holds together without some common interest 
other than the home tIe. (myemphasis).l) 
"Home-boyism" was such a strong force that sports clubs in Langa were actually 
established on that basis. Rugby and soccer clubs were formed and given names which 
reflected where the membership of those clubs hailed from. For instance, there were 
teams such as the Basutoland Happy Lads, Bechuanaland Swallows and the Transkeian 
Lions. There were, interestingly, splits in these clubs based on the urban-rural 
dichotomy, so that, ironically, the same force that tended to bring people together 
could also serve as the basis for a cleavage. l6 A rugby team called the Busy Bee, for 
example, comprised members from King Williams Town. An increase in membership 
also lea to increased differences and this eventually led to a split between those from 
the "town" and the "country". The result of this was the establishment of the Harley 
Queens, made up of members from the countryside and who resided in the barracks. l7 
The proliferation of many clubs was a healthy development for an emerging urban 
African community denied the benefit of recreational facilities. Significantly, sport, in 
spite of the fissiparous tendencies mentioned, remained a favourite form of escapism 
14.Saunders, 'The creation of Ndabeni', 165. 
15.Wilson and Mafeje, LANGA, 54-55. 
16.Wilson and Mafeje, LANGA, 114. 
17.M.wilson's Research Notes for the book LANGA, 267. 
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from the otherwise dull and monotonous tenor of township life. Moreover, in terms of 
consolidating community relations, R.Betto's informant neatly put it this way: 
.... sport is a great leveller; all classes of people come into contact with 
one another more intimately. Through sport we get into friendly terms 
with anybody, thereby our circle of friends is widened. IS 
Further to this, networks of kinship relations in langa bolstered this sense of common 
origin. It was not uncommon to find that some of the migrants in Langa were kinsmen 
who hailed from the same lineage, or mother's kin or from the same clan. Kinship 
ties, therefore, played a signicant unifying role in langa. 19 With the passage of time, 
kinship relations became less and less significant as new forms of urban-created 
associations came into being. 
A common language, too, was an important ingredient in the formation of a cohesive 
community. Xhosa was the predominant lingua franca in Langa. Sotho-speakers were 
a relatively small group and did not constitute a separate community.20 
The establishment of churches in langa was central feature of community-formation. 
By 1947 there were twenty-two denominations. 21 There were two dominant types of 
churches, those that owed their origin directly to missionaries, such as the African 
Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.), Catholic (Roman), Seventh Day Adventist and Dutch 
Reformed, on the one hand, and those known as "Independent African Churches", such 
as the Presbyterian Church of Africa, the Ethiopian Church of South Africa, and the 
Church of Christ.22 
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The politics of the origins and establishment of these churches has been sufficiently 
dealt with to require no further elaboration. 23 We will, therefore, deal with those 
aspects of that contributed to the evolution of the community, which even Wilson and 
Mafeje glossed over. Churches in Langa were the most significant vehicle of 
association. They attracted the largest numbers of people, more than any other type of 
association. 24 For example, the Women! s Christian Association (U manyano wabafazi) 
of the Bantu Presbyterian Church (established in Langa in 1934) had a striking 
membership of 90 women. 25 Because of this numerical superiority, Christianity 
commanded an overarching influence on the community.26 
Women's and Young Men's Christian Associations made an outstanding contribution 
towards giving Langa a Christian outlook. To demonstrate this contribution, we will 
consider the activities of a few associations of Independent African churches. The 
activities of each denominational association were similar, The Women's Christian 
Association of the Presbyterian Church of South Africa (established in 1903) in Langa 
served the interests of its womenfolk and children of the congregation. Demonstrating 
a sense of organisation, the association had an elaborate structure. It had an elected 
chairwoman and the incumbent minister's wife was the President for the whole 
congregation. The chairwoman was assisted by elected secretary and treasurer. The 
association's task was to assist in the activities of the church such as fund-raising by 
holding concerts, bazaars and many other social activities at which money was 
collected. In their 1947 account they had fifty pounds. 27 For this and other activities, 
Hammond-Tooke's informant, Reverend S.P.Lediga. the church minister, .showered 
praises on the women! s role: 
23.B.G.M.Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in south Africa, (London, 
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They are very active socially. The Women's association is a spark of 
life in the church. 28 
Apart from the Women's Association, there was the Young Men's Christian 
Association of the same church. The minister was the president of the congregational 
association. The Young Men's Association numbering about sixty played a significant 
role in the, 
revival services and do much to spread the Gospel to the heathen. They 
are specially interested in the youth of Langa and go to the roughest and 
rawest places, in fact rather like the Salvation Army. 29 
The Home Mission Society (Uvanjelo lwasekhaya) of the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church I s (started in 1930 at Ndabeni) itinerary included conducting Bible studies, 
holding prayer meetings, helping the sick, giving clothing and food to those in dire 
need. This was a male organisation. If a member of this Society or of the church saw 
or heard about a destitute family, he/she had to report to the Society which in tum 
would asse$the case. The church did not discriminate against those who were not 
members of the church. It tried to assist anybody deemed fit to get help.3o 
The Mission Volunteer Society, was for adolescents and children, numbering about 20 
boys and girls who were taught to carry out the same tasks as those of the elders I Home 
Mission Society. To instil a sense of responsibility in these youth they were divided 
into groups like "friends", "helpers" and "comrades". The Dorcas Society for women 
of the same church devoted their time and energies to the making and gathering of 
clothing and food for the destitute. They also made contributions for purchasing 
materials and foodstuffs. 31 
A similar role was played by the Women's Home and Foreign Society of the A.M.E. 
in Langa which consisted of about twenty-two members. A structure of this Society 
called the Sick and Poor Committee was charged with the specific task of collecting 
28.Hammond-Tooke, 'Six Native Churches', 30. 
29.Hammond-Tooke, 'Six Native Churches', 31. 
30.Hammond-Tooke, 'Six Native Churches', 59. 
31.Hammond-Tooke, 'Six Native Churches', 60. 
130 
basic necessities such as candles, sugar, matches and many other items, to give to those 
who could hardly fend for themselves due to abject poverty, or sickness.32 
Lastly, the Women's Association of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa, with a 
membership of about forty-four women ministered to the destitute as well and prayed 
'to help those who walk disorderly'. Their programme, for every Thursday, the day 
they met, included praying for the whole of Africa and so that it could be converted to 
Christianity, to discuss issues concerning husbands, sons and daughters, and speaking 
against "uncleanness and witchcraft". The church's Young Men's Association, which 
consisted of fifty members, showed it had a controlling effect on the discipline of its 
youth in Langa. Before anyone in the church could join the Association they had to 
undergo a thorough examination. Would-be members of the Association were 
compelled to refrain from beer-drinking and leading a "loose" existence. They 
attended meetings on Saturday evenings because it was '''the time when the African 
male is at his worst"', and presumably this was supposed to persuade him to listen to 
the word of God. 33 
Despite the duplicated roles that these various associations played in Langa, what is 
significant about this was that, taken in their totality, they infused a very strong sense 
of discipline among the youth by introducing and implementing a strict moral and 
ethical religious code. Given the poor economic status of most of the residents in 
Langa, it is remarkable that they could contribute something to help the poor and the 
sick. Even though not every resident in Langa was a christian, the magnanimous 
gestures of the associations could not fail to have an indelible impact on a considerable 
number of people. 
The church's impact on the shaping of the Langa community was expressly 
demonstrated by its vehement rejection of the Council's beerhall scheme as this would 
32.Hammond-Tooke, 'Six Native Churches', 76. 
33.Hammond-Tooke, 'Six Native Churches', 93. 
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have subverted the evangelical programme of the church or so they thought.(see 
Chapter 3). It is also not surprising that the church went into conflict with the City 
Council because it had allowed the opening of sports fields on a Sunday. Since football 
and cricket were very popular, there were fears that the church would lose a lot of 
membership to Sport.34 It is also probable that there was an element of sabbatarianism. 
The proliferation of many churches in Langa should not suggest the total absence of 
levels of inter-denominational co-operation. An African Ministers' Association served 
as a unifying factor to all the congregations whose ministers were affiliated to it. The 
ministers met every fortnight to discuss common themes, problems, and saw to it that 
church activities such as fund-raising were not held at the same time. 35 This practice of 
co-ordinating denominational activities promoted a spirit of christian brotherhood. 
The formation of these associations including self-help clubs such as the Umgalelo and 
Zenzele Clubs,36 civic organisations like the Langa Vigilance Association, political 
organisations37 , are all a significant indication of the qualitative changes that the social 
life of the people in Langa were going through. They were qualitative because 
'changes took place not only in the "exogenous" levels of life', (such as demands for 
better and adequate housing and good working conditions), 'but also in the deeper, 
"endogenous" levels of life, concerning the life-style and outlook of people' .38 The 
men and women of Langa developed a conscious habit of solidarity and cohesion in 
defence of their community. This partly explains why the community served as the 
basis of protest action in Langa. 
The development of a sense of neighbourliness between and among the Langa residents 
reinforced the development of a spirit of togetherness. To begin with, the structure and 
34.Harnmond-Tooke, 'Six Native Churches', 100. 
35.Wilson and Mafeje, LANGA, 100. 
36.Kondlo, 'The Culture and Religion of the People of 
Langa' , 48-49. 
37.To be dealt with in chapters 6&7. 
38.Yoshikuni, 'strike Action and Self-Help Associations', 
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lay-out of houses in Langa, especially those for the married people, was such that 
members of each and every household lived in very close contact with the other 
immediately next to it, and there was constant interaction. On either side of each 
house, there is another. Moreover, the yards of two rows of houses face each other. 
Although the basis for relating to one's neighbours could depend on commonality and 
mutual compatibility of interests, there was, however, a relationship of friendship that 
developed. In an anthropological survey conducted by Ruth Levin in Langa between 
April 1945 and April 1946, she found out that: 
Neighbours shop together, eat in each other's homes and accompany one 
another to meetings of different kinds; they afford each other help by 
lending various articles and performing favours for each other. 
Neighbours assist each other on all occasions of note, such as births, 
marriages and deaths, and at various parties, like those held at baptism 
and initiation, are among the main leaders of the proceedings.39 
The proximity of the residents' households made it easy for neighbours to know what 
took place in each other's house. This, in a way acted, as a social control mechanism 
on some people's behaviour. For example, neighbours could report the infidelity of 
someone's wife to her husband when he was away at work,40 or the husband's extra­
marital relationships. While this could lead to a split of families it also served as a 
form of social control. 
Inter-ethnic marriage practices in Langa were a stabilizing factor and this brought 
people closer together. Although this practice was shunned by conservative elders who 
encouraged their sons and daughters to marry from within their ethnic group, certain 
limitations made it impossible for some people to adhere to this advice. Some people 
in Langa married outside their ethnic group because there were very few men and 
women who shared their ethnicity. 
39.R.Levin, 'Marriage in Langa Native Location', (M.A. 
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Moreover, the increasingly urbanized young men and women did not want a "country" 
bred partner for marriage purposes. Boys born and raised in town saw country girls as 
"backward, uncivilised and coarse", and preferred to marry town bred girls because 
they were "brighter and more polished". Likewise, urbanized girls derided country­
bred men as "too coarse and raw", preferring, instead, the "smartly dressed" town-bred 
men.41 
With the increasing independence of the youth in Langa particularly in choosing a 
marriage partner, ethnic boundaries were often ignored, thus resulting in inter-ethnic 
marriages e.g. between a Xhosa and a Mfengu, or a Sotho or a Pedi.42 One positive 
point about inter-ethnic marriages is that they minimise conflicts which would 
otherwise be prevalent. 
The developing relationships in the Langa community culminated in the formation of 
the Langa Parents' Association in 1948. This was a "new and independent" 
organization whose cardinal aim was to find ways of combating juvenile delinquency, 
following an increase in 'acts of violence, assaults without provocation, the use of the 
knife, house-breaking and theft, highway robbery, gambling and hooliganism', in 
Langa. 43 It was problem that beset the whole community. 
At its inaugural meeting in 1948 the Langa Parents' Association (L.P.A.) invited 
influential organisations which represented a wide spectrum of people to find a 
common solution. These organisations included the Langa Vigilance Association, the 
Rentpayers Association, the African National Congress, the National Council of 
African Women, the Teachers Association, the Ministers' Association and the Students' 
Association. 44 They unanimously agreed that the cause for the problem on their agenda 
had five inter-connected aspects. Firstly, it was the economic postion in the 
41.Levin, 'Marriage in Langa', 37. 
42.Levin, 'Marriage in Langa' , 20-24. 
43.Cape Archives (hereafter CA), 3/CT 4/2/1/1/617, Langa 
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countryside which forced the African:~igrate to the towns. Secondly, whilst in the 
town, he received a pittance of a wage which fell far short of meeting the ever rising 
cost of living. This compelled him to 'resort to any means in order to make ends meet 
for necessity knows no law'. Thirdly, the same African had to adjust to 'strange and 
unfamiliar conditions and surroundings' . Fourthly, his family had disintegrated and his 
children received no proper training. Fifthly, his social institutions had disappeared 
such that nothing remained to positively influence his future conduct. 45 
They condemned punitive police raids which although directed against bona fide 
criminals, ended up affecting the whole Langa population. This, they felt, was a 
'negative solution! to a complex problem. Instead, they recommended ten solutions 
and demanded that they be implemented by the Cape Town Municipality. 
Among these "positive solutions" were: 
(a) the opening up of employment avenues to Africans. They condemned the 
employment of fifteen Europeans in Langa as one of the worst aspects of Cape Town's 
administration of Africans which knew 'no parallel elsewhere even amongst the largest 
locations in South Africa. I 
(b) the provision of a big community centre complex where their youth could spend 
their time constructively. They condemned the Langa Civic Hall and described it as an 
"eyesore". They demanded that such a complex should have a lounge, a library, a 
gymnasium big enough to be used as an entertainments hall whenever it was necessary, 
a billiard saloon, a milk bar and other social amenities. Aware of the importance of 
social interaction they added that this proposed complex could become, 'the rendezvous 
and headquarters of our cultural life where residents and visitors could meet in 
congenial atmosphere and company for social intercourse and exchange of opinion for 
mutual improvement' .46 
45.CA, 3/CT 4/2/1/1/617, L.P.A. memo. 
46.CA, 3/CT 4/2/1/1/617, L.P.A. memo. 
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(c) they also demanded the services of a Social Worker employed by the City Council 
to be based in the community. They wondered why and how a 'small dorp like Umtata 
right in the heart of the Transkei', could afford to employ an African Social Worker 
and maintain a social centre for Africans when such a big centre like Cape Town 
lagged far behind. 
Last1 y, they called for the provision of bursaries by the City Council to train African 
men and women to enable them to run their own civic matters, financial aid to Boy 
Scout and Girl Guide movements, the Boy's Club and African sport as was done by 
other local councils. What embittered them most was that in Langa Location, 'we 
witness the unusual spectacle of a tennis court for Europeans and yet African sport at 
Langa is neglected by the City Council', as they put it. 47 
The coming together of all these organisations which had disparate interests, is 
indicative of the growth of a formidable community. As parents, the nature and 
substance of their solutions and demands suggest a strong sense of permanence and 
stability, hence their concern about the future and conduct of their children. As far as 
they were concerned Langa was a permanent home and they rejected the life of a 
migrant, thinking of officialdom that the permanent home of the African was in the 
rural area. Implicit, also, in their demand for a typically European-style community 
complex is an assertion that they wanted to be provided with the same amenities as 
those given to whites in the city. 
What we have established up to this point, is that the urban African community-- the 
Langa Community in particular-- is not, in the words of Epstein, "a formidable mass of 
confusion, a social chaos". It has, quite to the contrary, 'its own form of social 
organisation, and this organisation provides a general framework for the understanding 
47.CA, 3/CT 4/2/1/1/617, L.P.A. memo. 
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of a good deal of the behaviour of its inhabitants'. 48 Kinship links, common ethnicity 
and socio-cultural networks could, therefore, be used as the basis of mobilising into 
collective action. 49 But the Langa community had its own internal tensions which have 
not received detailed attention from the few historians as well as social anthropologists 
who have worked on this area. 
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN LANGA 
THE MFENGU AND NTSIKANA MEMORIAL CELEBRATIONS: SOURCES OF 
CONFLICT. 
Botto,SO Wilson and Mafeje,SI and to a certain extent Kondlo,52 tended to emphasise the 
theme of group or community cohesion at the expense of forces of conflict, choosing 
only to make peripheral allusions to them. Occasions such as the Ntsikana, Mfengu, 
and Moshoeshoe Day celebrations, while indicating group cohesion, often led to 
"tribal" animosity especially between the Xhosa-speaking people and the Mfengu. 
"Tribal" animosity was usually engendered by the raking up of a "tribe's" past history 
glorifying one I s victory over, or "emancipation" from, the other. 
The launching of the Mfengu Memorial Association in February 1943 and the 
subsequent celebration of the Mfengu Emancipation Day on 14 May that same year, 
caused a stir in Langa which nearly led to a polarisation of relations between the 
"Mfengu" and the Xhosas, the Xhosas and the Langa Administration, and the conflict 
also permeated into some of the Independent Churches. In February 1943, all the 
Mfengu in the Western Cape Province, the majority of whom were in Langa, 
constituted themselves into an Association. The foundation members elected the 
48.A.L.Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, 
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following as the leaders, Messrs G.Nongauza, Chairman, G.Boqwana, Secretary, 
P.Zuma, Treasurer. The Executive Committee members were Messrs P.Zuma, 
Convenor, G.Boqwana, 1.Mafu and C.1.Nabe. A "Yellow Circular" was dispatched 
exhorting all the Mfengu to join the Association, rather provocatively, 'If you are a 
Mfengu what prevents you from joining the Association of Mfengus. 1iiis is an 
Association! ' . Without specifying, it vaguely promised to deal with 'all matters 
affecting us both socially and politically' .53 
However, their principal aim was to commemorate the day when their forefathers took 
an oath under the "milkwood tree", 14 May 1835, after they were supposedly 
"emancipated" by the British from Xhosa oppression. 54 On this day they pledged : 
(i) to be faithful to God and adhere to the teachings of Religion. 
(ii) to be loyal to the British King, and 
(iii) to educate their children.55 
There was an immediate reaction from the Langa Vigilance Association which, from 
the tone of their correspondence with the Manager of Langa, Mr S.A.Rogers, appeared 
incensed by the whole event. The Vigilance Association strongly condemned the 
formation of an Association along "tribal" lines to 'commemorate the so-called 
liberation (my emphasis) of the Mfengu people from the Ama-Xhosa' .56 The civic 
organisation registered its fears that once the establishment of this organisation was 
allowed it would set an unfortunate precedent that would see Langa regimented into 
"tribal" sections. It stated that: 
Once such an organisation comes into existence then the 
Ama-Xhosa will see to it that they too, are organised 
along those lines. Then follows the Basuto, Zulu, Swazi, 
etc., and Baca and other tribes resident in the Location. 57 
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It further appealed to the Manager t0 discourage such moves as the "position forebodes 
ill for the future" ,and "It promises tribal fights, etc." .58 
An unspecified number of concerned residents representing the Ama-Xhosa, 
approached Mr .Rogers on 19 February 1943 and echoed the fears expressed by the 
Vigilance Association. 59 In spite of these protests the newly formed Mfengu Memorial 
Association went ahead with its plans to hold celebrations on 14 May. The Manager's 
response to the appeals was not clear and this seemed to suggest to the Vigilance 
Association and the Xhosa-speaking residents, that he was giving the Mfengus a go­
ahead with their function, hence giving effect to the divide and rule policy. 
In early March, a deputation of the Vigilance Association met the Manager, to object to 
any form of Mfengu Memorial Celebrations. A deputation from the Mfengu 
Association also attended the meeting. What was striking about the Vigilance 
Association I s delegation was that it consisted of I several members who were Mfengus' 
and who spoke against the celebrations.6o The Manager who presided over the 
meeting gave his decision in favour of the celebrations. The minutes of the Vigilance 
Association show the latter's displeasure. Firstly, according to the minutes,the 
Manager failed to show impartiality when the Mfengu deputation used, 'deep and 
wounding language and insults to the Ama-Xhosa people'. Secondly, he completely 
disregarded the advice of the Mfengus in the Association I s deputation against allowing 
the event to take place. Thirdly, Mr. Rogers acted unprocedurally by unilaterally 
deciding to give the greenlight to the Mfengu Association without consulting the 
Advisory Board as clearly enunciated in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. 61 
58.MA, MP BC579 A24.255. 
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That Mr. Rogers was employing "divide and rule" tactics by displaying favouratism 
towards the Mfengus was not a baseless allegation. The founder members of the 
Mfengu Association were employed by the Langa Administration of which Rogers was 
the Manager. It is probable that he did not want to disappoint his employees, given the 
fact that he never, at any time, raised the slightest objection to the holding of the 
celebrations. The Manager and the Chairman of the Native Affairs Committee, 
Councillor S.l.Fort were, reportedly, going about posing the question, 'How many 
Mfengus have you in the Advisory Board or Vigilance?' . According to Rev. Citashe 
of the Ethiopian Church, such a question was potentially suggestive of which side they 
were. I Apart from its other meanings it has embedded, indeed it is capable of, a spirit 
that officials of the standing of the Manager and the Chairman are not disinterested' .62 
Moreover, Rogers did not honour an agreement that he would hold another round of a 
dispassionate discussion of the issue with Messrs B.Ntshinga, W.Ndunyana, and 
P.Petu, all members of the Vigilance Association. 
The Manager's reluctance to consider the advice of the residents' statutory 
representative structures, especially the Advisory Board, reinforced the importance of 
the Board. Suffice it to say that the Manager's arbitrary handling of this matter tended 
to fan the potentially volatile situation. 
It is likely that the Manager did not appreciate the gravity of the matter for lack of a 
clear insight into the historical background to the conflict that the Mfengu celebrations 
would inevitably rake up. In an examination of the 1835 soy-called "Mfengu 
Emancipation", A.Webster argued that claims made by historians like Ayliff and 
Whiteside that the British liberated people who came to be known as the "'Mfengu", 
were "largely mythical", as this was a 'cover-story intended to disguise the illegal 
62.CA, AWC 3/26/228, Rev.Citashe's letter to Rogers, 15 
April 1943. 
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labour practices being carried out by the colonists, with the knowledge and aid of the 
colonial authorities '63. 
According to Ayliff and Whiteside, about 17 000 refugees who fled from Chaka's 
wars, the Mfecane, and lived in poverty and led a servile life under the Gcaleka (a clan 
of the Ama-Xhosa), were liberated by the British Army in May 1835.64 But the war 
between the Gcaleka and the British, leading to the "Mfengu Emancipation" also left 
Xhosa independence weakened, their infrastructures, wealth and power destroyed and 
allowed the British to seize involuntary labour. 65 For this the Xhosa blamed the 
Mfengu because they sold out. Explaining why he would dare not participate in the 
Mfengu celebrations one umu-Xhosa said, 'this is a painful and unforgettable day when 
the Mfengu betrayed the Xhosa and sold them to the whites' .66 When the war 
commenced, the Mfengus resolved that; 
(a) they would not take part in the Bri tish invasion of the colony, 
(b) 'as far as possible the Fingo shall defend and protect the English 
missionaries and traders, 
(c) 'the Mfengus shall be the nightly bearers of letters from Mr. Ayliff 
to the commander of the British forces, giving information of the state of 
Kaffirland' .67 
Therefore, as far as the Mfengus in Langa were concerned, it was worthwhile for them 
to commemorate the day they were liberated from the "tyranny" of the Xhosa-speaking 
people. For the Xhosa-speaking people, it was a sensitive matter to dig into such a 
"dark past", hence the alleged "tribal" animosity it would engender. 
What made the formation of the Langa Mfengu Memorial Association peculiar, was 
that it did not receive the blessings and approval of a Kentane Attorney, Mr. H.S.E. 
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Bikitsha, the General-Secretary of the Mfengu Day Memorial Celebrations. 6s The 
General-Secretary dissociated himself and his organisation from the one in Langa. Mr. 
Bikitsha also took a swipe at the Langa Mfengu Association's "Yellow Circular" 69 , 
which is said to have contained language offensive to the Xhosa. Bikitsha' s attack read 
in part: 
One cannot but deplore the offending intemperate and probably 
unwarrantable language in which the Cape Town Fingos sought to 
support their application for permission to observe the Fingo Day at 
Langa..... 70 
While Bikitsha's response should not be construed to mean that he was totally opposed 
to the formation of such an association, his castigation vindicates the concern of the 
Vigilance Association, the Advisory Board and other residents about possible animosity 
in Langa. Despite these objections, the Native Affairs Committee of the City Council, 
on the advice of the Manager of Langa, authorised the first inaugural celebrations on 
14 May with the proviso that, the celebrations would be restricted to the set objectives 
when the association was formed. 71 Although the first and subsequent celebrations 
took place without incidents, tilL '::'cL ~k '-...i- (H •.:.t'"1..t5r between the Ama-Xhosa and 
the Mfengus were sown. 
While the formation of the Mfengu Association caused a sensation, it is striking to note 
that when the Ama-Xhosa chose 14 March 1944 as the day of observing the S1. 
Ntsikana Memorial Celebrations there does not seem to have been any noticeable 
objections from the Mfengus. But there is no doubt that the Ntsikana Celebrations 
were begun in response and opposition to the Mfengu Memorial Celebrations. S1. 
Ntsikana was rever ed by the Ama-Xhosa as their first Christian and who urged his 
68.The Bantu Forum, 'Inkundla Ya Bantu', 30 June 1943. 
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people to accept Christianity and to educate their children.72 The Ntsikana Memorial 
Organisation was noted for its special fuPfilment of the latter aspect. It created a Fund 
for a scholarship to be awarded to enable deserving students irrespective of "tribal" or 
ethnic origin to proceed with higher education. 73 On the day of the celebration the 
national outlook of the Ntsikana Organisation was emphasised. What also made the 
Ntsikana Ceremony less ethnic-oriented was that, generally all the ministers of all the 
congregations were on the Commemoration Committee as they regarded this as a 
religious event. The Rev. Lediga, for example, of the Presbyterian Church was a Pedi 
and spoke Sotho. Church ministers were known to say about the Ceremony; 'We feel 
that it represents all Bantudom'. 74 This outlook gave it a more national than a sectarian 
outlook. 
Rogers seems to have accepted the formation of the Xhosa organisation with 
considerable equanimity, save for his uncertainty as to whether it would not be 
receptive to the political influence of the A.N.C. This was so because the Rev. J.A. 
Calata (of the Cradock Anglican Church), who was the president of the National 
Committee of the Ntsikana Day Celebrations, happened to be the President of the Cape 
African Congress. 75 At the 13 April 1947 celebrations held in the Methodist Church, 
Rev.Calata is said, by Rogers, to have devoted the major part of his speech to 
proposals to send delegates to the United Nations Organisation as was being done by 
the Indian community. Rogers did not take this lightly, because he feared that these 
organisations might be used as political platforms. 76 
Although the Ntsikana Organisation seemed to be all-inclusive, there were strong 
under-currents of Mfengu-Xhosa conflict in the Langa community. This conflict 
permeated through the churches. For instance, the Presbyterian Church of South 
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Africa was affected. Membership of the church dropped Rev. S.P.Lediga, attributed 
this to the arrogance of the Xhosa who regarded themselves as 'the true rulers of the 
country and despise and hate the Fingos as traitors to the land'. 77 In the church these 
two groups did not cooperate. For example, Xhosa elders did not bother about the 
welfare of the Mfengus under them, and the reverse was the case. Only the arrival of 
Rev. Lediga, who was a Pedi and acted impartially, was a bridge between the widening 
chasm between the Xhosa and the Mfengu. 78 
In the Seventh Day Adventist Church, although there was not much friction between 
the Mfengus and the Xhosa, there was still "a little of it". During church elections, 
Xhosa members in the church tended to vote for Xhosas, on the one hand, and the 
Mfengus preferred to vote for Mfengus, on the other. 79 In other congregations there 
were under-currents of this conflict but they did not in any way have a deleterious 
effect on church activities. 80 
Although we saw above that inter-ethnic marriages played an important role in the 
Langa community, there were exceptions to this rule. Some parents did not allow 
inter-ethnic marriages as they felt strongly about the Mfengu-Xhosa cleavage. Some 
Xhosa parents felt that it was an act of self-denigration for their children to marry 
among the Mfengus as they believed that the latter were a "low tribe". 8] As a general 
observation, one does get from the fore-going, the impression that it was always the 
Ama-Xhosa who taunted and villified the Mfengus rather than vice-versa. 
77.Hammond-Tooke, 'Six Native Churches', 24. 
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THE TOWNSHIP MANAGER's IIDIVIDE A~1) RULE II POLICY. 
Some of the cleavages in Langa were brought about by Mr. Rogers in his capacity as 
the Manager of Administration. Acting like a typical Location Superintendent 
described in Chapter 1, Rogers was prone to using "divide and rule" tactics to get his 
way through the community. He was in the habit of exploiting the already existing 
structural division between the migrants/bachelors and the married people, playing off 
one against the other. He had a very patronising attitude towards the migrants in the 
Main Barracks. He seemed uncomfortable with the idea that the Advisory Board or the 
Vigilance Association genuinely and correctly represented the view-point of the 
migrants, preferring to by-pass these bodies and directly communicating with the 
migrants. This conduct was predicated upon his perception of migrants as 
"uneducated"82, "ignorant people" ,83 and therefore gullible. Such a division and other 
forms of conflict might have evidently existed but a striking feature about the Langa 
residents was their intense sensitivity, if not suspicion, and ready reaction to forces that 
threatened to divide them. 
An illuminating example of this behaviour is the cause of the outbreak of a riot in 
Langa in March 1947. The major cause of the riot was the proposal that a municipal 
beerhall should be erected for the use of all the men in the bachelor quarters in Langa. 
By the beginning of 1947, there still was no beerhall in place. It was the 
Municipality'S strong conviction that the bachelors desperately needed a beerhall. 
Assuming that the bachelors were being inhibited from making a decision by those 
residents who enjoyed the privilege of domestic brewing, Mr. Rogers convened a 
meeting at the Main Barracks on Sunday, March 9, 1947, to discuss the beerhall 
question. &4 
He pointed out that the choice was theirs to make, whether they wanted the beer hall or 
not. But he emphasised that: 
82.CA, AWC 3/26/228, Rogers' letter to Citashe, 21 April 
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Protests from the married quarters should not force the bachelors to 
oppose something beneficial to themselves, as since 1940 he had 
received numerous requests from bachelors that a beerhall should be 
opened. 8S 
Rogers' audience of about 200 bachelors was quick to detect his covert intention to 
divide the bachelors and the married people. One of the bachelors stood up and 
majestically demanded an explanation from the Manager as to 
why the Advisory Board had not been consulted about this matter, who 
were the bachelors who had asked him to open a beerhall, and why a 
decision was being forced upon them before they had had an opportunity 
of discussing the problem fully. 86 
Responding to the speaker Rogers stubbornly said that there was no need to speechify. 
What he wanted was a straight reply to his question. The crowd was all the more 
incensed by Mack Mngongo who stood up and charged that the bachelors were wasting 
their time by arguing, because 'if the City Council wanted a beerhall they would get a 
beerhall, and there was nothing the Langa residents could do about it'. 87 Rightly or 
wrongly, the bachelors construed what he had said to mean that he endorsed what the 
Manager had said, and pandemonium broke out. This led to a "disturbance" in which 
people used sticks to hit Mngongo until he was rescued by the police. The Manager, 
again, insultingly remarked that he would not talk to "hooligans", 88 
This incident angered the Langa residents In general, who attended a meeting in "their 
thousands" later that day under the banner of the Anti-Pass Committee, the Vigilance 
Association and the Communist Party. At this meeting the beerhall scheme was 
condemned "root and branch", and the Manager was reprimanded for his overall 
conduct. In the evening a riot broke out and people shouted; "No beer hall", "smash 
the kitchens", "down with the superintendent" ,89 
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At a trial held in October 1947 at the Wynberg Court, at which 13 out of 19 Langa 
residents were acquitted, the Magistrate Mr.C.H.Cloete ruled that 
there was not the slightest doubt that the cause of the trouble was the 
meeting called by the superintendent, Mr. Rogers. The people resented 
the way in which Rogers had handled the question of a beer hall. 90 
The Manager's conduct and the consequences of what it led to, point to a number of 
factors which enhance our understanding of the community-cleavage balance in Langa. 
The Langa bachelors were part of a community to which they were tied by many inter­
relationships and to use the beerhall as a divisive instrument, regardless of the rationale 
behind it, was bound to be a non-starter. The bacheiors' response to Rogers' disproved 
his stereotypic perception that they were a gullible lot. The bachelors, like any other 
bona fide resident of Langa, were acutely aware of the unbridled contempt with which 
the Native Affairs Committee and the Langa Administration held the Advisory Board. 91 
They, therefore, conceived Rogers' by-passing of the Advisory Board not only as 
unprocedural but as seeking to divide the community into two hostile camps. In the 
same vein, to them Rogers represented a system which had seen them move from pillar 
to post through the system of forced removals and rigid controls since 1901 and it 
seems there was no reason for them to trust him then. Lastly, the Magistrate's verdict 
and the apportionment of all the blame for the riot on the Manager was a victory for 
the Langa community. It also underscored that collective communal action could be a 
major force to reckon with. 
No sooner had the crisis he had caused ended than did Mr.Rogers resume his unpopular 
tactics. He decided to introduce mobile food vans from which "inmates" of the North 
and Main Barracks could buy foodstuffs.92 He approached two members of the 
Advisory Board for the Barracks (North and Main) on 18 August 1947 and tried to 
90.The Guardian, 23 October 1947. 
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discuss the issue with them. But the two Board members refused to discuss the matter 
until the other four Board members had also been consulted. Concerned about the 
divisive approach of the Township Manager, the Advisory Board convened a meeting 
to consider Roger s'new idea. Instead of discussing the matter with him the Board 
registered its displeasure about the way the Manager had sought to obtain the people's 
views, by taking the matter straight to the Native Affairs Committee. But Mr.Roger's 
told the Board that he would have his way and enforce his intensions as he chose. 93 
The inmates of the North and Main Barracks did not take the Manager's conduct lightly 
particularly his '''divide and rule" system which he has been using all along'. At a 
meeting convened by the the Board to report the Manager's intended use of deliberate 
force to the bachelors of the Barracks. The bachelors passed emotionally charged 
resolutions which demonstrated their disapproval of the Manager's management 
competence. In one such resolution they condemned the "Hitlerism habits of 
Mr. Rogers" , as was evidenced by his, 'deliberate and persistent clashes with the 
residents of Langa, his unwarranted ideas to enforce his intentions and his frequent 
undesirable attitude and also his deadly action towards the residents of Langa' .94 
The inmates of the bachelor quarters resolved that the Mayor Mr. A. Bloomberg, Mr. 
D.B.Molteno and the Native Affairs Committee as well as Mr Rogers should all be 
invited to attend a meeting in Langa at the Main Barracks on 24 August where Langa 
residents would ventilate their grievances and also "give their final decision to 
Mr.Rogers" employers in person and in their presence'. The actual words that were 
used do capture the anxiety and mood of that moment. The bachelors demanded, 
'Ntshinga, bring us the men who have hired Mr. Rogers, we wish to talk to them 
personally but you Ntshinga must also be there'. 95 They also claimed that, by so 
doing, they wanted to avert a recrudescence of the violent disturbances that had occured 
in March. 
93.CA AWC 3/72/44 
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Again the Manager's "divide and rule" system of management had moved the 
community to yet another potentially explosive situation. The bachelors' negative 
response to the Manager's proposal for the introduction of mobile food vans 
was not just an impulsive one. This, to them, was reminiscent of incidents in 1943 and 
1944 when the municipality outlawed the selling of foodstuffs by women traders in an 
attempt to force bachelors to utilise the Eating House which it had taken over from 
African traders. 96 They were also not allowed to do their own cooking. Whenever 
conditions to cater for themselves were relaxed, certain prohibitive regulations which 
effectively nullified that limited freedom, were introduced. 
For example, the Manager decided in 1944 that Barracks residents would have to buy 
tickets for 3d. at his Office as was done in the Married Quarters. 97 This was 
impossible, as the bachelors retorted, because most of them worked all day and did not 
have wives to send to buy tickets as did those in the Married Quarters. 98 Mobile food 
vans were, therefore, an attempt to force people to refrain from self-catering but to buy 
from the Council-owned food vans, just as in the case of the Eating House. 
What also made the mobile food van issue reminiscent of the Eating House scheme is 
how it was going to affect relations amongst the bachelors themselves as had happened 
in the past. There were, obviously, those few bachelors who were in favour of buying 
food from the Eating House who fell victim to those who chose to boycott the 
municipal service. In May 1944, at a meeting convened by the Advisory Board, people 
were advised not to buy food from the Council's kitchen and that "anyone attempting to 
do so should be prevented".99 Those who did were attacked by 'gangs of men who 
went to purchase food at the kitchen were set upon by gangs of men armed with bars of 
96.see Cha12ter 3 
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iron, sticks and other dangerous weapons', if Mr.Rogers' account was anything to go 
by. tOO 
This discussion has demonstrated that although there were internal divisions among the 
Langa residents, they were not that too deep to undermine collective action. Their 
sensitivity to official divisive tendencies, predicated upon their internal structural 
divisions, demonstrates a high level of community growth and consciousness. 
lOO.MA, MP BC579 A24. 591, Rogers to Molteno. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
POLITICAL ORGANISATION AND ACTIVITY IN LANGA: 1935-1948 
From 1935, there was a significant shift in the levels of political organisation in Langa. 
Whereas, political organisation had hitherto been a localised affair, with the local 
leadership, in the form of the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Association, forming 
the vanguard of community-based protest, future protests found organised expression 
through the increasing participation of political parties in the affairs of Langa. Without 
necessarily supplanting the leadership of Langa, political organisations, especially the 
NLL, the ANC and the CPSA chose to work with and through the local leadership in 
order to make their poliiical programmes more acceptable to the target constituency. 
This, obviously, added a new dimension to the nature of popular protest in Langa. 
This new brand of protest was met with an intensified form of State repression. The 
emergence and dynamics of this new ideology of popular protest was the result of the 
amalgamation of the "inherent" and "derived" ideas as enunciated by Rude. l 
This chapter demonstrates how these ideas were synthesised and produced a distinct 
ideology of protest which found Langa carving for itself a niche in national politics. 
This objective sounds as though there were rigid time-boundaries when these localised 
struggles took place without any "external" influence in the form of political 
organisations. In the case of Langa this is definitely the case. The evidence available 
suggests that for most of the protest activities that took place in Langa up to 1935, there 
was very little, if any, occasional "interference" by politcal parties in these protests. 
The prece ding chapters bear testimony to this assertion. But after 1935, community­
based protest action fluidly transmuted into national politics. In other words, what one 
sees after 1935, is that process of fusion between the "inherent" and "derived" 
elements, which Rude wrote about. The absence of party political activity, could be 
1.G.Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest, (New York, 1980), 
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explained by the fact that the two prominent organisations, the ANC and the CPSA, 
were both in abeyance. 
The Western Cape ANC, had in the late 1920's and early 1930's been caught up in 
ideological power struggles between the conservative and reactionary "Professor" 
James Thaele, president of the ANC (Western Cape), and the militants Bransby Ndobe, 
the Provincial Secretary, and Elliot Tonjeni who concentrated their activities in the 
rural districts of the Western Cape.2 
The power struggle usurped the energies of the political leadership so much that 
campaigns and organisations at the grassroots were neglected. At no other time could a 
political party, sympathetic to the urban African people in Langa, have gained more 
political clout than at the time of the widespread opposition against forced removals 
from Ndabeni to Langa. But none of them took advantage of that. By the end of 
1930, the arrest of the leaders of the radical movement, under the Riotus Assemblies 
Act, paralysed the ANC in the Western Cape.3 The central ANC's loose grip on its 
Provincial branches, which Dr. A .B. Xuma CANC President) reversed from 1940, also 
partly explains this apparent dormancy. 
Because Langa was inextricably linked with Cape Town, and political organisations 
straddled between the two centres, we will consider their activities in Langa in relation 
to, or in conjunction with, Cape Town where necessary. 
2.P.Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in south Africa: 
The African National Congress 1912-1952, (London, 1970). 
3.E.Roux, Time Longer Than Rope: A History of the Blackman's 
struggle For Freedom in South Africa, (Madison, 1964). 240. 
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PART ONE 
THE NATIONAL LffiERATION LEAGUE OF SOUTH AFRICA 
At the time when the ANC and the CPSA were in a slumber, a predominantly 
Coloured organisation, the NLL was formed in December 1935, and led by Mrs. Cissie 
Z. GooI, the youngest daughter of Dr. Abdurahman (leader of African Political 
Organisation (APO», James La Guma, Johnny Gomas and Goolam Gool (Cissie's 
brother-in-Iaw).4 This new organisation was to become increasingly involved in the 
local affairs of Langa. The NLL was not necessarily launched to fill the hiatus created 
by the lacklustre organisations, but it was a break-away from the African Political 
Organisation (APO), by a "new and self-conscious Coloured intelligentsia". In fact, it 
became the new home for Communist Party leaders, e.g. Gomas and La Guma who 
had been expelled firstly from Clement') Kadalie's Industrial Commercial Union (ICU) 
and secondly, from the Western Cape ANC by Thaele in 1930.5 
The formation of the NLL is noted for its inherent ideological tensions in its leadership 
structure. There were two factions which nevertheless managed to coalesce an uneasy 
relationship. One faction was led by Cissie Gool and the other one by her husband's 
brother, Dr. Goolam H.Gool. The latter was a "purist faction" which did not want any 
form of participation in the "dummy" political institutions established under Hertzog's 
1936 Native Acts. The former was influenced by the communists, especially Gomas. 
Cissie GooI's faction advocated - v working class alliance between blacks and whites 
and the use of strikes, boycotts and mass action to achieve their objectives.6 Even with 
such divergent ideological pursuits, the NLL managed to survive. But Cissie Gool 
who, for a better part of the NLL's existence remained its president, strove to recruit 
Africans to her organisation. 
4.1 Goldin, Making Race: The Politics and economics of 

Coloured Identity in south Africa, (Cape Town, 1987) 

5.G.Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of south 

African Coloured Politics, (Cape Town, 1987), 179. 

6.Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 181. 
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The NLL rejected the strategies and tactics of the already established Coloured 
organisations and their parochial emphasis or definition of a Coloured exclusive 
identity. Instead, they opted for a wider black and working-class alliance, the use of 
mass action in the form of strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts to realise their goals of 
complete e!luality. 7 In practice however, the NLL, like APO, employed the well worn­
out constitutional methods of struggle. These were deputations, resolutions, court 
action, petitions and the election of its own candidates to central and local 
governmental public institutions. Nowhere else amongst all of its branches in the 
Western Cape did the NLL demonstrate its tenacious commitment to the use of such 
methods of struggle than in Langa. Where the NLL differed fundamentally from APO 
was its hatred of the latter's emphasis on the social separation of black and white. The 
NLL emphasised the need for the freedom of all black people in South Africa. It had 
as its main objective the attainment of total democracy because of its belief that black 
South Africans had to go through the' "democratic stage of their history'" .8 The NLL 
publicised its activities in its branches (which numbered 29 at the beginning of Nov. 
1939)9 through its official organ, which was always inserted in the the CPS A-aligned 
newspaper, The Guardian. It also used the Liberator for campaign purposes and 
included articles which implored unity among the black working-class .10 
It was with such objectives in mind, that the NLL established a branch in Langa with 
Mr.A.Ndlwana as its Chairman and Mr. William Ndunyana, as Secretary. Mr. 
Ndunyana a few years later became a prominent member of the CPSA and also served 
on the portfolios of the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Committee. I I The NLL was 
especially prominent in 1939 and 194I when it harnessed the people's discontent over 
the failure of the authorities to redress their grievances. It fizzled out in 1943 because 
7.Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 180. 
8.Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 185. 
9.The Guardian, 'Liberation League Page', 3 November 1939. 
10.Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 185. 
11.Kingwill, 'The African National Congress in the Western 
Cape', 28. 
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of its own internal divisions. There was a clear-cut realisation that mass political 
interest in the NLL could only be aroused by dealing with those specific issues that 
constituted an immediate concern to the Langa residents. Thus, the Langa branch was 
formed at a time when there were mounting grievances concerning living conditions in 
Langa. 
The NLL's ebullient interest in Langa was necessitated by a waning popUlarity among 
its Coloured supporters, especially the elite. Gavin Lewis made the observation that 
although the NLL had successfully mobilised the Coloured elites against the residential 
segregation measures which tinkered with their privileged material rights, there was 
nothing left afterwards to sustain their interest in the NLL. He went further to say, 
quite justifiably, that after 1939, Cissie Gool extensively immersed herself and her 
organisation in social welfare and upliftment matters to keep the NLL's popularity 
buoyant. 12 
It is against this scenario that one of the crucial issues the NLL tried to articulate for 
the Langa residents, to the Native Affairs Committee of the City Council, was the 
shortage of African housing and the appalling conditions under which a good number 
of people resided. Following a visit by the executive leaders of the League to Langa, 
in mid-September 1939, 'to inspect conditions under which our African comrades 
live', a letter was dispatched to the Town Clerk's office emphasising the advisability of 
not only improving the appalling housing conditions in Langa but also of taking drastic 
steps to solve the critical housing shortage for Africans in Cape Town as a whole. \3 
But such appeals were nothing new. The Advisory Board and the Vigilance 
Association had, over the years tried all but in vain, to bring to the Council's 
awareness the critical housing shortage and its attendant hardships. Even the Council 
needed no reminder about this because the crisis was undeniably manifest. All that the 
NLL got from the Town Clerk was a reply that the Native Affairs Committee was 
12.Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall, 194. 
13.The Guardian, ILiberation League Pagel, 29 September 
1939. 
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acutely and 'fully aware of the position of Native Housing in Cape Town, and an 
endeavour is being made to provide additional accommodation' at Langa. 14 Further to 
this, the NLL was requested to send a deputation at its request to have an interview 
with the Native Affairs Committee Sub-committee. 
Although it was radical in principle, the NLL chose the path of dialogue with the 
Council authorities. It accordingly, selected a deputation comprising Mrs. Gool, Mrs. 
Kobese, Messrs. Booker Lakay (General-Secretary), Morley-Turner (Assistant 
Secretary), Ho Ho, Nhlyana and Ndunyana (NLL, Langa Branch Secretary). Top in 
their package of grievances for discussion were housing issues, and these demands 
were, (i) the provision of additional blocks of lavatories at Langa; (ii) repairs to 
leakages, cracks in walls, and new floors; and (iii) rent reduction and an addition of 
more but improved houses. They also intended to discuss other general, but equally 
important, issues such as (a) that there was no resident doctor (the doctor was only 
available during day time at 1O.a.m. or after 3.p.m.)15 ; (b) that there was no trained 
African nurse and (c) that there was only one mid-wife for the whole of Langa; (d) a 
demand that the Langa Advisory Board Secretary had to be an African as from 1940; 
and (e) why African municipal employees, the cleaners, got different pay from Cape 
Town coloured employees doing the same work. 16 
At the end of October 1939, the NLL deputation was granted audience by the Native 
Affairs Sub-committee, and the above grievances were aired. The 'committee were 
surprised to learn how bad are the conditions at Langa' .17 In spite of the promise by 
the Sub-committee to visit Langa itself, which did not mean much in real terms, the 
NLL took pride in the communication it had made with the local government 
authorities and what it had done for the people of Langa. A general comment to that 
effect in its official mouthpiece, the "Liberation League Page", said: 
14.The Guardian, 29 September, 1939. 
15.The Guardian l 29 September, 1939. 
16.The Guardian I 'Liberation League Page', 13 October 1939. 
17.The Guardian, 'Liberation League Page', 27 October 1939. 
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Together with the members of the Langa branch we have been patiently 
working day and night to obtain better living conditions for the people of 
Langa. Inspections, investigation and personal contact with the people 
have revealed a situation which is a disgrace to a civilised community. 
We have utilised every means at our disposal to show the public how 
detrimental it is in their own interests to allow conditions such as exist in 
Langa. 1S 
It is clear from the above propaganda statement that the NLL's objectives, at least in 
this respect, were to get involved in the community affairs of Langa and increasing the 
people's awareness of how to respond to their condition. In the process, they hoped to 
gain popularity, which the organisation desparately needed to prove that it was a bona 
fide non-racial political movement. Whilst it may have been quite genuine about its 
willingness to heip its African constituency by attending to its grievances, this raises 
questions about the tactics the NLL applied which had previously yielded very little 
results. For an organisation whose leadership was renowned for its radical 
outspokenness, it seems astonishing that they could have employed the same worn-out 
tactics for which it had severely, at the time of its formation, criticised other Coloured 
organisations. In effect what it simply did was to suppliment the already existing civic 
structures in Langa without substantially and fundamentally changing the method of 
struggle. 
Before the end of 1938, a 50 000 pound loan had been granted for the general 
development of Langa Native Location Fund and for the provision of accommodation 
for Africans in the Municipality. The Superintendent of Langa Mr. Rogers, had 
subsequently submitted a package of reforms which the loan had to cover. These 
changes were: 
(1) the installation of ceilings at the men's Special Quarters; 
(2) making alterations and improvements to the barracks; 
(3) the construction of a bakery at the Main and North Barracks; 
18.The Guardian, 27 October 1939. 
157 
(4) the alteration of eating houses which existed then at the Main and North Barracks; 
and 
(5) 3-roomed houses for men. 
There is no evidence to suggest that these improvements were made necessary at the 
instigation of the NLL deputation and yet it claimed to have won some concessions 
from the City Council. 19 The fact of the matter is that, Langa was built in phases and 
was supposed to accommodate an official figure of 5 000 persons only. White rate­
payers who ratified the loans for the further expansion of Langa used to pressurise the 
City Council into ensuring that more accommodation was provided for the Africans 
who "illegally" resided in the city centre. I would argue that it was only a coincidence 
as plans were already afoot to work on this that when the NLL deputation met the 
Native Affairs sub-committee, there was an unbinding promise that their demands 
would receive attention. As a result, the NLL stated confidently in the Liberation 
League Page that, 'The League will not cease to press for the fulfilment of all its 
demands regarding living conditions at Langa' .20 Such statements which indicated a 
serious commitment to the affairs of Langa were, undoubtedly, designed to win the 
hearts of the residents. 
The NLL's practice of assuming the role of the Langa 
residents' mouthpiece was in conflict with the provisions of 
the Natives (Urban Areas) Act which stipulated that there 
should be, in every location or township, an advisory board 
which would serve as a communication link between local 
government authorities and the residents. The mere fact that 
a political organisation, the NLL, had assumed the role of 
the Advisory Board seemed to suggest that the nominal of 
the latter had been usurped. Following the NLL's meeting in 
Ocober 1939, with the Native Affairs Sub-committee, the 
Acting Town Clerk of the City Council informed the General 
Secretary of the NLL that, 'representations on behalf of the 
residents of Langa will only be recognised by the Native 
Affairs Committee of 
the Advisory Board.21 
the Council if they are submitted by 
19.The Guardian, 27 October 1939. 
20.The Guardian, 27 October 1939. 
21.The Guardian, 29 December 1939. 
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Although there is no evidence to suggest this, one can justly surmIse that the 
Municipality was not at all enthused by the prospect of a political party volunteering to 
represent the Africans. The Council must have become suspicious of the real intentions 
of the NLL. 
In order to legitimise its role without losing its influence in Langa the NLL chose to 
use the same structure, the Advisory Board for that purpose. It resorted to fielding 
candidates, who were members of the organisation, for the Board elections in 
December 1939. The NLL members won the elections by a slight majority. The 
results were as fol
Married Quarters: 
lows: 
No. of Votes 
P. Peter (NLL) 48 




M. Qongo 72 
Special Quarters: 
A. Zilwana (NLL) (unopposed) 
S. Bhingela (NLL) (unopposed) 22 
This "infiltration" of the Advisory Board by the NLL does not seem to have gone down 
well with the City Council because it was tantamount to challenging constitutionally 
established structures. The League also seemed bent on "converting" all the members 
of the Board to its side. A month after these elections, in January 1940, the NLL 
lodged a strong protest with the City Council against its decision not to recognise the 
League as an "official mouthpiece" of the Langa residents for as long as the Advisory 
Board continued to exist. The League explained to the ~ouncil that its response to this 
22.The Guardian, 29 December 1939. 
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decision was to put up candidates for the elections. The League went further to boast 
that: 
Of the nine candidates returned, four were League 
candidates and two others have since joined the Langa 
branch. Six of the nine members are now connected with 
the League. 23 
From the League's point of view, the fact that it commanded a majority on the Board 
justified its claim to being the residents' mouthpiece. 
Although the Council disapproved the idea of having the NLL assuming the role of 
spokesmen for the Langa residents, it seems to have softened on its original stance. 
The Native Affairs Sub-committee met with the NLL deputation again.24 But, this visit 
took place only after a full year had elapsed since the jast meeting, from the end of 
October 1939 to the 17 November 1940. If this was an ample indication that the NLL 
had pressurised the Council into coming to Langa to have a first-hand observation of 
the ugly conditions obtaining there then, given the time taken by the Council to 
respond, it is also an ample indication that the Council took its time and acted only 
when it deemed it fit and opportune. 
The NLL deputation was led by Mrs C.Z.GooI who happened to have been a City 
Councillor since 1938. The fact that she was a Councillor might have induced the 
Native Affairs Sub-committee, to give her and her delegation a sympathetic ear. At 
another level, the same fact that she was part of the municipal structure may also have 
influenced her organisation I s use of the so-called constitutional methods of appeal. 
An account of the visit per se and the conducted tour of the Township made by the 
delegation and the members of the Native Affairs Committee, is revealing in terms of 
the seriousness of the people's grievances. It also provides us with a peep-hole through 
23.The Guardian, 'Liberation League Page', 19 January 1940. 

24.The Guardian, 1 December 1940. 
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which we can see why the NLL saw such grievances as a fertile ground on which to 
broaden their support-base among Africans. 
On 17 November 1940, the party was taken around the Township by the Manager of 
Langa, Mr. Rogers. The party went to the North Barracks where it was discovered 
that the conditions in the dormitories were unhealthy, and unclean. The rooms were 
"terribly overcrowded" and each dormitory had 'coated, roof, walls, and bunks, with a 
sticky layer of sooty deposit, which came from the smoke, hung in thick clouds from 
the central fire-places'. They further discovered that the dormitories had no windows 
and the air bricks for ventilation were closed up. The floors were made of cement and 
were therefore very cold in winter. 25 Given these decrepit conditions, the lavatories 
outside the dormitories could not have been better than the dwelling place. The 
Manager's entourage also discovered that the lavatories were "an even greater blot". 
Cleaning water which was suppos ~ to run through cement troughs, merely trickled, 
'with the result that they are never clean and the flies collect by the million'. 26 The 
situation in the lavatories had been left to deteriorate in spite of the expert technical 
advice of Mr Walton Jamieson, the adviser to the Central Housing Board, who had 
unreservedly condemned the conditions. The Cape Town Medical Officer of Health 
had, in the same vein, corroborated this observation. 
But the picture would not have been complete if the party had not had at least a glance 
at the centrally situated eating houses which the visitors described as an 'eyesore and a 
definite black mark in Langa'. It was discovered that the big fire-place at the centre 
belched clouds of smoke. 'Flies are attracted by the food and bits of carcasses from 
the abbattoirs. The eating house itself, instead of being clean, fresh and an appetising 
place, is smelly, smoky and absolutely unhealthy',27 
25.The Guardian, 1 December 1940. 
26.The Guardian, 1 December 1940. 
27.The Guardian, 1 December 1940. 
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The Married Quarters did not escape the investigative eye of the municipal and NLL 
officials. They were stunned by the 'uncomfortably cramped space in which families 
of five, six and seven are expected to live in comfort and cleanliness'. Moved by such 
conditions, the municipal officials could only say that the original scheme of the 
Township was not the ideal one for the conditions existing then. They recommended 
that a new plan that met the laws and regulations of health and comfort had to be 
introduced. 28 
The hospital, which was supposed to serve as a symbol of hygiene and cleanliness, 
was, apart from being under-staffed, in an equally messy state. In the wards, "there 
seemed to be more flies than ever". The conditions were such that babies were to be 
kept under cover of nets because of the swarms of flies. 29 This visit and the horrendous 
conditions which the Native Affairs Sub-committee observed served as a serious 
indictment on a local authority which incessantly patted itself on the back for having 
built a model township in the Western Cape, if not in the whole of South Africa. 
After wrapping up their inspection, the Native Affairs sub-committee was more than 
convinced that the condition of Langa left a lot to be desired. As the comment in 
Liberation League Page said, there was a realisation that, 'a lot had to be done to 
Langa, before the Cape Town Council can boast, as they have done in the past, that 
Langa Location is a model location in South Africa'. The Committee recommended 
the disbursement of the 50 000 pound loan allocation for improvements and alterations 
was to be treated as an urgent matter. 30 
There is no doubt that the NLL treated the outcome of this visit as well as the 
assurances made by the Committee as a victory and a vindication of the necessity for 
its self-assumed role of representing, working with and for the Langa residents. 
Encouraged by this development, the Langa Committee of the National Liberation 
28.The Guardian, 1 December 1940. 
29.The Guardian, 1 December 1940. 
30.The Guardian, 1 December, 1940. 
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League embarked on an aggressive recruiting drive in Langa in February 1941. It was 
scheduled to begin with a mass meeting in the Market Hall in Langa which was to be 
addressed by officials from the NLL Headquarters and officials in Langa. 31 But before 
dealing with the fundamentals of the recruiting campaign itself, a brief background is 
necessary. 
There had been campaigns before in Cape Town and additional branches had been 
established under the slogan "Organise Now, To-morrow will be too late".32 However, 
these had taken place in predominantly Coloured residential areas in, Athlone, 
Bellville, Belgravia, Eureka, Grassy Park, Kuils River, Rylands Estate, Surrey Estate, 
Oudtshoorn etc. 33 The February 1941 recruiting campaign in Langa was, however, 
started by invoking the people's grievances and complaints. The NLL, at the request 
of its branch in Langa, approached the Western Cape parliamentary representative Mr 
Molteno about the conduct of the police, seeking clarity on the legality of their actions 
in searching passengers for liquor.34 The NLL decided to play on the people's 
indignation that had been aroused by these grievances. The League interpreted this 
simmering discontent to mean that there was a need for 'an active political body 
working together with sympathetic forces in Cape Town for protection against such 
abuses' .35 The NLL felt that it was 'the only organisation capable of giving the 
leadership required'. Furthermore, it felt that a strong branch in Langa would be an 
indispensable complement to the endeavours of the Advisory Board and the Vigilance 
Committee in seeking lasting solutions to the residents' almost perennial grievances. 
Given the fact that the ANC and the CPS A had just started resurrecting from total 
moribundancy, and the incapacity of both the Advisory Board and the Vigilance 
Committee to act independently, the NLL was well placed to assume that 
organisational role which was lacking in Langa. 
31. The Guardian, 20 February 1941. 

32.The Guardian, 15 September, 1939. 

33.The Guardian, 3 November, 1939. 
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Besides playing on people's grievances, the League also sought to capitalise on the 
annual commemoration of the Mendi Tragedy in which hundreds of African troops 
aboard the Mendi ship drowned when it capsized on its way to France to help in the 
war effort in 1917. The NLL regarded the Memorial gathering that was to be 
organised by the Committee of Langa Church Ministers in February 1941 as an 
opportune occasion, 'for working African sentiments in order to arouse war fever, 
which is conspicuously absent in Langa', notwithstanding the fact that the gathering 
was a solemn occasion when people demonstrated their 'respect for their heroic 
brothers and of faith in their own courage and loyalty to their people' .36 
There is no evidence which indicates how this campaign proceeded. Nor is it clear 
how the political activities of the NLL in Langa faded. But this can be attributed to the 
fact that, faced by an immediate concern, it diverted most of its attention to the 
increasing threat of Fascism to South Africa in 1943 as well as the increasing 
discrimination against Coloureds by the Government. At a time when the popularity of 
the NLL in the township was at a low ebb, Langa became the hub of the political 
revival of the ANC and the CPSA. 
PART TWO 
The Si2nificance of Lan2a Township in the Resurrection of the ANC and the 
CPSA in the Late 1930's and 1940's. 
Langa Township served as a political catchment area also for the ANC and the CPSA. 
It was a crucial linchpin for the resurrection and the eventual ascendance to prominence 
36.The Guardian, 20 February 1941. 
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of the ANC and CPSA in the 1940s. But surprisingly, little is known about the 
centrality of such "little" places like Langa in the resurgence of these organisations. 
The dovetailing of social and political issues with shrewd party political leadership 
produced a formidable ideology of popular protest. 
Although the ANC and the CPSA remained as separate entities, the revival of the ANC 
in Langa and Cape Town demonstrates the existence of a symbiotic relationship 
between itself and the CPSA, particularly at the leadership level. It was particularly 
the CPSA which, because of a lack of a large following, needed the ANC. In 1937 
there was a realisation by the CPSA that the ANC had been in existence for a long time 
and was therefore the only organisation that commanded a broad support-base. The 
communists chose, therefore, to work for the rebuilding of the ANC.37 This new 
thinking which, in essence, was a compromise between its relationship as a class party 
with other national liberation movements, was necessitated by the expUlsions of 
Communists, in the 1930's, from Thaele's Western Cape ANC. From then on, there 
was no CPSA activity until about 1939, when its headquarters was transferred to Cape 
Town and fell under the leadership of Mr.Moses Kotane who had returned to Cape 
Town from Johannesburg in 1937. As its national secretary, Kotane was instmmental 
in the CPSA's revival. 38 Kotane, thus became an embodiment of the co-operation 
between the ANC and the CPSA. 
The Revival of the ANC 
The main task that Mr.Kotane undertook initially was the revival of the ANC in Cape 
Town and the surrounding areas. In this exercise, he was assisted by a coterie of ANC 
stalwarts, namely Joseph Nkatlo, Wilson Tsikiwe, Johnson Ngwevela and Julius 
Malangabi (both of Langa), Ngwenya, Sebela, Ndimande, Setloho, Msila and James 
Dambaza Chikerema (a Zimbabwean, who became a prominent nationalist leader 
37.B.Bunting, Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary. A 
Political Biography, (London, 1975), 83. 
38.T.Karis and G.M.Carter, From Protest to Challenge: A 
Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 
1882-1964, vol.2 (California, 1973), 108. 
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during Zimbabwe's independence struggle). These men successfuly est2.blished ANC 
branches in Cape Town, Langa, the Cape Flats, Blaauvlei, Paarl, Simonstown, 
Worcester and Stellenbosch. 39 In reconstituting the organisation, Kotane and his 
colll.~ues were wary not to repeat the same blunder of leaving out the grassroots 
membership as had been done by the previous ANC leadership. By building the party 
from below they hoped to have an intensive as well as an extensive membership activity 
and participation in the decision-making process. 40 
In Febuary 1939 the central branch of the ANC in Cape Town (with its offices at 73 
Francis Street), led by its chairman Moses Kotane, T.C.Kumalo, the treasurer, and 
Joseph Nkatlo, the secretary, dispatched a campaign programme that was published in 
The Guardian. The programme was notable for its apologetic tone for the ANC' s past 
mistakes and an appeal to move forward. The programme also noted the incapacity of 
the old ANC to lead the people in organised protest. It read, in part: 
Big political, social and economic questions are "settled" 
without any organised protest from us... This Committee 
feels that the time ha<; when the Africans must be up and 
going.41 
The programme contained an elaborate list of eleven points which had a social appeal 
to the African petty bourgeoisie, the African worker, and even the lumpen class in 
Cape Town. The central branch promised to do some of the following; 
(i) to present the people's grievances to the responsible authorities and to get them 
redressed; (ii) to fight for the abolition of the Pass system; (iii) for the inclusion of the 
African workers under the Industrial Conciliation Act as other workers (this was in 
reference to white workers); (iv) for the right of Africans to buy and hold land on 
individual system of tenure in rural and urban areas; for the right of Africans to do 
trade and business where they desired and (v) for better housing and improved sanitary 
conditions in Langa and to fight for the abolition of the barrack system. The ANC 
vowed to work for the annulment of (a) the Native's Representation Act; (b) the Native 
39.Bunting, , 87. 
40.Bunting, Moses Kotane, 
41.The Guardian, 24 February, 1939. 
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Laws Amendment Act and (c) the Colour Bar Act. Lastly, it promised to strive for co­
operation between itself and other non-European organisations. For the first time, here 
was a serious attempt by the ANC in Cape Town to take charge of the people's 
mundane problems. 
But unlike the NLL, the ANC central branch committee did not restrict itself to issues 
of a local character, such as the people's grievances only. It aroused in people a sense 
national consciousness by reminding them that 
the time has come when Africans must be prepared to do real work and 
make real sacrifices for their national emancipation. The road to 
emancipation is hard, full of trials, failures and misunderstandings. But 
these obstacles could be overcome and be turned into stepping stones. 42 
In March of 1939, Joseph Nkatlo reminded the Africans in Cape Town that it was only 
through joining Congress and rendering it their moral and financial support that would 
make the organisation ' a force to be respected in Africa and beyond the seas'. 43 
During the campaign great stress was laid on reinvigorating the organisation by 
forgetting the mistakes and weaknesses of the past by the provisional leadership of the 
ANC, Provisional President, A. V. Coto; Moses Kotane; Stephen Olifant; Mr. Msila 
and Joseph Nkatlo. Kotane was on record as stirringly appealing to the African people 
to become members of Congress. At a campaign rally in the Congregational Hall, 102 
Harrington Street in Cape Town in June 1939 he emphasised the importance of unity as 
the bottomline to the resurrection of a formidable organisation. This could only be 
achieved if people "quit their petty bickerings" and if they stopped 'brooding over the 
mistakes of the past and to start afresh as a united people against the forces of 
reaction I .44 
The Cape Town Branch of the African National Congress wasted no time in taking the 
lead in championing the cause of its African constituency. In a strongly worded letter 
42.The Guardian, 10 March, 1939. 
43.The Guardian, 10 March, 1939. 
44.The Guardian, 23 June, 1939. 
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to the Cape Town City Council, in August 1939, the ANC protested against the 
Council's expulsion of Africans residing within the precincts of the City boundaries. 
The ANC pointed out that such treatment precipitated alarm and agitation within the 
African community in the Cape Peninsula. The ANC also spoke for the bourgeoisie 
landlords, who were prosecuted for renting out accommodation to African tenants. The 
organisation condemned such action as an act of "callousness and dastardliness and 
highly un-Christian". 45 The ANC found it rather disturbing that while landlords were 
prosecuted for the above reason, those Africans who had struggled to get temporary 
shelter in the city were also prosecuted. 
The Council, argued the ANC, did not take cognizance of the fact that there was little 
accommodation at Langa for married people. It went further to lambast the Council for 
providing unmarried Africans at Langa with barrack accommodation which was "not fit 
for human habitation", never mind the demoralising effect this had on the tenants. The 
letter implicitly hinted at the organisation's concern with class by pointing out that, 
some of the people living in the barracks had progressed and were too decent 
to live there. 46 
The nature and style of accommodation at Langa and above all the entire concept of 
racially motivated residential segregation tended to obliterate "class divisions" among 
Africans at Langa. Even those Africans who had successfully ascended the economic 
ladder, and could, therefore, afford to buy a better house elsewhere or build or extend 
a house in Langa could not do so as it was against the law. It is this voiceless type of 
African that the ANC spoke for to the Council. This was a curiously class-based 
approach which the ANC displayed indicating that it hardly represented the workers 
only. 
45.The Guardian, 11 August, 1939. 
46.The Guardian, 11 August, 1939. 
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This, it can be said, was the first serious attempt by the ANC to deal with the bread 
and butter issues that affected the urban Africans. What one finds striking about this is 
the apparent lack of cooperation between the ANC and the NLL in dealing with such 
issues. Both were dealing with more or less the same issues, at the same time, using 
the same tactics of protest, and campaigning and recruiting among the same people but 
in different ways. In terms of strategy, the forging of a united front between the two 
organisations might have made a significant difference and impact on the Council. 
Notwithstanding this, it is clear that the socio-economic conditions and changes that 
obtained in Langa and Cape Town were very important for the ANC in that they 
provided a concentrated mass organisational basis for political activity and political 
revival. 
There is an assumption which has falsely become a historical fact. The resurrection in 
the fortunes of the ANC is a process which some historians say, began in the 1940s 
with the accession of Dr.A.B.Xuma to the presidency of the organisation. 47 The point 
is rarely made that this process had already begun in the Western Cape in 1939 led by 
Moses Kotane and his collegues. They put ANC back on track so much that when 
Xuma was elected the organisation had already been transmogrified. So it was that, in 
recognition of the popUlarity of the ANC as mass based organisation in Langa and Cape 
Town, the CPSA which was seeking a political home in order to have a grassroots 
following or appeal, transferred its headquarters from Johannesburg to Cape Town in 
1939.48 The ANC in Johannesburg was still too dormant to provide the CPSA with a 
reliable mass base.49 Further to this, Kotane, who had not relinguished his membership 
of the CP, during its nadir, was elected as the General-Secretary of the CPSA in 1939. 
As the two organisations had resolved to work together, he did not subordinate his 
loyalty to the other party. 
47.Lodge, Black Politics in south Africa, 24; see also Karis 
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Like the ANC, the CPSA went through a period of regeneration and ran its own 
separate campaign programme from the ANC. Instead of engaging in a revolutionary 
struggle to attain its historical objective i.e. a socialist dispensation in South Africa, the 
CPSA chose to concentrate on those issues that would deliver quick, tangible political 
benefits to the African workers and other classes of people. It also campaigned among 
the same people as the ANC so that in most cases both organisations had an 
overlapping membership. 50 Alf Stadler rejected as a myth the notion by some critics 
that there was a communist conspiracy to control African nationalist politics. Instead 
he argued that the CPSA did not have a preponderant influence over other nationalist 
organisations, especially the ANC.5J This observation might be true in a very general 
sense but if one considers the dynamics of local or regional party political activity, one 
soon finds that the CPSA had a preponderant influence over the ANC, in Langa and 
Cape Town. Once it had been revived and had become vibrant the ANC seems to have 
taken a backseat whilst the CPSA leap-frogged the latter. 
Once the headquarters of the CPS A had been transferred to Cape Town, Kotane again 
was at the centre-stage of the mass political mobilisation for the CPSA in Langa and 
Cape Town. He employed the same approach he had used when he campaigned for the 
rebirth of the ANC, that· the people must be encouraged to be actively involved in 
rebuilding the party. The leadership must never alienate itself from them". Speaking of 
the communists, Kotane said, 'Communists must be where the people are. Theories 
and policies must be judged by their success in mobilising the people for action' .52 In 
trying to get closer to the people, the Cape Town District Committee of the CPSA, 
which comprised activists like Ray Alexander and her husband Jack Simons, Eli 
, 	 Weinberg, Johnny Gomas, Jam es la Guma and Leepile and Kotane himself, busied 
itself with taking up the African people's grievances, exposing their living and working 
conditions, calling for the abolition of the pass laws and similar discriminatory 
50.Stadler, The Political Economy of Modern South Africa, 
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legislation. It is quite clear that the provision of political organisation and leadership 
around issues of a subsistence character was a necessary bait towards communal 
mobilisation. 
The most common grievance among Africans in Cape Town, at the end of the 1930's 
was either the shortage or the poor condition of accommodation in the Cape Peninsula 
resulting in "squatting". The position was further exacerbated by the outbreak of the 
Second World War which saw a sharp increase of the African population in the urban 
areas, following a relaxation of the influx control regulations by the government. 
Because the government took no necessary precautions to meet the housing needs of 
this popUlation rise, this, among other things, led to a number of problems such as 
squatting. The seriousness of this problem was highlighted by Mr.Slarke's report on 
the "Conditions of Natives in the Peninsula". The report estimated that a rough figure 
of about 32 000 men, women and children were resident in the Cape Town Municipal 
Area. But the legal accommodation that existed, including Langa, could only house 12 
000. What this meant was that the rest were living under wretched conditions. 
The unorganised and unco-ordinated popular agitation against these conditions was not 
strong enough to prod the Cape Town City Council into redressing the anomalies. The 
CPSA, like the NLL and the ANC, took up this issue and articulated the position of the 
Africans to the Municipality. The Cape District Committee (CPSA) accused the 
Council of failing to provide enough accommodation even when the Government had 
made available sub-economic loans for the people.53 The CPSA presented to the 
Council the objective but shattered social and material conditions in the rural areas 
which forced people to come to Cape Town to search for employment. The inadequacy 
of land and the imposition of heavy taxation were singled out as the reasons why people 
flocked to the City. But even if they found employment they still encountered more 
serious problems such as low wages, the denial of social, political or civic rights. 
Above all, lack of adquate housing forced many to live in shanties around Cape Town. 
53.The Guardian, 6 May 1943. 
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Therefore, argued the CPSA, no amount of tinkering with the people's rights or 
hounding them out of Cape Town would solve the problemY 
In a demonstration of a struggle towards common objectives with the ANC, the CPSA, 
ended its statement of appeal to the Municipality by reiterating the demands the ANC 
had made in February 1939. The CPSA called upon all 'workers and progressives' to 
renew the demands, for the adequate provision of housing for Africans by using sub­
economic loans; the provision of a "human rate" of pay of lOs per day for unskilled 
workers; recognition of African workers' trade unions under the Industrial Conciliation 
Act; an increase of land allocation to the African people; and lastly the abolition of all 
pass or "control" and poll tax systems.55 
The tone of these demands is also notable for its lack of a revolutionary fervour. The 
CPSA hoped that a 'conference prepared to accept these basic requirements of the 
African people can hope to provide any sort of a solution to the so-called African 
problem' .56 A possible explanation of this approach can be found in Tom Lodge's 
observation that the Communists' emphasis on reformist demands and their avoidance 
of confrontation with the authorities was a tactical expedient designed to promote the 
growth of an alliance with the conservative African National Congress. 57 But at the 
same time, the communists' "imaginative responses" to the "deprivation and 
helplessness" of the urban African ensured their commitment to the welfare of the 
downtrodden. 58 This was also a difficult period for communism world-wide in the 
1940s. 
54.The Guardian, 6 May 1943. 
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In order to gain a foothold in Langa and Cape Town, and to be able to agitate over 
such injustices and material hardships, the CPSA participated in a number of local 
governing structures with a view to ensuring that wherever and whenever possible, its 
interests would be represented. For the first time in its history it contested and won 
two seats in the Cape Town municipal elections in September 1943. A victory for 
these two councillors obviously became a victory for the CPSA. They were Mrs Betty 
Sacks (nee, Betty Radford, editor of The Guardian), and Mr Sam Kahn, an advocate, 
were the first Communists to sit on any official body in South Africa, according to the 
Cape District Committee leadership of the CPSA.59 Much to the expectation of the 
CPSA the two Communists were assigned portfolios which were relevant to the party's 
objectives. Betty Sacks was elected as chairman of a Special Committee, the 
Scholarships Committee. She was also elected to the committees of Markets, Public 
Health, Native Affairs, and to represent the Council on the committees of Woodstock 
Public Library. Mr. Sam Kahn, was elected to the Traffic and Fire Services, Native 
Affairs, Trade Licences committees and to a special committee for Dental Clinics, 
chaired by Mrs Cissie Z. Gool. 60 These committees do not seem to have been central 
ones. It seems this was a deliberate move to marginalise them. 
The CPSA viewed this as a victory. The appointment of both communist councillors to 
a committee that dealt with African Affairs could not have come at a better time. The 
councillors usually spoke against restrictions on Africans, the Council's unilateral rent 
increases and against pass legislation. It bolstered the Party's position vis- -a-vis the 
problems facing urban Africans. Here was a golden opportunity for the CPSA to 
intensify its struggle for the social upliftment of the Africans in Langa and Cape Town 
and hence gain a firm foothold within its constituency. 
It is important to remember that Africans were not directly represented on the Council. 
But, even though the election of CPSA councillors on the Council seemed to provide 
59.The Guardian, 9 September 1943. 
60.The Guardian, 9 September 1943. 
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some form of representation for the Langa residents, this did not stop them from 
demanding direct representation. That Africans were suspicious of the usefulness of 
indirect representation to them, is made abundantly clear by the statement issued by the 
Langa Advisory Board in response to a questionnaire from the Native Laws 
Commission of Enquiry in 1946. It said that, 'Only through direct representation can 
our interests be protected. As long as Africans are not taking part in the election of 
Councillors, so long will Councillors have no reason to safeguard African interests' .61 
In trying to increase its identity and define its social location among the Africans, the 
CPSA, pursued its policy of participating in Advisory Board politics by canvassing 
support for its candidates, as it had done in Orlando since 1934 until the rise of James 
Sofasonke Mpanza's squatter movement in 1944.62 In Langa Township, the CPSA 
working in close conjunction with the Vigilance Association fielded its candidates for 
election on the Langa Advisory Board from 1944 and in subsequent years until it was 
banned in 1950. The Langa Branch of the CPSA and the Langa Vigilance Association 
fielded six candidates for the elections, of which four were communist members and 
two were members of the original Vigilance Association. 63 
These candidates were, however, opposed by candidates of a new splinter Vigilance 
Association (from the original one led by Mr.B.Ntshinga) led by the Rev. Nontshinga­
Citashe. Rev. Citashe and his clique, as it was commonly known, had an anti­
communist agenda with the support of the Superintendent of Langa. 64 This was one 
indication that the CPSA was not always as popular as The Guardian would have its 
readers believe. The outcome of the elections held on 28 December 1944 was as 
follows: 
61.CA 3\CT 1\4\10\1\1\12, Langa Advisory Board, Reply to 
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MARRIED OUARTERS: NO. of VOTES 
Mr Johnson N. Ngwevela (Comm. Party) 232 
Mr William Ndunyana (Comm. Party) 231 
Mr J. Fuku (Citashe Clique) 140 
Mr J. Pama (Citashe Clique) 139 
Mr J. Malangabi (Independent) 21 
SPECIAL QUARTERS: 
Mr S. Bingela (Comm. Party) 80 
Mr T. Lwana (Comm. Party) 76 
Mr Kakaza (Citashe Clique) 71 
Mr Mthula (Citashe Clique) 69 
NORTH AND MAIN BARRACKS: 
Mr F. Mvunyisa (Langa Vig. Assoc) 140 
Mr N. N tantiso (Langa V ig. Assoc) 140 
Mr Ntantale (Citashe Clique) 86 
Mr G. Mhlontlo (Citashe Clique) 83 
It is worth to note, for reasons not immediately clear, the presence of the CPSA in both 
the Married and Special Quarters but not in the North and Main Barracks. 
All in all, the Communist Party and the Vigilance Association obtained 900 of the 
1,509 total votes, and the Citashe clique 588, and the Independent, twenty-one. 65 It is 
one thing to see the victory of the CPSA as a confirmation of its popularity and quite 
another to see it in terms of the confidence people had in certain influential individual 
leaders, e.g. Messrs Ngwevela and Ndunyana. Some voters voted for the Party and 
some for the individual because of his association with and contribution to many 
aspects of community life without necessarily linking him to the party he belongs. The 
profile of Johnson Ngwevela might be informative in this regard. 
The election of Mr. Ngwevela (with the highest number of votes), was seen by the 
CPSA as an indication of the eminence not of the man himself but of the party. 
Ngwevela's colourful profile presents him as a leader of many parts. He was a 
prominent ANC leader and some informants in Langa said he became the Chairman of 
65.The Guardian, 4 January 1945. 
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the Cape Town Branch of the ANC in the 1950s.66 He succes!":.fully combined his 
leadership of the communist organisation and that of the Wesleyan Church in Langa, in 
spite of the atheist doctrines associated with communism. In this church he was once a 
preacher and Treasurer and Secretary of the Wesleyan Men's Association. 
At the time of his election to the Advisory Board, he had just resigned as the Secretary 
of a Committee responsible for the Welcoming of Chiefs to Langa but immediately 
became the founding-father of the Red Cross First Aid in Langa. 67 With such wide­
ranging and varied experience, and influence in the Langa community the CPS A 
banked on him for providing a sustained level of support for the party in Langa. 
Even though Advisory Boards along with similar segregated institutions, were widely 
seen by the residents in Langa and elsewhere, as well as political organisations, as mere 
"talking shops", after 1937, there was a changing perception within the ranks of the 
CPS A concerning the role of such institutions. Moses Kotane clarified the position of 
the Party towards participation in Advisory Boards in spite of their "impotence and 
helplessness" . 
Perhaps the correct line to follow would be to boycott the advisory 
boards. But an effective boycott demands a high degree of political 
consciousness, organisation, unity of purpose and action. I do not think 
we have attained these qualifications yet. Meanwhile we can and should 
make use of the advisory boards. From a propaganda point of view it is 
a good thing that the Party should take part in the advisory board 
elections. However our aim should be to get the Africans out of the 
rut. 68 
It is this collaboration with such institutions, that partly led to the formation of the non­
collaborationist Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) in 1943 in Cape Town by a 
group of radical middle-class intelligentsia. The strength of NEUM lay in boycotting 
segregated institutions and 'pillorying the perceived careerism and mendacity of all 
66.Mr.Kobo, Ms.Sporty Ngwevela, (Mr.J. Ngwevela's 
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those who willingly colluded with the dominant white capitalist classes in the hope of 
securing incremental reform for those classified by statute as "African", "Coloured" or 
"Indian'" .69 
If Colin Bundy's observation that NEUM's claim that it was the only genuine national 
liberatory movement, was based more on its "theoretical claims" rather than in any 
"actual organic strength" ,70 is anything to go by, then, the CPSA, chose to pursue the 
development of the latter first and temporarily suspend the former. Experience had 
taught the CPSA that there was no way it could hope to successfully launch a workers' 
revolution in South Africa, without the Party first organically evolving out of the 
workers themselves. Hence, the Party immersed itself in the subsistence issues of the 
people in the hope of achieving immediate benefits, after which it could talk of a 
workers' revolution. In other words, the Party shifted its ideological emphasis on the 
attainment of an Independent Native Republic first to an analysis of non-racialism. 71 
A significant area in which the CPSA, working in conjunction with the ANC, made its 
political mark, was in arousing the people's consciousness by agitating against passes 
and pass laws. While this was generally an issue around which the whole African 
population was mobilised nationally, local mobilisation trends suggest why success was 
not achieved at the national level but at the local level, specifically in Langa and Cape 
Town. 
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In these two parts, there was evidently an emphasis on politics at the leadership level. 
Very little can be detected about popular political initiative. It would be an act of 
commission and ommission to simply concentrate on popular political responses 
without also paying attention to elitist nationalist political activity. The limited political 
activity from below might help to explain the abrupt demise of the NLL. It also 
explains why both the ANC and the CPSA saw it fit to appeal to the grassroots levels 
to shake themselves out of the political limbo they were in. What these two sections 
have demonstrated is that dealing with popular mundane issues and articulating their 
grievances is not enough. The people whom political leadership purport to represent 
need to be empowered, taken along and be put into the confidence of that leadership. 
Chapter 7 attempts to demonstrate how the ANC and the CPS A tried to do this. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
"DOWN WITH PASS LA WS~We want Freedom": The Anti-Pass Campai2n in 
Lan2a and Cape Town. 1943~1946 
The decade of the 1940' s has historically been described as a period of mixed fortunes 
especially for urban Africans. It is a decade in which there was a rural-urban drift, but 
for a very brief period (1942-1943) influx control was suspended at the beginning of 
the war to contain African political agitation and because their labour was needed. But 
the point is not often made that Cape Town and its environs did not enjoy this brief 
spell of pass control suspension. I Even though political organisation and mobilisation 
against the pass laws was started in Johannesburg, it is no coincidence that Cape Town 
and Langa became the focal point of intensified party political activity, culminating in 
the historic bonfire of passes at Langa on 4 August 1946. 
By late 1943, stricter control of the pass laws was firmly in place on the 
Witswatersrand and naturally anti-pass campaigns mushroomed there. The CPSA was 
quick to capitalise on the Africans' mounting discontent. It took the initiative to 
convene an Anti-Pass Conference in Johannesburg in November 1943. At this 
conference, 153 delegates from 112 bodies (the ANC, trade unions, civic leagues, 
sporting bodies, religious organisations etc.), representing 80 796 people, unanimously 
agreed to establish local anti-pass committees and to send resolutions to the Prime 
Minister and Minister of Native Affairs and the Native Representative CounciI.2 
Formed also at this meeting was a National Anti-Pass Committee made up of fifteen 
mainly African communists and a sprinkling of non-communist members of the 
Transvaal African Congress. 3 
1.D.Hindson, Pass Controls and the Urban African 
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Anti-pass local committees were hastily set up throughout the length and breadth of the 
country. Although the Anti-pass drive had originated with the CPSA in Cape Town, it 
was the ANC (Western Province) which started the movement and oversaw the 
formation of an Anti-Pass Committee whose office-bearers were predominantly ANC 
members. For instance, Joseph Nkatlo, secretary of the ANC (Western Province) was a 
member of the Anti-Pass secretariat. 4 By March 1944, the Cape Town Anti-Pass 
Committee formed at the end of January was already engaged in an elaborate series of 
campaigns at the grassroots level in Langa, Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Philippi 
Bellville, Kensington, Retreat, Blaauwvlei etc. s The Cape Town Anti-Pass Committee, 
like other similar committees in the country, was notable for its campaign strategy 
largely aimed at making the affected people anti-pass conscious. Through open-air 
mass meetings which usually attracted many people, speaker after speaker from the 
Committee vividly chronicled how obnoxious the pass laws were. 6 Africans in the 
Cape Peninsula, generally, demonstrated a 'keen determination to secure a complete 
repeal of the pass laws in 1944'.7 
Freire's concepts, which we have examined in the introduction, may have been 
specially tailored for a specific discipline, but they sound pertinent to our analysis of 
the Anti-Pass Campaign. Rarely did the leadership of the Cape Town Anti-Pass 
Campaign (also subjected to the rig ours of Pass legislation), issue statements without 
the endorsement of the people they represented. There was a genuine realisation of the 
need to involve the people. The first mammoth mass meeting convened in the City 
Hall in Cape Town on Saturday, 1 April 1944, at 2.30 p.m., is one such example. The 
meeting, attended by about 3 500 Africans, was addressed by, among others, 
Dr.A.B.Xuma and Moses Kotane. The address by Kotane underscored the importance 
of unity and cooperation as a vital force that could bring to an end the Pass Laws. 
Resolutions passed at the end of the meeting reflected the people 1 s consciousness that 
4.The Guardian, 20 January 1944. 
5. Inkululeko, 25 March 1944. 
6.The Guardian, 25 March 1944. 
7. Inkululeko, 25 March 1944. 
180 
the Pass Laws were nothing more than a mechanism introduced by the State to secure 
the conditions for capital accumulation and the reproduction of cheap labour power. 
We are of the opinion that the Pass Laws were introduced for the sole 
purpose of restricting our right to move freely and obtain employment in 
accordance with our wishes, thus condemning us to a state of 
backwardness and to being a source of cheap labour. We therefore call 
upon the Government to repeal these laws immediately. 8 
The April meeting was followed by the Cape Anti-Pass Conference called by the Cape 
Town Anti-Pass Committee on 18 June 1944. The Committee sought to reach a wider 
spectrum of people by inviting non-European political and trade union organisations, 
civic and welfare associations and religious and sporting bodies. Clearly, the pass laws 
were directed against Africans as a race, but the leadership of the Anti-Pass Campaign 
found it worthwhile to solicit the support of all the non-European sections of the 
population in the Cape Peninsula because 'we believe none of them can be free while 
another is oppressed and because their interests are the same and interdependent', stated 
Mr.J.N.Ntshona, secretary of the Cape Town Anti-Pass Committee. 9 
The conference, convened to deliberate on the modalities of "stimulating and 
intensifying the agitation" against pass legislation, attracted a record 41 delegates 
representing 17 800 people in 22 organisations. The Anti-Pass Committee was 
streamlined and strengthened to popularise the anti-pass movement. The Committee of 
21 was given powers to 'suspend members for inactivity and to co-opt' more members. 
Those elected to the Committee were: Messrs. W.Tsikwe, M.Kotane (Gen. Scretary of 
the Communist Party), T.C.Kumalo, N.Hassen, 1.Ntshona (CPSA), F.C.Welcome, 
J.Nkatlo, R.Moses, A.Mtsi, L.Phillips, Mrs.M.Bhola, (my emphasis), Messrs. 
S.Nkolombe, N.Kota, 1. MoY.atedi, R.Ndimande, J.Ntloko, L.Manyela, T.Ntsinde, 
J.Clarke, T.Ngwenya, and H.Kalipa.lo The composition of this Committee reflected 
the "alliance" between the ANC, the CPSA and the workers' trade unions represented 
8. Inkululeko, 15 April 1944. 
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by ANC member Lucas Phillips, Secretary to the C.C.N.E. Engineering Trade 
Unions. I I 
The re-organisation of the Committee was accompanied by the adoption of a four-point 
Plan of Action. It emphasised the need for the new Committee to work closely with 
the rest of South Africa through the Press and the National Working Committee, i.e. 
the National Anti-Pass Committee; to hold more public meetings which were widely 
representative; to establish smaller Anti-Pass committees in work places and residential 
areas; and personal contacts with the people through the selling of badges and the 
collection of signatures to the anti-pass petition. 12 
Although the pass law grievance seemed to overshadow other problems by the sort of 
urgent attention it was given, the Conference did not over-look the gravity of the local 
problems in the Peninsula. Resolutions were passed condemning the Cape Town City 
Council's proposal to erect a depot in Langa, where Africans seeking employment from 
outside the Cape Peninsula would be received and quarantined until such time they 
found employment. 13 Another issue which received widespread condemnation and 
objection was the Native Affairs Department's proposal of a new system of recruiting 
Africans into "controlled mobile labour gangs", to benefit agricultural capital. 14 These 
forms of control were nothing less of a complement to the cardinal objective of the pass 
laws, namely the regulation of cheap labour power. 
Before gearing itself to its campaign schedule, the Cape Town Anti-Pass Committee 
further set up three sub-committees with the intention of speeding up and facilitating its 
work. These were the Finance Sub-Committee, whose members comprised Messrs. 
R.Ndimande, T.C.Khumalo, and N Hassen; the Campaign Planning Sub-Committee, 
with members Messrs. M.Kotane, R.Moses, and S.Manyela; and the Publicity 
11.MA BC 579 A7.1441, Anti-Pass Corom. memo., 10 March 1945. 
12.The Guardian, 22 June 1944. 
13.Ihe Guardian, 22 June 1944. 
14.The Guardian, 22 June 1944. 
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Committee, whose members were, 1. Nkatlo, S.Nkolombe and N.Kota. These sub­
committees constituted the most significant element of the whole Anti-Pass campaign, 
which was to win public support by selling Anti-Pass badges, soliciting signatures to 
the Anti-Pass petition and the donation of funds to make all these efforts possible. IS 
The large crowds that attended the marathon meetings in August 1944 at Langa, Paarl 
and Stellenbosch, bore ample testimony to the effectiveness of the streamlined Anti­
Pass Committee. Incensed by the crippling effect of the pass laws, the people voiced 
their strong objection to the discriminatory legislation. 16 Public outcry provided ample 
ammunition for the Anti-Pass Committee to intensify the Campaign. The Committee 
set aside Sundays to collect signatures for the Anti-Pass Petition but alternated this 
activity with public meetings. The highlight of this renewed strategy was the 
"invasion" of Langa Township by Committee officials as they moved from "door to 
door" canvassing for signatures. 
The response in Langa was overwhelming. While successful progress in the collection 
of signatures was reported, the same could not be said about fund-raising with the 
result that Committee members' had to meet the expenses incurred during the campaign 
with their own money, if the report in the The Guardian is to be believed. The fund­
raising functions organised by the Campaign Committee, did not yield a favourable 
response. But, although the Committee was financially ham-strung this did not scuttle 
its campaign programme. 17 
Although winning the support of the African people through the Anti-Pass campaign is 
not a remote possibility, what is strikingly clear about the conduct of the Campaign 
leadership, is that during the campaign there was virtually no talk of recruiting 
members for either the ANC or the CPSA. For as long as these organisations worked 
together for the campaign to succeed there was no talk of party affiliation or loyalty. 
15.The Guardian, 6 July 1944. 
16. Inkululeko, 26 August 1944. 

17.The Guardian, 23 November 1944. 
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This probably explains why the CPSA launched a separate three-month campaign 
progamme which it dubbed "BUILD THE PARTY DRIVE", from I June to 31 August 
1944 with the immediate aim of gaining 1 000 new recruits nation-wide. The main 
thrust of this campaign was recruitment of members and financial contribution towards 
the war effort. In Cape Town the first recruitment meeting was held on 1 June 1944 
and the District Committee of the CPS A aimed to recruit the biggest number of the 
1000 national member target as well as raising 1000 pounds fighting fund. J8 Instead of 
concentrating on pass law issues, the campaign focussed on the Second World War and 
the fascist threat to the progress of communism since the entry of the Soviet Union into 
the war. Very little was also discussed at the meetings about domestic grievances. The 
result was that by 15 July, Cape Town came third, after Durban (194 new members), 
followed by Pretoria with (186). Cape Town recruited only 141, the East Rand, 87 
and Johannesburg, 48. The recruitment drive was miserably low in Port Elizabeth, 
East London and Pietermaritzburg with 10, 10 and 7 members respectively.19 
Be that as it may, the degree of the campaign's success was manifested by the massive 
turn-out of Africans in Cape Town in a grand demonstration against the Acting Prime 
Minister Hofmeyr's refusal to meet the Anti-Pass Deputation. In June 1945, the 5000­
strong crowd, led by the Anti-Pass deputation, marched from the Grand Parade to the 
Parliament chanting the African National Anthem, "Nkosi Sikelela iAfrica" punctuated 
with the slogan "Down with Pass Laws--we want Freedom". 20 Besides marching and 
chanting, resolutions were also passed condemning the stubornness of the Acting Prime 
Minister to meet the deputation. The demonstration, apart from registering the 
Africans' profound resentment of the pass laws, yielded nothing tangible. 
African resistance in Cape Town was further accentuated by the proposed introduction 
of pass laws (framed under the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945) in the 
municipal area by the Native Affairs Department. Until then Cape Town with its 
18.The Guardian, 1 June 1944. 
19.The Guardian, 17 August 1944. 
20. Inkululeko, 25 June 1945. 
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liberal tradition had escaped the formal introduction of the pass laws unlike other urban 
centres in South Africa. The Government's plan was to decentralise the control of 
African pass registration to local authorities as from 1 April 1946.21 According to the 
proposals, an African work-seeker could not get employment in the Cape Peninsula 
without a pass. Only a few select classes of people were exempted from the new draft 
regulations and these were chiefs and headman, ministers of religion who were 
marriage officers, teachers 'whose salaries are paid or defrayed directly or indirectly, 
in whole or in part by the Government', and interpreters of courts in the Union. 22 
But the tenor and tempo of African resistance against the draft regulations changed with 
the proposal to subject women and children to the pass laws. Under the proposed 
regulations, women and children who came to Cape Town seeking work were to be, 
first and foremost, bearers of passes.23 The rationale behind the exclusion of women 
from urban areas was obviously to prevent the permanent settlement of migrant 
labourers. These regulations were passed by the Government at the behest of both 
agricultural and mining capital which was in dire need of cheap labour, as they were 
losing labour to the relatively financially rewarding manufacturing industries in urban 
centres. The pass laws would, therefore, facilitate the ejection of Africans from 
industrial areas and drive them into the "clutches of the exploiting mine magnate and 
land owner". 24 What is spectacular about the draft pass law regulations is their arousal 
of gender sensitivities. No longer was the pass law merely perceived as an assault on 
the African race.It was also viewed as an assault on gender. Probably because they 
were directly affected, women in Langa and Cape Town became increasingly vocal 
against the pass laws. 
21.The Guardian, 11 October 1945. 

22.MA MP BC579 B9.53 Registration Regulations framed under 

section Thirty Eight (1) of the Natives (Urban Areas) 

Consolidation Act, 1945 (No.25 of 1945). 

23.MA MP BC579 B9.53 Registration Regulations of the Natives 

(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945 (No.25 of 1945) . 
24.Quoted from Mr.D.B.Molteno's article specially written 
for The Guardian, 18 October 1945. re: Draft Native 
Regulations. 
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Africans in Langa held protest meetings and expressed their indignation against the 
draft regulations. A meeting held during the first week of October 1945, attended by 
about 5000 people, was unique not only in the sense that it was jointly addressed by the 
local leadership of Langa (members of the Vigilance Association) and CPSA and ANC 
leaders, but also in the sense that among the predominantly male speakers was a 
woman, Mrs.Siqwana. 25 An informant remembers her as a very militant woman who 
often led other women in community protest activities in Langa. 26 She was the author 
of the resolution adopted at the meeting condemning the anticipated "arbitrary official 
molestation II of women and children.27 Consequently, Mrs.Siqwana became the 
representative conscience of the women at Langa and beyond at various fora. But 
Mrs.Siqwana did not see the women's struggle as unique to their sex. Rather, she 
implored African women to support men in the struggle against pass laws because 'You 
are the ones who will suffer most' .28 
The threat of pass law legislation to women demonstrated a massive display of 
women's consciousness about their rights (to live, work, to visit in and out) in the city. 
They organised themselves into a strong political force that complemented the inroads 
already begun by men. On 18 October, African women met at the Banqueting Hall in 
Cape Town to protest against the inimical Draft, but with special reference to the 
clauses that directly affected women, juveniles and the one on medical examination and 
vaccination. 29 Mrs.Siqwana presided over the meeting and was assisted by a like­
minded lady, Mrs. M.Bhola. These two women were, subsequently, to lead the 
Women I s League of the ANC as part of a twenty-three organisation strong delegation 
to the Minister of Native Affairs, Major P.G. van der Byl to express their reservations 
about the Draft regulations.. These organisations included the African National 
. 25.The Guardian, 11 October 1945. 
26.Interview with Mr Kobo. 
27.The Guardian, 11 October 1945. 
28.The Guardian, 18 October 1945. 
29. Section 18 (1) of the Registration Regulations 

stipulated that "Any male native entering, or employed or 

residing in the proclaimed area may be ordered by the 

registering offficer to present himself for medical 

examination and vaccination ...•. " 
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Congress, Anti-Pass Committee, Langa Advisory Board, Langa Traders, Race 
Relations, Race Contacts Committee, Joint Council of Bantu and European, the South 
African Communist Party. There were also business representatives and members of 
neighbouring local authorities,3o Members of this motley group of organisations, even 
though they were brought together by the pass law issue, represented different interests. 
Nevertheless, the representations made to the Minister were notable for their militancy. 
A few examples of these will suffice. Mrs.Bhola made a stinging attack against the 
carrying of passes as well as against the Native Affairs Department itself. She told the 
Minister that if the pass regulations were turned into law, then: 
This means we have to carry a pass in the land where we were born --we 
resent it as women. It is the Native Affairs Department which is killing 
our people today. They should be the protection of our people. We 
cannot tolerate these laws any more piling on top of each other. We 
women will never carry passes--we will go to gaol or be short first)l 
Mr.J.Malangabi, representing the Langa Vigilance Association, reminded the Minister 
that: 
There are as many Natives leaving as coming and there is no need for 
this "panic legislation". The problem should be discussed coolly and 
rationally. You will not only drive The Africansfrom Langa to 
Windermere, but into the bushes where they will only come out at 
night' ,32 
Lastly, Mr.Jellicoe Ntshona, secretary of the Anti-Pass Committee expressed a vote of 
no confidence in the Native Affairs Department: 'We are losing faith in the Department 
of Native Affairs. You are engendering hatred which youb will not be able to control 
in future. The confidence of the African people is going very fast' .33 
30.The Guardian, 25 October 1945. 
31.The Guardian, 1 November 1945. 
32.The Guardian, 1 November 1945. 
33.The Guardian, 1 November 1945. 
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The immediate effect that these protests had was that the Minister promised not to take 
any action until the Cape Town City Council had considered the Draft Regulations. 34 
The City Council, however, decided against the acceptance of the Draft Regulations for 
the introduction of Passes. But then this was a partial victory for the lobbyists against 
the Passes as the Council recommended that, instead, those regulations which applied 
to Cape Town be extended to the adjacent towns and revised. 35 
During the struggle against the Draft Regulations, the Cape Town Anti-Pass Committee 
seemed to have taken a very low profile, leaving much of the campaign around this 
issue to the local leadership. In fact it worked with other organisations. However, 
after the Cape Town City Council had made its position clear the A~ti-Pass Campaign 
Committee continued its campaign. The first phase of the campaign ahd unsuccessfully 
ended with the refusal by the Acting Prime Minister to meet the Anti-Pass deputation. 
This snub made the National Anti-Pass Committee to re-think its strategy towards the 
struggle. The National Anti-Pass led by Xuma was rather conservative and was not 
given to using violent means of struggling. But the failure of the deputation to meet 
the Prime Minister jolted it and in what remarkably became the second phase of the 
Anti-Pass Campaign, the Second National Anti-Pass Conference held on 23 June 1946 
decided to take practical mass action. The Conference agreed that within three months 
a day of national work stoppage would be organised and passes burned because as 
Xu rna said, 'We have been talking a great deal; now the time for action has come~36 
But at the same time Africans in the Cape Peninsula had their own problem. The 
enforcement of registration or the extension of pass laws to areas adjacent to Cape 
Town was to begin in earnest on 1 July. The Second Anti-Pass Conference 
"instructed" Africans in the Cape Province to refuse to be registered or to abide by the 
extension of pass laws.37 Rather than wait for the burning of passes nationwide within 
34.The Guardian, 1 November 1945. 
35.Bantu Forum, vol.8, no. 3, December 1945. 
36.The Guardian, 27 June 1946. 
37.The Guardian, 27 June 1946. 
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three months, the Cape Anti-Pass Committee decided that Africans in the Cape District 
should bum their registration passes at Langa on Sunday 4 August at 4. p. m. This 
decision was arrived at when Mr.Kotane, Secretary-General of the CPS A and member 
of the Anti-Pass Committee made this proposal at a rally at the Grand Parade attended 
by 2000 people. A report in The Guardian, said that every mon and woman who 
attended raised his or her hand as an indication of willingness to participate in the pass­
burning campaign.38 Mr.J.Nkatlo, a member of the Anti-Pass Committee described the 
planned action as signalling the opening up of a second front, in the mass struggle of 
Africans for liberation, that 'will sound the death-knell of the pass laws in south 
Africa' ,39 (The first front had been opened when the first group of Indian passive 
resisters took action in Durban). 40 
On 4 August, Africans, Indians and Coloureds came together at Langa to witness the 
burning of '''passes'' of slavery' which they regarded as being synonymous with 
lighting the flame of freedom. It was a solemn occasion the tone of which can only be 
graphically captured by a brief chronicle of the event. Mr.Moses Kotane opened the 
ceremony by a brief which sounded non-committal on his part. 
The settlement of peace in South Africa will be on the 
altar of the African people. You must say this afternoon-­
now--what you want. I shall read the resolution, but 
before doing so I solemnly declare, that the final decision 
rests with the people. 41 
This declaration was followed by a resolution to which the people agreed that they were 
determined to rid ourselves of the pass because we 
recognise it as the most important administrative 
instrument by which the Government is able to carry out 
its policy of impoverishing us, and preventing us from 
improving ourselves economically, by denying us the 
right to move freely in search of employment in the land 
of our birth. We are resolved not to carry passes any 
longer and if arrested, not to pay fines. 42 
38.The Guardian, 1 August 1946. 
39.The Guardian, 1 August 1946. 
40.The Guardian, 1 August 1946. 
41.The Guardian, 8 August 1946. 
42.The Guardian, 8 August 1946. 
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The ceremony proceeded with the handing in of passes, voters' registration forms and 
certificates to the platform. It should be noted that not everyone handed in his or her 
pass or certificates for fear of losing one's job, although they supported the event in 
principle. 43 The highlight of the occasion came when the chairman of the Anti-Pass 
Committee invited an African woman to start the bonfire of passes. The crowd hailed 
this gesture as "a revolutionary step" because, 'not only was an African woman setting 
the "passes" on fire, but she was at the same time destroying her own badge of 
inferiority in the the eyes of her people'. The burning of the "scraps of paper" was 
accompanied with a flourish. The people sang "Mayibuye" (The Freedom of the 
People). Incidentally, as this pass-burning ceremony was taking place, a Peace 
Conference was being held in Paris so that there was a ubiquitous belief that the smoke 
coming from the burning passes not only billowed into the sky but it was taken by the 
"winds of the earth" to the Peace Conference. It carried a 'solemn message from the 
African people that peace was indivisible and that unless there was Freedom for All 
then there could be Freedom for None'. 44 
A few weeks later other areas around Cape Town followed suit. Residents of 
Kayamnandi Location in Stellenbosch burnt hundreds of passes. As had happened in 
Langa, a woman again lit the bonfire. 45 
This mass action was the culmination of a scrupulous, well-co-ordinated and sustainable 
campaign exercise. If anything, it demonstrated the merit of good organization on the 
part of the Cape Town Anti-Pass Committee leadership which was clearly confirmed, if 
{­
not also informed, by the positive grassroots response. The success of the fE-SS­
,­
burning event in Langa is in itself a veritable rite of passage for the Township of the 
Mother City. This is so in the sense that Langa, in its search for identity and 
legitimacy as an indispensable element in the complete outlook of the City of Cape 
43.The Guardian, 8 August 1946. 
44.The Guardian, 8 August 1946. 
45.The Guardian, 29 August 1946. 
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Town went through distinct community struggles. But as these struggles were 
transpiring the people's perceptions, in general, about their world-view did not remain 
confined within the strictures of community struggles but widened upon the realisation 
that their struggle was not unique to themselves. 
If it is part of the historian's task to retrieve the local or regional history of a small 
place then it is imperative that the significance of that "small place" be located within 
the context of national history to discover its worthiness. Firstly, we have established 
that Langa and Cape Town anticipated the national revival of the ANC in 1939. 
Secondly, the successful revival of the CPSA in the same places, necessitated the 
transfer of the Party's Headquarters from Johannesburg where its political fortunes 
were in an absolute lull. Thirdly, the fact that the rass-burning campaign began and 
ended in Langa and the surrounding areas is a matter of historical significance. This is 
because, as Eddie Roux and Baruch Hirson have noted, after the June 23 1946 Second 
Anti-Pass Conference, nothing was heard about the initiative towards a national work 
stoppage and the burning of passes.46 But the Cape Town Anti-Pass Committee did not 
wait for the stipulated three months to act. It almost single-handedly led the Africans 
into militant action--an achievement of no mean feat considering the fact that this was 
the first time such a bold action was being taken. 
The ANC, from mid-1946 up to 1949, progressively declined in its popularity and 
political activities. The natIOnal leadership became alienated from the rank and file 
membership of the organisation. Unanimous decisions were not implemented. The 
pass-burning issue is one case in point. Secondly, decisions carried out at the 
Bloemfontein National Conference in December 1946 were hardly implemented. The 
boycott of the Royal visit was not observed. In fact Dr.Xuma, the National President 
of the ANC travelled to a place called Eshowe to attend the Royal reception. Thirdly, 
the decision to boycott elections under the Representation of Natives Act following the 





brutal repression of the 1946 African Mine Workers' strike was neglected. 47 This lack 
of competence and conservatism by the national leadership widened the chasm between 
the pro-militant Africanists (mostly members of the City Youth League), leading to the 
ousting of Xuma from office in 1949. 
On the other hand the CPSA, was incapacitated by the police raid on its headquarters in 
Cape Town, the subsequent seizure of its documents and the arrest of its leadership.48 
Its influence in Langa, however, remained evident in Advisory Board elections in 
which the CPSA stalwarts in Langa, Messrs.Ngwevela and Ndunyana were always 
returned unopposed. 49 
47. Inkululeko, December 1947. 
48.The Guardian, 22 August 1946. 
49.The Guardian, 23 December 1948. 
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CONCLUSION 
What this study has attempted to establish is that Langa township was and still is, to­
date, a prime site of community struggle - a 'crucial area in which people can start to 
challenge the controls of their everyday lives'. 1 This community struggle provided the 
inhabitants of Langa with some important lessons in political education. Hence, it is 
said community struggle' is a crucial area in which the living process of democratic 
participation in decision-making can be learnt' and '(i)t is only in the "living political 
school, by the fight and in the fight", that those lessons can be learnt'.2 One area from 
which such a lesson in political education was drawn was in the Langa residents' quest 
for direct municipal representation. They were clearly aware of the futility of the 
functions of the advisory board. Hence the incessant struggle between them and the 
dominant local authority. This local struggle for municipal representation was 
microcosmic in that the Langa people were not blind to the reality that they did not 
have parliamentary representation. They could not also be hoodwinked into accepting 
the sort of parliamentary representation that was provided for under the Representation 
of Natives Act of 1936.3 It has been argued in Chapter 4 that the Langa residents' 
dependence on Molteno was not because they approved of the existence of such 
institutions. Instead this was a strategy which they used to their benefit. 
African political responses manifested through community battles over forced 
removals, rents, bus fares, living and housing conditions, democratic participation in 
governing structures, and pass laws did not always meet with quantitative success 
mainly because of the repressive nature of the state. Nor did the protests lead to a 
qualitative upliftment of their social and material conditions. 
1.Philip, 'Mitchell's Plain', 46. 
2.Philip, 'Mitchell's Plain', 46. 
3.The Act provided for the election of five white 
representatives only by qualified Africans in the Cape on a 
separate roll, three in the House of Assembly and two in the 
Cape Provincial council. Provision was also made for the 
election of four whites to represent Africans in the Senate 
as well as for the establishment of a Native Representative 
council to serve only in an advisory capacity. The later 
would include African members indirectly elected. 
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Moreover, these responses were not 'reflex responses to urban problems, but concerted 
actions that grew out of community and class ties, political consciousness and 
organisation' .4 In spite of the impresssive mobilisation around these issues it was 
disheartening to note that 'at the end of the day when the euphoria of protest has died 
down things remain as they were, or more often than not, worsen'. 5 
Be that as it may, we can single out the struggles over the beer hall question in Langa 
as a poignant example of the successes that the ideology of protest and resistance 
scored. The absence of a municipally-sponsored beer hall and, more so, the non­
participation of the Council in trading activities even to this day, suggests how 
resistance and protest were employed as offensive strategies to challenge the local 
authority against going ahead with the introduction of such schemes. There is, today, 
no beer hall in Langa except the now popular taverns owned by African entreprelJr>t.Ts. 
Mention of the municipal beer hall still conjures up in the minds of some residents the 
image of a "drinking cage" and a place where the youth could quite easily be found 
wallowing in the pools of social decadence. 6 It is little wonder that the beer hall which 
the Cape Town City Council had eventually erected between 1965 and 1966 became a 
target of physical attack during the ..:~tudent ,tprisings of 1976. 
It is common knowledge that the peoples' non-violent protests failed to stifle the 
implementation of the apartheid scheme in 1948 by the Nationalist Party Government. 
The Apartheid State became increasingly repressive in order to legitimise its reign and 
this in turn intensified the resistance capacity of the Africans. The people of Langa 
developed an "accumulated heritage of resistance" since the days of Ndabeni which no 
amount of repression could break. This bountiful wealth of resistance did not remain 
dormant. Confronted by increasing state controls and ferocious repression, the people 
of Langa armed with their "collective memory of resistance" engaged in more daring 
4.Cooper, 'Urban Space, Industrial Time and Wage Labour in 
Africa', 34 
5.M.Francis, "'The Past is Theirs, The FutUre is Ours" - A 
study of the United Democratic Front in the Western Cape', 
(B.A. Hons. thesis, University of the Western Cape, 1984), 2 
6.Interview with Mr.Galo, 24 Aug. 1991. 
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scenes of struggle especially against the pass laws. The period 1943-1946, had 
witnessed an ever mounting resentment against the pass laws country-wide and we saw 
how langa Township distinguished itself during the Anti-Pass campaigns. langa 
remained the vanguard in the continual struggle against passes and pass legislation. 
This period, again, witnessed an increase in militancy by women in langa and Cape 
Town with Mrs. Siqwana and Mrs Bhola taking the lead in the anti-pass campaigns. 
The same women and many more carried over the same tradition of resistance into the 
second phase of the anti-pass campaigns between 1955 and 1959. 
At the beginning of the 1950s, the Nationalist Government passed a series of repressive 
influx control legislation which was mainly targeted on women. The first one was the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 which was 'principally concerned with 
establishing political/administrative control over squatting in peri-urban areas by 
Africans seeking or already in employment in adjacent towns'. Then in 1952 two Acts 
were passed viz. the Native Laws Amendment Act No.54 and the Abolition of Passes 
(and Co-ordination of Documents) Act. 7 This aimed at bringing in women into the 
influx control system. From 1953 the State intensified raids on "illegal" squatters and 
particularly African women. 8 
In 1956 the Government started forcing African women to carry reference books. Both 
actions on the part of the State gave rise to intense resistance by local African women. 9 
A series of anti-pass campaigns took place in the Western Cape between 1955 and 
1959. The campaigns culminated in the massive anti-pass demonstration of 21 March 
1960. The demonstration received widespread support in Langa, Nyanga Township 
and Windermere. langa served as the central locus of this protest. What symbolised 
7.J.C.Cole "When Your Life is Bitter You Do Something" Women 
and Squatting in the Western Cape, - tracing the origins of 
Crossroads and the role of women in the struggle', in 
D.Kaplan (ed.), South African Research Papers, (Dept. of 
Economic History, Univ. of Cape Town, June 1986) 31. 
8.Cole, "When Your Life is Bitter You Do Something", 32. 
9.B.Kinkead-Weekes, 'A Brief History of Local Resistance to 
Apartheid: 1948-1960', (unpub. paper, Workshop on the 
Western Cape, Univ. of Cape Town, 6 Dec. 1984), 26 
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the significance of Langa as a flash-point in the anti-pass/resista..'1ce campaign, was the 
killing and wounding of 4 people and about 49 people respectively when police broke 
up a gathering of 6000 people outside the bachelor quarters on 21 March. tO Moreover, 
it was from Langa that the biggest crowd of 30 000 in the protest history of the 
Western Cape marched to the city centre on Wednesday 30 March 1960. 11 Thus it has 
been said 'the events of March 1960 came closest to representing a crisis for the South 
African state in its political capital, Cape Town'.I2 
Langa never lived up to its status as "the torch-bearer of decent housing" as the Council 
officials designated it. By African standards at that time, the economically well-to-do 
residents could not, legally, buy or own houses anywhere outside Langa as we saw in 
Chapter 6. Hence, the desire and incentive for "upward social mobility" remained a 
remote possibility. Protest against such hindrance was taken up by the ANC in the 
1940s. However, while there is not much that has changed in Langa in terms of the 
infrastructure today, a visitor to the township today would be struck by the uneven 
housing development that has taken place over the years. Those few residents who can 
be referred to as the middle-class have gone ahead to extend and modernise their houses 
in spite of the fact that the yards are quite small. However, this has not been the same 
for those who until now live at the barracks and the one-roomed special quarters 
because there just isn't space to extend the buildings. The fact that such buildings have 
mushroomed is in itself a gesture of protest and defiance to, and a manifest subversion 
of, the local authority's housing policy. 
This study has also endeavoured to show that the Langa community was not inherently 
prone to protest and resistance. Rather, it was because of the forces that were brought 
to bear on them (the residents) by the dominant classes which dictated the nature of 
such a response. Even today, because there has been very little qualitative 
10.Lodge, Black Politics in south Africa, 216 
11.T.Lodge, 'The Cape Town Troubles', Journal of Southern 
African Studies, (vol.4, no.2, April 1978), 216. 
12.Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, 210. 
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transformation in the peoples' material and political conditions one can still witness 
their resolve to have this transformation take place. With South Africa on the 
threshold of a new political dispensation, one can only hope that the life of protest and 
resistance will come to an end and Langa and similar townships will have the chance to 
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source: Medical Officer of Health Annual Reports 
Notes: 
1927: figures only provided for male, female 
other years: Adult Male, Adult Female, Children 
I Langa I Langa I LangaI Langa Ndab. Ndab. Hen , Women, Chn 'Total Men Women 
1927 231 2 ! 233 I 3980 1005 
1928 611 160 i 189 I 960 4649 564 
1929 808 , 257 275 1340 2714 505 
1930 808 25:;7 275 1340 2714 505 
1931 1161 326 I 334 1821 I 1835 I 493 I 
1 345 \ 990 
I 
1932 1236 371 1952 I 477 
I r 
I1933 1512 364 I 428 2304 I 346 443 
1934 1937 I 416 ! 562 2915 265 368 
1935 1787 ! 515 844 
I 
, 3146 123 180 
I 
1936 2106 I 634 1171 3911 26 29, 




1938 I, 3321 I 791 5570 " 
I1939 3372 832 I 1459 5663 I 
1940 I 3655 I 874 : 1509 6038 
\ 3757 
I I 
1941 " 889 I 1559 6205 
l 4276 I 1 I1942 1134 I 1824 7234 
1943 I 4372 : 1169 I 1996 7537 I! 
I II 
1944 I 4417 
" 
1209 2058 7684 
: I
1945 i 4453 I 1254 2142 7849 I 
1946 I 1289 
~ 
4671 2200 8160 , I 
11377 
I 
I 10517 \ I1947 6613 , 2527 I 
1948 6312 I 1397 1 2750 10459 I 
, 
1949 6518 I 1414 2913 10879 





















































A. UNPUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES 
Official Sources 
Cape (Government) Archives (CA) 
Municipality of Cape Town: Archives of [he Town Clel* 
3/CT 114/6/6/41111-2 Native Affairs Sub-Committee, Minutes, 1937 1940. 
3/CT 114110111111-15 Native Affairs Committee, Minutes, 1922 -1950. 
3/CT 411111111 - 3/CT 4/1/511277 Correspondence Files, Langa, 1924-1949. 
3/CT 4/21111/334-807 Native Affairs, Langa Township, 1924 - 1948. 
3/CT 4/2/1/3/1022 Langa. Ethiopian Church of South Africa, 1940. 
3/CT 4/211/3/1152 Plans of proposed alterations and additions to 25 
shops, additions to existing and new lavatory blocks, 
creche and clinic, Langa Native Township 
Bokmakirie, Athlone, 1943. 
3/CT 4/211/311154 Proposed drainage, Langa. 
3/CT 4/2111311303 Damp floors, Shop MQ18, Langa; Cape Town 
Corporation. 
3/CT 4/211/4/2 Langa Township. Seventh Development Scheme, 1940 
- 1941. 
3/CT 4/311 /306 Langa Native Township, supply to, 1940 - 1944. 
3/CT 4/3/1 /309 Langa Native Township , supply to, 1923 1940. 
3/CT 4/3/11789 Langa Housing. Communal Kitchen 
Boiler, 1943 - 1946. 
Cocbron 
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3/CT 4/3/1/789 	 Steam Heating Equipment, 1942 - 1946. 
Attorney General 
AG 17659, Ref 1849 	 Langa, Illicit Liquor Traffic, 1908. 
Cape Provincial Administration 
PAS 2/477, Ref L19/L/65 	 Cape Town Division. Second Development Scheme at 
Langa Township, 1925 - 1935. 
PAS 2/603, Ref L19/C/237 	 Cape Town Municipality. Re: Test Case Langa 
L.'1cation, 1930. 
Intermediate Archives 
Administration of Western Cape 
AWC 3/1, NO.3 Monthly Reports, 1945 - 1949. 

AWC 3/21, No. 57 Docks Compound, 1926 - 1949. 

AWC 3/23, No. 201 Disturhances at Langa, 1947 - 1949. 

A WC 3/26, No. 228 Fingo Celehration Memorial 1943 1949. 

AWC 3/27, No. Ib Historical Background to the Developm.ent of Langa 

(General), 1928 - 1949. 
AWC 3/28, No. 56 Hostels - Stakeshy-Lewis, 1926 - 1949. 
AWC 3/38, No. 47 Langa Community Centre, 1948 - 1949. 
A WC 3/42, No. 158 Langa Advisory Board (Regulations), 1945 - 1949. 
AWC 3/43, NO.5 Married Quarters, 1940 1941. 
A WC 3/44, No.6 Main barracks, 1939 - 1949. 
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AWC 3/47, No. 39 

AWC 3/47, No. 58 

AWC 3/49, No. 229 

AWC 3/49, No. 34 

AWC 3/51, No. 208 

AWC 3/52, No. 131 

AWC 3/53, No. 185 

Awe 3/57, NO.7 
AWC 3/58, No. 27 

AWC 3/60, No. 69 

AWC 3172, No. 44 

AWC 3175, No. 132 

A WC 3176, No. 230 

Notices for information general, 1944 - 1949. 

Nyanga Bantu Township, 1946 - 1949. 

N t'iikana Memorial Celebrations, 1948 - 1949. 

Public transport services, 1946 - 1949. 

Proclamations, 1926 1949. 

Removal of Bantu into Townships, 1938 - 1949. 

Registration of Bantu (Anti-pass Movements), 1945 ­
1949. 

Sports field - sporting amenities, 1937 - 1949. 

Schools: Langa/ Guguletu, 1939 - 1949. 

Vigilance Association, Langa, 1941 - 1949. 

Welfare - Langa Administration, 1946 - 1949. 





University of Cape Town Manuscripts and Archives (MA) 
Molteno Papers 
Langa Constituency Files, 1937 - 1948 
MP BC 579: A7.1441 1761 
MP BC 579: A24.1 - 1227 
Parliamentary Files, 1937 - 1948 
MP BC 579: B 9.1 - 53 
MP BC 579: BILl - 86 
MP BC 579: B12.1 - 31 
MP BC 579: B25.1 - 64 
MP BC 579: B28.1 67 
Monica Wilson Papers 
BC 880 Interviews and Note Book(s) 
Interviews conducted by M. Musemwa 
25 July 1991 Mr Bernard Nozeu 
24 August 1991 Mr Fisher Gallo 
31 August 1991 Mr Ntlihuntshe, Mr Zandi 
5 Septemher 1991 Mr E. Price Suqwana, Mr Koho, Ms Sporty 
Ngwevela, Ms Gertrude Ngxolo 
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B. PUBLISHED OR PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES 
Official Publications 
G 68 E2 	 Native Affairs Department. Report on Social, Health 
and Economic Condition of Urban Natives, 1942. 
(Chairman: D.L. Smit) 
G 682 VC3 	 c. W. Slarke (Inspector of Urban Locations). 
Inspection of Conditions of Native in the Cape 
Peninsula, 1943 
UG 33/1945 	 Report of the Cape Coloured Liquor Commission, 
1945. (Chairman: R. Meaker) 
Cape Town Medical Officer of Health Annual Reports, 1926 - 1950 
Report of the Native Affairs Commission 1941 
Report of the Native Affairs Sub-Commission July 1939 
Unofficial Publications 
Bantu Forum 1943 - 1945 
Cape Argus 1929 - 1947 
Cape Times 1927 - 1935, 1965 
Inkokeli ya Bantu 1941 
Inkululeko 1944 - 1947 
Race Relations News 1947 
The Guardian 1939 - 1948 
The South African Outlook 1941 
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C. PUBLISHED SECONDARY SOURCES 

Alexander, N., 'Aspects of Non-Collaboration in the Western Cape 
1943-1963', Social Dynamics Vol. 12, No.1 (1986). 
Ayliff, J. and J. Whiteside, History of the Abambo Generally Known as Fingos 
(Cape Town, 1962). 
Baines, G., 'The Control and Administration of Port Elizabeth's 
African Population 1834-1923', Contree- Journal of 
South African Urban and Regional History No. 26, 
October 1989. 
Bekker, S. and R. Humphries, From Control to Confusion: The Changing Role of 
Administration Boards in South Africa: 1971-1985, 
Occasional Paper No. 29 (Rhodes University, 
Grahamstown, 1985). 
Bickford-Smith, V., 	 'A "Special Tradition of Multi-Racialism"? 
Segregation in Cape Town in the Late Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Centuries', in W.G. James and M. 
Simons (eds), The Angry Divide: Social and 
Economic History of the Western Cape (Cape Town, 
1989). 
Bloct" R. and P. WiLldnson, 	 'Urban Control and Popular Struggle: A Survey of 
State Urban Policy 1920-1970', Africa Perspective 
No. 20 (1982). 
Bonner, P., et al (eds), 	 Holding their Ground: Class, Locality 
and Culture in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century 
South Africa (Johannesburg, 1989). 
Bozzoli, B., 	 'Popular History and the Witwatersrand', in B. 
Bozzoli (ed), Labour. Township and Protest: Studies 
in the Social History of the Witwatersrand 
(Johannesburg, 1979). 
Bozzoli, B., 	 'Class, Community and Ideology in the Evolution of 
South African Society', in B. Bozzoli (ed), ~ 
Community and Conflict, South African Perspectives 
(Johannesburg, 1978). 
Bradford, H., 	 "'We are now the men": Women's Beer Protest"} in 
the Natal Countryside, 1929', in B. Bozzoli (ed), 
Class. Community and Conflict, South African 





Colson, E. and T. Scidder, 
Cooper, F., 
Cooper, F. (ed), 
Cuthbertson, G. c., 
Davenport, T.R.H, 
Davenport, T.R.H., 
Davenport, T. R. H., 
Dewar, D. et al., 
'Land and Liheration: Popular Rural Protest and the 
National Liheration Movement", in South Africa 1920­
1960' in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds), The Politics 
of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century 
South Africa (London, 1987). 
Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary. A 
Political Biography (London, 1975). 
'''When Your Life is Bitter You Do Something": 
Women and Squatting in the Western Cape - tracing 
the Origins of Crossroads and the Role of Women in 
the Struggle' in D. Kaplan (ed), South African 
Research Papers (Department of Economic History, 
University of Cape Town, June 1986). 
For Prayer and Profit: The Ritual, 
Economic, and Social Importance of Beer in Gwemhe 
District, Zamhia 1950-1982 (California, 1988). 
'Urban Space, Industrial Time, and Wage Lahour in 
Africa', in F. Cooper (ed), Struggle for the City: 
Migrant Lahour, Capital and the State in Urhan Africa 
(London, 1983). 
Struggle for the City: Migrant Lahour, Capital and the 
State in Urhan Africa (London, 1983). 
'A New Town at Uitvlugt: The Founding and 
Development of Pinelands 1919-1948', in C. C. 
Saunders et al (eds), Studies in the History of Cape 
Town Vol. 1 (Cape Town, 1979). 
'Historical Background' in M. Swilling et al (eds), 
Apartheid City in Transition (Cape Town, 1991). 
The Beginnings of Urban Se&regation in South Africa: 
The Natives (Urhan Areas) Act of ] 923 and it'" 
Background (Grahamstown, 1971). 
'Rhodesian and South African Policies for Urhan 
Africans: Some Historical Similarities and Contrasts', 
Rhodesian History 3 (1972). 
Responses and Policies in Four Case Studies, Kenya, 
Zamhia, Tanzania and Zimhahwe (University of Cape 
Town, 1982). 
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Duhow, S., Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in 
South Africa 1919-36 (London, 1989). 
Epstein, A.L., Politics in an Urhan African Community (London, 
1923). 
Freire, P., Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Great Britain, 1972). 
Gann, L.H., 'Changing Patterns of a White Elite: Rhodesia and 
other Settlers', in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds), 
Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: The History and 
Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960, Vol. 2 
(Cambridge, 1970). 
Gargett, E., The Administration of Transition: African Urhan 
Settlement in Rhodesia (Gwelo, Zimhabwe, 1977). 
Go!din, 1., Making Race: The Politics and Economics of 
Coloured Identity in South Africa (Cape Town, 1987). 
Granelli, R. and R. Levitan, Urban Black Housing: a Review of Existing 
Conditions in the Cape Peninsula with some 
Guidelines for Change (Urhan Problems Research 
Unit, University of Cape Town, 1977) 
Hellman, E., Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa (Cape 
Town, 1949). 
Hindson, D., Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat 
(Johannesburg, 1987). 
Hirson, B., Yours for the Union: Class and Community Struggles 
in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1989). 
Hofmeyer, W., 'Rural Popular Organisation Problems: Struggles in 
the Western Cape, 1929-1930', Afri~a Perspective 
No. 22, 1983. 
Karis, T. and G.M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of 
African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964, Vol. 2 
(California, 1973). 
Kinkead-Weekes, B., 'Donald Molteno and the Politics of "Native 
Representation" in Cape Town, 1936-1948', South 
African Historical Journal 25 (1991). 
Kuper, L., An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in 
South Africa (Yale University Press, 1965). 
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Kuper, L., 
La Hausse, P., 















'African Nationalism in South Africa 1910-1964', in 
M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds), The Oxford 
History of South Africa Vol. 2 (Oxford, 1971). 
'Drinking In A Cage: The Durban System and the 
1929 Beer Hall Riots', Africa Perspective No. 20 
(1982). 
'The Crime of Langa', Africa South April 1957. 
Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of South 
African Coloured Politics (Cape Town, 1987). 
'The Cape Town Troubles', Journal of Southern 
African Studies Vol. 4, April 1978. 
'The Destruction of Sophiatown', in B. Bozzoli (ed), 
Tovln and Countryside in tIle Transvaal: Capitalist 
Penetration and Popular Resistance (Johannesburg, 
1983). 
Black Politics in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1990). 
'States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historical 
Survey', African Studies Review Vol. 24, No. 23 
(1981). 
'Religion, Class and Ideology in South Africa', in 
M.G. Whisson and M. West, Religion and Social 
Change in Southern Africa (Cape Town, 1975). 
The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: 
Class, Nationalism and the State in Twentieth-Century 
Natal (Johannesburg, 1986). 
City Government: The Johannesburg Experiment 
(Oxford, 1938). 
'The Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance 
Ideologies' in P. Mayer (ed), Black Villagers in an 
Industrial Society: Anthropological Perspectives on 
Labour Migration in South Africa (Cape Town, 
1980). 
'The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in South 




'The Unity Movement: Its Legacy in Historical 
Consciousness', Radical History Review Vol. 46, No. 
7, 1990. 
'Historical Perspective of Urbanization', in R.A. 
Obudho (ed), Urbanization and Development in Kenya 
(Nairobi, 1981). 








Construction of Urban Space - An Overview of Some 
Aspects of Urbanization and Urban Space 
Construction in South Africa 1860-1970', in R. 
Haines and G. Buijs, The Stru~~le for Social and 
Economic Space: Urbanisation in Twentieth century 
South Africa (Durban, 1985). 
The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People 
in th.. n~",S Of 'Th..ir Tnrlenendenroo ITnhannesh""r.
."'....... .Iv li-'''''''...TL ..... ,u.".. ..... AI- 1""'''''' ,JUl. lJU1E"
.....u ..... '"". III 
1981). 
The Makin~ of Apartheid. 1948-1961: Conflict and 
Compromise (Oxford, 1981). 
'Class Struggle, Segregation and the City: A History 
of Sophiatown, 1905-40', in B. Bozzoli (ed), Labour. 
Townships and Protest (Johannesburg, 1978). 
'The Male-Female Dynamic Amongst Migrant 
Workers in the Western Cape', Social Dynamics Vol. 
12, No.1 (1986). 
'The Compound, the Reserve and the Urban Location: 
The Essential Institutions of Southern African Labour 
Exploitation', South African Labour Bulletin Vol. 1, 
No.4 (1974). 
The Urban African in Local Government: A Study of 
the Advisory Board System and its Operation, Fact 
Paper No.9 (South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 1960). 
'African Politics and the Cape African Franchise 
1926-1936', Collected Seminar Papers No. 24: The 
Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th 
















Time Longer Than Rope: A History of the 
Blackman's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa 
(Madison, 1964). 
ldeology and Popular Protest (New York, 1980). 
'The Stay-Away of the Brakpan, 1944' in B. BozzoH 
(ed), Class, Community and Conflict. South African 
Perspectives, (Johannesburg, 1978). 
'African Settlement and Segregation in Brakpan, 
1900-1927', in P. Bonner et al (eds), Holding their 
Ground: Class, Locality and Culture in Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Century South Africa (Johannesburg, 
1989). 
'The Creation of Ndabeni: Urban Segregation and 
African Resistance in Cape TO~1n), in C.C. Saunders 
et al (eds), Studies in the History of Cape Town Vol. 
1 (Cape Town, 1979). 
'From Ndabeni to Langa', in c.c. Saunders, et al 
(eds), Studies in the History of Cape Town Vol. 1 
(Cape Town, 1984). 
'Liquor, the State and Urban Blacks', in D. Davis and 
M. Slabbert (eds), Crime and Power in South Africa: 
Studies in Criminology (Cape Town, 1985). 
Donald Molteno "Dilizintaba - He-Who-Removes­
Mountains n (Johannesburg, 1979). 
'Location Advisory Boards', South African Outlook 
Vol. 70, April 1940. 
The Political Economy of Modern South Africa (Cape 
Town, 1987). 
'Birds in the Cornfields: Squatter Movements in 
Johannesburg, 1944-47', in B. Bozzoli (ed), Labour. 
Township and Protest: Studies in the Social History of 
the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg, 1979). 
The Concept of Christianity in the African 
Independent Churches (Institute of Social Research, 
University of Natal, 1958). 
Bantu Prophets in South Africa (London, 1962). 
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